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ABSTRACT 
This thesis argues that the tum to poetry undertaken by Schlegel, Novalis and 
HOlderlin during the period of early German Romanticism is largely a tum that 
seeks to culminate in a particular and comprehensive philosophical ascesis. While 
contemporary discourse (Frank, Beiser, Henrich, Bowie, Millan-Zaibert et al) has 
done much to uncover the philosophical underpinnings of early German 
Romanticism, and has secured the place of thinkers such as Holderlin within the 
history of German philosophy, the theme of poetry and philosophical ascesis has 
not been sufficiently explored. This thesis focuses on the determination with 
which Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin seek to expand philosophical 
understanding by integrating traditional philosophical reasoning with 
comprehensive poetic processes. This thesis argues that this integration exploits a 
symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy that enables a refined 
response to philosophical issues such as Fichte's theory of subjectivity, the 
discrepancy and reconciliation between idealism and realism, and the moral 
education of humankind. 
The strategy of this thesis is first to elicit the technicalities of the symbiotic 
relationship between poetry and philosophy, followed by an exploration of 
Holderlin's calculative approach to Fichte's theory of subjectivity that seeks also 
to achieve a metaphorical representation of an 'intellectual intuition.' In 
conjunction, Holderlin's theory of tones, plus the preparation and function of the 
poet, are explored. The thesis then turns to Schlegel's 'formula' that seeks to 
articulate the nature of God in relation to the poetic ideal. This is followed by an 
investigation into the moral education of humankind and finally an in 
investigation into Novalis' Magical Idealism. 
This thesis concludes that although there are differences between the kinds of 
methods and responses on which each thinker draws, all share a preoccupation 
with the unity of subject and object, and its role as an analogue for the unity that 
underpins all binary oppositions. The identification of the tum to poetry 
undertaken by Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin is seen to be based in an assertion 
of a symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy that itself constitutes 
an ascesis in which the subjective self integrates with the determination of the 
very 'thing' that it contemplates. 
There are two qualifications that apply to the research undertaken here. First, the 
focus is philosophical rather than poetic in that the concern is with philosophical 
theory rather than poetic success. Second, while the aim of the thesis is to identify 
a level of philosophical asceticism at work in the thinking of Schlegel, Novalis 
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NTRODUCTION 
The poem of the understanding is philosophy. 
It is the greatest impetus that the understanding gives itself about itself 
- union of the understanding and the imagination. 1 
This thesis argues that the tum to poetry undertaken by Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin during the period of early German Romanticism is largely a tum that 
seeks to culminate in a particular and comprehensive philosophical ascesis. The 
thesis particularly focuses on the means by which Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin 
seek to advance this ascesis through integrating comprehensive poetic processes 
in the service of philosophical objectives. The method of this particular 
integration exploits a symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy to 
enable a refined response to various philosophical issues ranging from the 
problem of subjectivity and the discrepancy between idealism and realism to the 
challenge of the moral education of humankind. This refined response, the thesis 
Novalis (1997) Logological Fragments, p. 5 
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further argues, is given motility from the very dynamic in the symbiosis between 
poetry and philosophy, and is conducive, above all, to an ascesis in which the 
subjective self integrates with the very 'thing' that it contemplates. Indeed, the 
unification of poetry and philosophy that grounds the ascesis is purposed 
ultimately to reconcile subject and object and in so doing also facilitates the moral 
development of humankind towards its highest determination, 'the ideal of being' 
(Novalis 2003, p. 165). 
In effect, Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin pioneer an early modem attempt to 
integrate the self and reality into a totality, primarily, in and through this 
particular symbiotic relation. Their method is to embrace what they hold to be a 
crucial symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy; an embrace, which 
they persistently present as a fundamental means for profoundly furthering 
epistemological, ontological and moral understanding2• The impetus for this 
embrace reflects Novalis' sentiment that '[t]he poem of the understanding is 
philosophy'. Moreover, Novalis argues that '[w]ithout philosophy a person 
remains divided in his most essential powers. He is two people - one who has 
understanding - and one who is a poet. Without philosophy, a poet is incomplete 
[ ... ] '(1997, p. 54). This approach contrasts with most philosophical treatments of 
the relationship between poetry and philosophy, which, at least in the history of 
2 I have listed here three modes of philosophical inquiry; however, ultimately, the 
ascesis transcends inquiry. Therefore, while it is useful to categorise the aspirations of 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin according to conventional philosophical categories, such 
as epistemological, ontological and ethical, the ultimate aim is for an integration of 
internal and external processes that will eventually take the place of the yearning for 
knowledge. 
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western philosophy, either prioritise the cognitive significance of conventional 
philosophising over poeticising (as in the Platonic view), or (as in the 
Heideggerian view) prioritise the revelatory significance of poeticising over 
conventional philosophising. 
A key objective of the thesis is to articulate the tum to poetry undertaken by 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin beyond its current voicing within contemporary 
philosophical discourse. Dieter Henrich, Frederick Beiser, Andrew Bowie, 
Manfred Frank and most recently, Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert, have done much to 
uncover the philosophical underpinnings of early German Romanticism and of 
Holderlin. 3 Indeed, they have succeeded in securing them a place between Kant 
Although Hi:ilderlin is more often than not included under the rubric early 
German Romanticism, this thesis works with the understanding that Hi:ilderlin is not, as 
such, an early German Romantic. The rationale behind this is that Hi:ilderlin was not a 
member of the Jena circle and despite the fact that his turn to poetry and his philosophical 
concerns are similar to those belonging to the Jena circles, he did not collaborate with 
other members of this group. Albeit that he had become acquainted with some key 
members of the early Romantic School, including Schlegel and Novalis, there is little 
evidence to suggest that a closer, working relation between them had ensued. Hi:ilderlin's 
time in Jena was short lived. He was there in late 1794 and again in 1795 and apart from 
being at one gathering of what must have been an early meeting of the new Romantic 
School, taking place at the home of Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, Hi:ilderlin clearly 
had left before the most productive years of the early German Romantics had begun. 
Instead, Hi:ilderlin lived somewhat unhappily in Frankfurt from 1796-1798 and then lived 
in Homburg from 1798-1800. One could speculate however, that ifHi:ilderlin had not left 
Jena so abruptly when he did, that is, if things were working out for him, employment 
and other wise, he may well have become more involved in the Jena circle. Like the other 
members of the circle, Hi:ilderlin too had attended lectures given by Fichte and he too had 
developed a relationship with Schiller who was at this time an influential lecturer at Jena 
University. Niethammer was also a friend or acquaintance to all those present at that early 
gathering including Schiller, Fichte and Novalis (Behler, 1993 p. 14). But the fact is that 
Hi:ilderlin did not remain in Jena and did not remain in friendly or professional contact 
with immediate members of the Romantic School except to have a number of his poems 
critiqued by August Schlegel, who incidentally spoke quite favourably of them 
(Constantine, 1988). Accordingly, we may be surprised to learn that Hi:ilderlin's work did 
not appear at all in Das Athenaeum, which may have something to do with Henrich's 
argument, that Hi:ilderlin' s poetry did not meet the criteria of romantic theory and that his 
poetics is 'entirely Fichtean' (See Chapter 2). Alternatively, it could be simply speculated 
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and Hegel in the history of German philosophy. However, the theme of poetry and 
philosophical ascesis implicit in the intentions of Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin, 
is unexplored. This is because contemporary discourse has for the most part 
focused on the initial task of validating early German Romanticism and 
Holderlin's work as legitimately philosophical4• Millan-Zaibert, for example, in 
her recent publication Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic 
Philosophy, 2007, seeks firstly to justify dealing with Schlegel as a philosopher 
and to rescue him together with early German Romanticism from persisting 
notions that are less sympathetic. In previous engagements, early German 
Romanticism was more often severely criticised. For example, in his In the Spirit 
of Hegel (1983), Robert C. Solomon makes these scathing remarks: 'Romanticism 
that the Jena circle was a somewhat elite circle, into which Holderlin simply could not (or 
would not) fit. 
4 Further, there are scholars who have not engaged philosophically with early 
German Romanticism as a philosophy, but who have nonetheless contributed in this 
direction by recognising a very real relationship between philosophy and poetry. Ernst 
Behler, for example, although a professor of comparative literature and with a biased 
view to see early German Romanticism as predominantly a 'Romantic theory of 
Literature' in the history of criticism, nonetheless gives some clear insight into its 
underpinning philosophy. The collaborated effort made in presenting the Kritishe 
Friedrich Schlegel-Ausgabe, with Hans Eichner is also an invaluable resource. Hans 
Eichner himself, in his 1968 publication of Friedrich Schlegel, besides giving a 
comprehensive historical overview of Schlegel's life and his place in the history of 
criticism, provides access and insight to some of the more intricate examples of the 
philosophical fragments that came out of Schlegel's notebooks. The formula for 
Romantic poetry for instance, which will be discussed in Chapter 5 is a philosophical 
gem insofar that it gives insight into the genuine attempt made by Schlegel in his 
aspiration to unify philosophy with poetry. This attempt Schlegel makes in response to 
philosophical issues, such as the epistemological and metaphysical implications arising 
out ofFichte's Wissenschaftslehre, and as far as this thesis is concerned, this attempt is a 
clear demonstration of assigning to the realm poetry, a philosophical function. 
Jochen Schulte-Sasse is another scholar while specialising in l 81h - 201h Century 
German Literature and literary theory has nonetheless made an excellent contribution to 
exposing the philosophical underpinnings of early German Romanticism in his Theory 
as Practice. A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, 
1996/1997 
41Page 
is an extremely limited movement whose main consequence in Germany was to 
render a once informative word completely useless (l 983, p. 97).' He adds that 
'[ ... ] Romanticism was a world view without a back bone, an inarticulate 
philosophy that needed structure and a spokesman' (p. 97). In a particular 
response to the Romantic's emphasis on genius, Solomon argues that 
'unfortunately, the group contained few, if any geniuses and their own theories 
rendered their cosmic consciousness as obscure pretentiousness' (p. 97). 
Although, these remarks are not entirely surprising since Solomon makes them in 
the context of presenting an exegesis of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. It was 
Hegel after all, who himself in his Lectures on Fine Art, announced that 'A.W. 
and Friedrich von Schlegel, greedy for novelty in the distinctive and 
extraordinary, appropriated from the philosophical Idea as much as their 
completely non-philosophical, but essentially critical natures were capable of 
accepting' and that 'neither of them can claim a reputation for speculative 
thought.' And while they had enough 'critical talent [to] put themselves near the 
standpoint of the Idea' and 'directed a spirited polemic against the views of their 
predecessors' by launching a new critical theory to deal with 'modern poetry', 
they nonetheless were lacking in 'a thoroughly philosophical understanding of 
their standard' (1975, p. 63). 
It is this type of rhetoric that scholars like Millan-Zaibert seek to negate. Indeed a 
key objective of Millan-Zaibert's most recent publication is precisely to 
demonstrate the depth of Schlegel's philosophy in order to advance further its 
5 I Page 
philosophical significance and herewith Schlegel' s status, in the history of 
German philosophy between Kant and Hegel. 5 
We can be thankful however, that in the process of evaluating the philosophical 
significance of early German Romanticism and of Holderlin's poetics, and 
particularly in the effort to extend the view of its significance from beyond 
literary and aesthetic discourses, that a more mature assessment of their 
philosophical achievements has been given thoughtful consideration. Of particular 
value is Millan-Zaibert's identification, for example, of a clear distinction 
between early German Romanticism and the idealism of their contemporaries, in 
particular, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Of value also is the manner in which 
contemporary discourse in general gives an extensive overview of how early 
German Romanticism and the philosophy of Holdetlih stands primarily as a 
critique of Fichte and more importantly how it stands uniquely, in contrast, as 
Millan-Zaibert demonstrates, to Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. Millan-Zaibert's 
argument falls in line with Manfred Frank (2004) who in his publication 
Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism argues that early 
German Romanticism, (including Holderlin this time), has up until recently, been 
misrepresented as a development of Fichte's idealism an effect of which is a 
generalised subsuming of early German Romanticism under the rubric of 
Richard Eldridge in his publication, The Persistence of Romanticism: Essays in 
philosophy and Literature, (2001), also fulfils this function partly, but as a defence of 
Romanticism in general, extending his concerns to British poets such as Wordsworth. 
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idealism6• It is quite possible that Dieter Henrich's interpretation of early German 
Romanticism will have contributed to this, with the theory that the 
'transcendental' nature of romantic poetry affirms the independence of the mind 
'from all finite states' (Henrich 2003, p. 226). In contrast, this thesis argues that 
the transcendental in early German Romanticism and in the philosophy of 
Holderlin is not a term that seeks, necessarily, to describe a mind free from all 
finite states. It is not, as such, a 'getting beyond', but rather a 'getting in-between' 
the cyclic unification and separation of opposites, such as the real and ideal 
(Schlegel, 1968, p. 134). Indeed, it is in the sustaining of the balance between 
these two processes, unification and separation, that the transcendental presents. 
The call for the unification of philosophy and poetry is in the recognition of this 
totality in which subject and object nominally exist. For this purpose, both 
Schlegel and Novalis refer to romantic poetry as 'transcendental poetry' in that it 
is a balanced mixture of poetry and philosophy (Novalis 1997, p. 56, Schlegel 
1968, p. 145). 
In terms of philosophically validating early German Romanticism and the 
thinking of Holderlin, it is safe to say that contemporary discourse has fulfilled its 
task. On the other hand, in terms of an adequate representation of what this 
philosophy is, contemporary discourse can do more. For this reason, this thesis 
Taken from the following excerpt: '[y]ou will now object that I am here parting 
from the predominant view of early German Romanticism as it is represented in academic 
research. When early German Romanticism, which included thinkers such as Friedrich 
Holderlin, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel, has been considered at all as an independent 
epoch in the development of modem thought, then it has only been in relation to thinkers · 
such as J.G. Fichte, F.W. J. Schelling and G.W.E. Hegel' (Frank 2004, p. 24). 
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seeks to 'thematise' the philosophical determinations of Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin, in particular the sheer profundity of their aspirations, in terms of a 
complete epistemological, ontological and moral ascesis and in so doing shift the 
attention away from the need to philosophically qualify their combined projects. 
To speak of the tum to poetry by Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin during the 
period of early German Romanticism in terms of a philosophical ascesis is to 
emphasise in particular the method that dares to seek a harmonious balance 
between the normally antagonistically viewed relationship between poetry and 
philosophy. What is also taken into particular consideration is Novalis' argument 
that '[t]he art of becoming a philosopher lies in method' and that the 'art of 
becoming a moral person - in ascetics' (1997, p. 73). This juxtaposition highlights 
the connection between philosophy and morality, which is such that one is unable 
to be realised, without the other: 'Without philosophy' argues Novalis, 'there is no 
true morality' and 'without morality, no philosophy' (1997, p. 53). In other words, 
they are mutually determined. This being the case, asceticism must then be as 
appropriate a method for the development of philosophy as it is for morality. The 
connection between morality and philosophy and poetry is that poetry is integral 
to philosophy as the medium through which the full potential of philosophy is 
realised. It is thus equally true to say that, poetry is integral to morality for the 
same reason that poetry is integral to philosophy and that morality, like 
philosophy is incomplete without poetry. The task of poetry is to enhance the 
philosophical, and thereby the moral education of humankind. While philosophy 
as an analytic system may not strictly depend on poetry, it is nonetheless 
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incomplete, as a cognitive system, without it. The same is true for morality - if it 
is interlinked with philosophy, then it is enhanced directly through the symbiotic 
integration of poetry and philosophy. Indeed morality, according to Novalis, has 
degrees of maturity - and that 'premature morality' is in fact 'detrimental to the 
human race' (2007, p. 62). 
In the early German Romantic view of the role of the poet, the moral education of 
humankind relies on the premise that the poet is already a 'truly moral person' 
(Novalis 1997, p. 57). In relation to the transcendental, the poet is 'the 
transcendental physician' and poetry is 'the great art of the construction of 
transcendental health' and 'mixes everything together for the sake of its great 
purpose of all purposes - the elevation of the human being above himself 
(Novalis 1997, p. 56). 
The theme of 'elevation' features particularly in the thinking of Novalis and 
Schlegel. Schlegel too argues for instance, that the point that 'raises us above all 
that is individual' where 'we go beyond ourselves, if we raise ourselves to this 
point' is precisely the 'transcendental midpoint' mentioned earlier, that exists 
between consciousness on one hand and the infinite on the other (Schlegel, cited 
in Schulte-Sasse 1997, p. 261). 
With this in mind, to hold the relationship between poetry and philosophy as 
symbiotic, is to acknowledge the heuristic value of the relationship, each to the 
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other, particularly in the common aim of advancing the extent of cognitive 
understanding, and thereby broadening the cognitive foundations upon which the 
moral development of humankind may emerge from this 'transcendental 
midpoint'. 
In practical terms, the symbiosis refines cognition through the mutually 
challenging dialectic that exists between the poetic and philosophical processes 
when enjoined in the manner envisioned by Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin. The 
enjoining of these processes characterises at the same time the enjoining of all 
other nominal binary oppositions, including the connection between idealism and 
realism, the determined and undetermined, the finite and infinite and, importantly, 
the self as individual and totality. Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin regard all of 
these nominally opposing binaries as correlating polarities, rather than as discrete 
absolutes. Reminiscent of the Ouroboros in which the joining of the head and tail 
of the serpent symbolises cyclic and eternal renewing, so too poetry and 
philosophy join in an eternal yet progressive renewing or, taking into 
consideration Schlegel's famous.fragment 116, they join in an eternal 'becoming'. 
Indeed the conception of the transcendental in Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin 
concerns the process of renewal. Novalis gives us the example of a flame in which 
consumption and renewal occur in a reciprocally determined way and compares it 
to the 'act of transcending oneself' an act in which the self is perpetually renewed 
(1997, p. 64). Novalis uses the flame analogy also to describe a philosophy that 
too renews itself through its own consumption. He tells us that ' [ ... ] all 
philosophy begins where philosophising philosophises itself - that is, where it at 
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once consumes (determines, compels) and renews again (does not determine, 
releases)' (1997, p. 64). That philosophy is equipped to persist in this manner is 
dependent on the enjoining of philosophical and poetic processes in the way 
envisioned by the early German Romantics. To this end, Novalis argues that true 
philosophy is the 'complete concurrence of idealism and realism, with the most 
complete independence', which in the end 'furnishes the complete proof of the 
correct methodology [ ... ]transformation of one into the other' (2007, p. 114). For 
Novalis, idealism and realism are the head and tail of the same phenomenon, a 
phenomenon upon which the revolutionised enjoining of poetry and philosophy is 
based. 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin agree that the tension binding opposing forces is 
manifest in each particular part of the 'whole'. In humankind the two archetypal 
oppositions are, on the one hand, a longing for the infinite or as Schlegel puts it, a 
'striving for the ideal' (Schlegel, cited in Schulte-Sasse 1997, pp. 22-23), which is 
at the expense of the particular and on the other, a tendency towards individuation 
and thus, finitude, which is at the expense of the universal. The reconciliation and 
the preservation of both, is the philosophical business of Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin. Indeed Holderlin identifies a third tendency that exist within us, and 
that is a tendency to seek a harmonious balance between the first two tendencies 
(1988, p. 74). However, whether or not this third tendency forms an inherent part 
of the human condition, which Holderlin understands it does, it nonetheless 
becomes the third possibility that all three thinkers explore, either implicitly or 
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explicitly, within the structures of poetry and, indeed, it is a tendency upon which 
they focus especially so that the moral development of humankind, can proceed. 
The utility of the term 'ascesis' 
The utility of the term ascesis in this thesis has something in common with the 
original GreekAskesis, in that it is facilitated through the_ disciplining of mind and 
body. However, while these disciplinary practices are usually held to involve the 
denial of the self, in the context of Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin's 
philosophical intention, the disciplinary means through which to achieve their 
ascesis is not at the expense of the personal self. Instead, it is through the 
integration of that personal self with the 'wholeness' of reality that the ascesis is 
achieved. While this requires a form of personal self-denial, it is not a denial of 
the physical self as such (albeit that it requires a mastery of the senses, as in 
Novalis' Magical Idealism) but rather a denial or overcoming of subjectivity. This 
is the crucial point that lies at the heart of the philosophical ascesis, which 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin seek. Indeed the overcoming of subjectivity is 
both the means and the end of this particular kind of philosophical ascesis and 
finds its best expression in and through the actual structures of poetry. To this end 
poetry and the poetic process, include the poet who through a combination of 
intuitiveness and diligence has reached, already, the highest ideal of objectivity. 
Having reached the highest ideal, the poet answers his vocational calling and 
facilitates an overcoming of subjectivity in humankind that will allow morality to 
emerge unimpeded in accordance with a more holistic will, namely, the will of 
God. 
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Putting the ' will of God' aside for the moment, on a practical level the challenge 
for Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin is to resolve the problem of consciousness 
they inherited from their engagement with Fichte's Wissenschaflslehre. The 
implication in Fichte ' s Wissenschaflslehre is that the whole is dependent on a first 
and founding principle that cannot, itself be part of the world that it ' generates ' ; 
this principle is the Absolute Self. In effect, Fichte wants the Absolute Self to be 
the founding principle upon which consciousness and nature depend but not so 
that a commitment to the traditional understanding of causality is required. Fichte 
thus advances the idea of'positing', a means by which the subject (consciousness) 
and object (nature) are established without losing the sense of a first and founding 
principle through which this occurs. The adverse effect of Fichte ' s argument is 
that it leaves a disjunction between the Absolute and the conventional world as 
established through the posited subject/object relation. Theoretically, the Absolute 
is not part of this 'world ', yet, this 'world ' cannot exist apart from the Absolute, 
since it is wholly dependent on the positing that occurs in and through the 
Absolute Self. 
While Fichte ' s theory of the Absolute is problematic in the Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin view, they nonetheless want to retain a sense of it even if it is un-
representable, as is claimed by all three thinkers. In light of Fichte's 
Wissenschaflslehre, what is at issue for them is the bridging of the Fichtean gap 
between the Absolute and subject/object relation or at least to subscribe to a 
theory that there is no ontological difference between subject, object and 




















the founding principle and work with the subject/object relation inherent in 
'world' - or the world that arises out of the subject/object relation which as far as 
Schlegel, Novalis, and Holderlin are concerned, is a relation in which the 
components are reciprocally determined. As such, this relation becomes for them 
a ground from which to proceed. Our three thinkers no longer need to contend 
themselves with an Absolute that exists independently as a founding principle 
outside this relation. On the contrary, the Absolute is now construed as this 
relation and neither do they need to contend with prioritising subject over object, 
or vice versa, for as far as they are concerned, these perspectival aspects exist 
together, equally, symmetrically and concurrently. 
However, this reinterpretation or reframing of the relationship between the 
Absolute and the subject/object relation does not eliminate the problem of the 
limits of philosophy in terms of grasping the relationship in its entirety, for 
consciousness remains obstinately in the way of this achievement. So long as 
there is consciousness, there is consciousness of something, and while ever this is 
so, the grasping of wholeness, in theory, is not possible. The challenge now, while 
it no longer lies with the reconciliation of the Absolute with its posited world, is 
nonetheless, to achieve unity, which is now dependent on the conciliation of 
subject and object. This is where the overcoming of subjectivity becomes a crucial 
initiative. However, what Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin want to avoid is a 
complete annihilation of the subject. On the contrary, their aim is to make the 
conciliation a cognitive experience. What this cognition in the end consists of is 
difficult to pin point, since the aim is also, as is already suggested, to attain a 
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mode of objectivity, which is possible only in and through the overcoming of 
conventional subjectivity. For this reason Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin are 
resigned to the fact that whatever knowledge is attained can only approximate the 
actuality of unity. Nonetheless, if it were not for the refined method achieved in 
the combining of poetry and philosophy, this approximation, would be less. 
Strategy 
In order to fulfil the objective of this thesis, namely to 'thematise' the project of 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin in terms of 'poetry and philosophical ascesis', the 
strategy is to discuss firstly the comprehensive nature of the symbiotic 
relationship between poetry and philosophy, and to reveal, in particular, how this 
integration works towards a common objective. Addressed in particular, is the 
motivation behind the early German Romantic call for the unification of poetry 
and philosophy with a view to demystify the actual process. Further discussed is 
the relationship between poetry and philosophy in terms of its symbiotic and 
heuristic significance. The strategy is then to focus on a key philosophical issue, 
namely the contradiction that, in theory, consciousness represents, in the face of 
the Absolute. The objective of Chapter 2 is thus to reveal Holderlin's project as 
one that deals with Fichte's structure of consciousness as advanced in his 
Wissenschaftslehre. Indeed Holderlin is determined to achieve in poetry what 
Fichte cannot achieve in theory and works meticulously towards a metaphorical 
representation, first of all, of a reinterpretation of the inherent contradiction that 
underpins the relationship between consciousness and the Absolute, and secondly 
to create an illusion of a pure awareness in which there is no differentiation 
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between subject and object. This pure awareness is a condition that Holderlin 
holds to be an 'intellectual intuition'. However, union of subject an object does 
not equate with an 'intellectual intuition' since, theoretically, 'intellectual 
intuition' precedes the consciousness in which subject and object originate. As 
such, it is inaccessible to the conscious mind, but through the careful manipulation 
of poetic structures (discussed in Chapter 3) together with an initial preparation of 
the poet (discussed in Chapter 4), Holderlin aims to reveal at least a simile of an 
'intellectual intuition', and herewith make it accessible. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
address further the intricacies of Holderlin's method including his carefully 
calculated tonal theory, which functions as a mechanism by which to achieve the 
above objective. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to Schlegel 's formulaic approach. In particular, it is 
Schlegel's 'formula', identified by Hans Eichner as one that encapsulates the 
entirety of Schlegel's poetics that is discussed. This chapter takes into account 
Eichner's argument but elaborates on the philosophical underpinnings that support 
Schlegel's formula. The significance of this chapter is that it holds Schlegel's 
formula up as a prime example of an attempt made at integrating philosophical 
and poetic processes to achieve equilibrium of ideal and real states. 
Chapter 6 explores the moral education of humankind, which is a concern for all 
three thinkers, but particularly for Schlegel and Novalis, who decisively work 
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towards its facilitation and indeed have a particular view of what authentic moral 
being is. 
Finally, in chapter 7 Novalis' 'Magical Idealism', a term that describes a method 
that seeks not only the integration of binary oppositions but seeks to explore the 
integration at its ultimate conclusion as a state of pure freedom, is investigated. In 
this state of pure freedom, Novalis suggests that by the power to the will, the 
Magical Idealist is able to contravene the conventional sequencing of causality 
and achieve a mastery over the senses. In this state, all cognitive processes are 
refined to such and extent that the Magical Idealist is capable of anything, by 
simply willing it. Magical Idealism exemplifies the relationship between poetry 
and philosophical ascesis in that the refinement of the inner and outer senses is 
achieved through a relinquishment of the subjective self in order to facilitate the 
emergence of a harmonious balance of body and soul. 
While the endeavour has been to give equal representation to each thinker, the 
actual number of chapters dedicated to each is not equal. The exploration of 
Holderlin's theories for example, covers an ample three chapters, while Novalis 
and Schlegel's are given one chapter each, and another in which their joint 
aspirations for the moral education of humankind are considered. However, 
Schlegel and Novalis are given a voice throughout the thesis as representatives of 
early German Romanticism, and are particularly present in the first chapter where 
the renowned call for the unification of poetry and philosophy is discussed. But 
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because Holderlin's project, while it certainly fits in with the overall theme of 
poetry and philosophical ascesis, has unique aspects to it that are not obviously 
aspects of the early German Romantic project, the task has been to give his 
thinking adequate space to show its relationship to the thinking of Schlegel and 
Novalis. In particular, Holderlin's tonal theory and his thinking on the poet's 
vocation feature as key aspects of his poetics and the philosophy that underpins it. 
Also, Holderlin's dealing with the concept of 'intellectual intuition' and the goal 
to metaphorically represent it in poetry is a goal not necessarily shared with 
Schlegel and Novalis, but nonetheless is critical to the overall development of the 
thesis that there is a shared kind of ascesis which each of these thinkers are 
working towards. It therefore has been necessary to extend the analysis pertaining 
to Holderlin's project over three consecutive chapters. 
This thesis concludes that although there are differences between the kinds of 
methods and responses on which each thinker draws, there is a shared 
preoccupation with the unity of subject and object and how this unity works as 
analogue, for the unity that underpins all binary oppositions. Accordingly, the tum 
to poetry undertaken by Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin is seen to be based on an 
assertion of a symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy that itself 
constitutes an ascesis in which the subjective self integrates with the 
determination of the very 'thing' that it contemplates. 
Finally, there are two qualifications that apply to the research undertaken here. 
First, the focus is philosophical rather than poetic in that the concern is with 
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philosophical theory rather than poetic success. Second, while the aim of the 
thesis is to identify a level of philosophical asceticism at work in the thinking of 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin, the full elaboration of such asceticism and its 
implications is not attempted. While meeting the thesis's objective through a 
substantial and penetrative examination of their philosophical and poetic 
aspirations, along with an examination of their particular methodologies, there is 
nonetheless, scope for an even more comprehensive critical engagement with each 
thinker's personal philosophy. 
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Chapter 1 
THE SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN POETRY and 
PHILOSOPHY 
Philosophy and poetry, the two most sublime powers in man, which even in 
Athens in the period of their highest ji·uition were effective only in isolation, now 
intermingle in perpetual interaction in order to stimulate and develop each other 
(Schlegel 1968, p. 7 4) 
'To ground is to philosophise; to think up [erdenken] is to poeticise '7 
(Nova/is 2003, p.169) 
One of the arguments of this thesis is that Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin by 
integrating poetic processes with conventional philosophical processes, seek to 
extend an understanding of epistemological and ethical concerns beyond the limits 
of theory, by combining two modes of inquiry, namely poetry and philosophy. 
The strategy of bringing the two modes of inquiry together arises primarily out of 
The translation of this particular phrase is taken form Jane Kneller's (editor) 
2003, Nova/is F1chte Studies. While 'to think up' may appear to be 'an awkward 
translation of the German Erdenken, because it is a literal one, it nonetheless works in the 
context of this particular chapter, since it alludes to the 'conjuring up' nature of poetry as 
opposed to the grounding nature of philosophy. This particular distinction between poetry 
and philosophy will be elaborated, on later in the chapter. Kneller has inserted the word 
'something' in the translation as in 'to think [something] up' in an effort to make the 
translation more meaningful in English. 
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the concern that, as Novalis puts it '[w]ithout philosophy a person remains 
divided in his most essential powers' that '[h]e is two people - one who has 
understanding' and 'one who is a poet' (1997, p. 54). In conjunction with this 
basic view of the human intellectual condition, is the concern for the moral 
development and education of humankind; that, if it is to progress, the gap 
between poetry and philosophy must be bridged. This is because poetry and 
philosophy represent, as Novalis claims, a division between two 'most essential 
powers' and therefore to engage in one without the other, or to engage with them 
separately, is to disregard not only their intimate association, but also their 
common goal - their mutual contribution to a deeper more unified cognitive 
understanding. The thesis argues that the relationship between poetry and 
philosophy, as Schlegel, Novalis and HO!derlin harness it, produces a clearer and 
complete cognitive unity (expanding the human epistemic, ontological and ethical 
sensibility) and shows this relationship to be profound in its effect and essentially 
symbiotic in its nature. This is especially true in recognition of their mutual 
capacity to overcome, each for the other, their respective epistemic limits 
(discussed later) and that their union works to their mutual advantage. 
This chapter seeks to clarify the nature of the symbiosis, which the thesis argues 
best characterises the relationship between poetry and philosophy as Schlegel, 
Novalis and Holderlin construe it. This chapter focuses specifically on the 
interconnection between technical aspects of poetry and philosophy as understood 
by Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin and seeks to show how poetry and philosophy 
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can combine to form a heuristic relationship that culminates, ultimately, in the 
kind of philosophical ascesis, to which Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin aspire. 
The focus is particularly inspired by two claims that Schlegel makes, that 
ostensibly appear to be at odds but then, after scrutiny, can be seen as revealing 
two modes of expression of a single process. The first claim asserts that 'poetry 
must commence where philosophy ends' (1968, p. 154) while the second claim 
demands that 'every art should become science and every science should become 
art; poetry and philosophy should be unified' (1968, p.132). These claims appear 
to be at odds since they give the impression of a confused intention concerning the 
relationship between philosophy and poetry insofar as establishing what it actually 
is or ought to be. The first claim is suggestive of a clear discrepancy between 
philosophy and poetry - that indeed, poetry must commence where philosophy 
ends because philosophy has, like a boat designed to get a person across a river, 
done what it was designed to do once it has reached the banks on the other side of 
the river. At this point poetry is to take the journey further into realms where 
philosophy is no longer able to proceed, or at least not in its traditional theoretical 
capacity. The claim thus gives the impression of a process that is sequential but in 
a way that suspends, or in fact discards the mode that is, for the time, not in use. It 
thus employs at one point the services of philosophy and at another point, the 
services of poetry, but not at the same time. 
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The second claim, on the other hand, calls for poetry and philosophy to be unified 
which gives the immediate impression of a fusion or merging of philosophy and 
poetry as processes to form a hybrid method. This perception sharply contrasts 
with the first one in that it implies a different relationship between philosophy and 
poetry. This time there is no sequential ordering as such but rather, the 
relationship between poetry and philosophy as particular modes of thinking occurs 
in a synchronistic and intertwined fashion. These claims are thus open to varied 
interpretations, insofar as the relationship between poetry and philosophy is 
concerned. One is simply that poetry and philosophy are united in a cooperative 
sense to achieve a common goal with each retaining their respective 
distinctiveness while another interpretation has philosophy and poetry forming a 
hybrid method in which component functions are recognisably both philosophical 
and poetic in nature. As the chapter unfolds, we will see that both positions, with 
some qualification, are equally valid. 
The strategy of this chapter is to demystify the claimed union between poetry and 
philosophy. The strategy includes considering what might be follow-up questions 
to Schlegel's claims, such as - where does philosophy end and where does poetry 
commence? Secondly, the strategy is to focus on the integration and 
interrelationship of key technical components of philosophy and poetry, as 
processes. As will be revealed, in the Schlegel, Novalis and HOlderlin view, there 
are some cognitive functions that are common to both poetry and philosophy, 
such as reflection and imagination. These two functions, ultimately serve the 
common objective of epistemological, ontological and ethical expansion of 
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humankind in that they steer the philosophical and poetic processes in that 
direction. On the other hand, there are aspects intrinsic to the peculiar method that 
poetry and philosophy embody, respectively, but these peculiarities only exist in 
the sense that the tail and head of the Ouroboros, for example, or 'two sides of the 
same coin', exist as peculiar, but no less, related aspects of the same entity or 
process. The ultimate position about any pairing of binary oppositions, whether 
they are processes, products of processes or modes of being, that Schlegel, 
Novalis and Holderlin take, is to hold the oscillation between them in a 
harmonious balance. This is the key to the ascesis - to which Schlegel, Novalis 
and Holderlin aspire. 'Concept' and 'intuition', for example, are products of 
philosophical and poetic processes and exhibit a similar inter-functional 
relationship, when viewed as operating as aspects of the same totality. The 
exploration of 'concept' and 'intuition' reveals an intimacy that reflects the very 
nature of the symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy. Finally, the 
concept of 'intellectual intuition' will be discussed as an idea that is derived at 
from philosophical processes, and as an idea that characterises the ultimate 
connection between intuitive and intellectual (rational) awareness. This is 
important because poetry and philosophy in themselves, exemplify the intuitive 
and the intellectual, respectively. 
Demystifying the Romantic call to unify poetry and philosophy 
Millan-Zaibert points out in her recent publication Friedrich Schlegel and the 
Emergence of Romantic Philosophy - that the 'early German Romantics were 
seeking to redefine the categories of poetry and philosophy and hence they 
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employed unconventional expression of their ideas' (2007, p. 5). The 
unconventional expression Millan-Zaibert refers to is the manner in which 
Schlegel and Novalis convey ideas in fragments of text that are devoid of 
philosophical argument, in which case it is the medium that is appropriated. 
However, the intention behind the unification of philosophy and poetry runs 
deeper than the fragmentary nature of 'fragments' conveys. Indeed, the 
philosophical issues at stake are themselves incorporated into the structures of 
poetry in hardly a haphazard and fragmented way but according to a calculable 
process. The intention is to appropriate the method so that it holds the key, 
simultaneously, to both the problem and to the solution. As we will see in the 
discussion that follows, the underlying motivation for the union between poetry 
and philosophy is to strengthen rather than weaken the respective methods of 
poetry and philosophy and is obviously for the strategic purpose of achieving 
improved epistemological and, consequentially, ethical outcomes. Importantly 
what this means for poetry is that its epistemic purpose is now merged with the 
epistemic purpose of philosophy, whereas previously its purpose may have been 
predominantly confined to literary and aesthetic appreciation. Traditional 
philosophy too, is put to trial, as it is required to admit of its limits and negotiate 
with poetry a path for the advancement of its own epistemic inquiry. 
The interpretation of the call for unification of poetry and philosophy has two 
complimentary aspects: Firstly, there is an explanation of how the relationship 
between poetry and philosophy presents sequentially, albeit in a dialectic manner. 
Secondly, the relationship presents as a fusion, where philosophy and poetry, in 
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their integration augment each other to an extent that neither is limited by their 
traditional independence. 
If we take the broadest appreciation of the unification of philosophy and poetry, 
reflecting the first aspect of the interpretation, we can see that it consists in a 
move towards holism or what Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin identify as the 
formation of a new religion or 'mythology'. 8 Indeed, it is argued that philosophy 
and poetry as unified are 'nothing but religion' (Schlegel 1968, p. 154). In 
contrast, poetry and philosophy independently represent 'different forms, or 
factors of religion' says Schlegel ( 1968, p. 154 ). 
Indeed, these comments support the notion of a unification in which philosophy 
and poetry retain their respective and distinct functions. This point is strengthened 
in Novalis's Das Allgemeine Brouillon (Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia 
2007), 9 or the 'scientific Bible,' as Novalis himself calls it (2007, p. 99). Here 
Schlegel's Dialogue on Poet1y speaks enthusiastically about the poetry of the 
future as essentially mythological: '[w]e have no mythology' he argues 'but we are close 
to obtaining one or, rather, it is time that we earnestly work together to create one' ( 1968, 
p. 81. 
See also the 'Earliest Program for a System of German idealism': '[ ... ] we must 
have a new mythology but this mythology must serve ideas, it must become a mythology 
ofreason' (Cited in Schulte-Sasse 1997, p. 73). 
Das Allgemeine Brouillon is the title given to a collection of notebook style 
fragments reflecting Novalis's research activities between 1798 and 1799. The collection 
of ideas reflects Novalis' diverse interests which include various aspects of the arts and 
the sciences plus thoughts on ethics, politics, society and religion. The edition used as a 
reference in this thesis is the English translation by David. W. Wood, published in 2007. 
These notes were never published in Novalis's own lifetime but Wood reveals that 
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entries are made under various headings including 'Philosophy', 'Cosmology', 
'Pedagogy', 'Ethics' and 'Poetics' just to name a few. The idea behind Novalis's 
'scientific Bible' is to represent the 'real, and ideal' (2007, p. 99) in bringing 
together all aspects of human culture with a view to demonstrate their 
interrelatedness and to amalgamate them into a common curriculum that serves 
ultimately the moral development of humankind. Insofar as their individual 
capacity to contribute towards a common goal, namely to achieve a balanced 
development of human acculturation, is concerned, each activity is equally 
conducive to this cause. However when they function in isolation, these otherwise 
rational activities become, in a sense, dysfunctional. If we accept that Novalis's 
notes present as a prime example of 'romantic thinking' then it follows that the 
'unification' of poetry and philosophy, means something other than one mode of 
thinking losing its identity in the other, for throughout this collection of notes, 
poetry and philosophy are regularly referred to as distinct operations. 
However, poetry and philosophy were, at one point in time, more intimately 
associated; indeed philosophy, as Schlegel argues, is: 
Novalis's intention was to have these notes eventually published as a Romantic 
Encyclopaedia. 
In a recent review of this publication Jane Kneller (university of Colorado) 
argues that 'Taken as a whole, the notes represent the beginnings of a philosophical 
experiment that, if successful, would support the hypothesis that a unified methodology is 
possible for the arts and sciences' (2008) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews cited on 
http //ndpr nd edu/review cfm?id=l4068 accessed 12/12/08. 
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'[ ... ] the result of two contesting powers, poesy and praxis. 
Whenever these two powers completely penetrate one another 
and fuse, philosophy emerges; when philosophy breaks down 
again, then it becomes mythology or throws itself back into life 
(Schlegel cited in Schulte-Sasse 1997, p. 325). 
Following the argument of Schlegel's 'transcendental philosophy' (KAXll), what 
this suggests is that philosophy is the middle point between poetry and praxis, or, 
in other words, the synthesis of poetry on one side and praxis on the other. 
Schlegel makes another point that helps clarify what he might mean by these two 
opposites in particular, namely that 'it was out of poetry and laws that Greek 
wisdom arose' (Schlegel, in Schulte-Sasse 1997, p. 325).). We can thus assume 
that praxis in this instance is related to the more practical determination of law, 
which seems to match also Novalis's idea that there 'exists no genuine distinction 
between theory and praxis' (2007, p. 135). It is therefore the case that the 
synthesis between poetry and philosophy is more clearly represented as 
philosophy arising out of a fusion between law and poetry. 
In order that the dialectic continue, what needs to follow is the unification of 
philosophy and poetry, which in retrospect can be viewed as the unification of 
philosophy with a major progenitor to its own arising, namely, poetry. However, 
the fusion this time produces a sublimation of both - a transcendental poetry. 
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Novalis presents us with a similar scenario, (although for a different reason) 
regarding the mixing and separating of specific faculties - this time of 
'knowledge' and 'action.' In Das Allgemeine Brouillon, under the heading 
'PHILOSOPHY', Novalis argues that '[o]riginally knowledge and action are 
mixed - then they separate, and at their goal they should again be united, and 
cooperative, harmonious, but not mixed' (2007, p. 7). In this particular context, 
'united' exemplifies the relationship in which particular components co-exist 
harmoniously, and cooperatively, with each other, by virtue of their common goal. 
This excerpt highlights the emphasis on a common 'goal' which, for the purpose 
of this thesis, supports the vision of a uni-focused relationship, in which two 
distinct processes are working together to achieve a common objective. Novalis 
goes on to clarify his position by adding that '[o]ne will at once know and act in a 
reciprocal manner - know, how and what one does, do, how and what one knows' 
(2007, p. 7). What this amounts to is Novalis' 'living theory of life' (Novalis 
1997, p. 52) in which action and knowledge coincide and reflect each other. It is 
worthwhile, to give in full, the excerpt to which this last quote belongs, for it is in 
this passage where Novalis' expression regarding his aspiration for a unified 
process, are clearly raised. He begins with the 'first reflection' which is a poetic 
reflection (as opposed to a critical reflection); it is the 'wonder' 10, as it were, that 
gives rise to the philosophical method: 
10 For a notion of 'wonder' that is in accord with what is said here, see 'J. Malpas 
(2006) 'Beginning in Wonder, Placing the origin of thinking' in Philosophical 
Romanticism, Nikolas Kompridis (ed.) 2006, pp. 282-298. An interesting point that 
speaks (somewhat) to the above, although beyond the scope of this chapter to address in 
the main text, is as follows: 'Talk of wonder as the beginning of philosophy should[ ... ] 
be taken to indicate something about the character of philosophy as such, and so about its 
nature and limit, about that to which it is a response and so that to which it must be 
adequate' (Malpas 2006, p. 283). 
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The greatest problems occupy humanity earliest. On first reflection 
the human being feels extremely forcibly the need to unite the 
highest ends. As civilisation advances his attempts begin to lose the 
quality of genius - but they gain utility - whereby he is led into 
error - of generalising entirely from premises, and of pursuing the 
ambition merely to unite closer conditional terms. But it is 
inevitable that he soon notices the necessary deficiency of this 
method and looks for a possible way of combining the advantages 
of the first method with the advantages of the second, thereby 
completing both (1997, p. 52). 
The first method, is poetic - and indeed, it is 'the poet' argues Novalis, 'who ends 
the move as he begins it (1997, p. 54). 
Poetry and Philosophy as united and equal 
However in this chapter it is argued that poetry and philosophy are equally 
important and that the call for their unification reflects this. Novalis makes this 
quite clear, also, in the following passage: 
Just as philosophy strengthens the powers of the individual with the 
powers of humanity and the universe through system and state, 
making the whole of the individual and the individual the instrument 
of the whole - in the same way poetry functions in respect of life. 
The individual lives in the whole and the whole in the individual. 
Through poetry there arises the highest sympathy and common 
activity, the most intimate communion of the finite and the infinite' 
(1997, p. 54). 
With this in mind, it would be counterproductive to evaluate the distinction 
between poetry and philosophy in terms of a hierarchical relation. Indeed it is 
highly misleading to argue that in the early German Romantic context, art in 
general, is 'superior' to philosophy, as Frederick Beiser does in his The Romantic 
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Imperative, for example, where he argues that philosophy 'becomes the mere 
handmaiden of art' (2003, p. 73)11 • This is in fact a misrepresentation of the 
romantic imperative. While it is correct to point to a distinction between the 
respective capacities of each, it is incorrect to suppose that this difference points 
at the same time to a difference in value to the extent that it can be said one is 
superior to the other. It must be kept in mind that in the Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin context, both poetry and philosophy are manipulated to fulfil certain 
expectations, and the objective (epistemological and moral) that serves as the 
reason for this manipulation is in fact provided by philosophy. It follows that 
without the objective, the experience of the infinite that poetry can ultimately 
provide is incomplete. It is incomplete because without philosophy the poetic 
experience is ungrounded and thus can only be an experience for its own sake, for 
the sake of literature or for the sake of aesthetics. Philosophy thus retains its 
peculiar strength within the harmonious symbiotic relationship that this merger 
now clearly represents. Indeed as Schlegel points out, the function of philosophy 
is critical in that it must justify analytically and thereby prove that the Absolute is 
'indemonstrable' (Cited in Frank 2004, p. 187). It is precisely this 
'indemonstrability of the Absolute' that provides the precept and the impetus for 
poetry to commence where philosophy ends. In other words, poetry is utilised to 
push the perceptive process beyond the ongoing cognitive hiatus that presents, 
when analytic methods are at a point where only a synthetic intuition will enable 
the inquiry to proceed further. 
11 Although Beiser does acknowledge that for Novalis in particular, philosophy 
retains its significance: 'For Novalis insisted that, even though it cannot provide 
knowledge of the Absolute, and even though it cannot establish an infallible first 
principle of all knowledge, philosophy is still the source of regulative ideas that are 
crucial for guiding human action' (2002, p. 409). 
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Moreover, it is counterproductive to interpret the limits of philosophy in terms of 
a deficiency (even though, Novalis himself is quoted above, as using such a term). 
The limits of philosophy relate only to knowledge of the Absolute for which even 
poetry does not qualify. This is because in the early Romantic context, any effort 
made towards knowledge results always in an approximation. The argument that 
is developed in this chapter is that philosophy is not lacking anything in and of 
itself - it is what it is - which in terms of the W estem philosophical tradition 
amounts to a systematic intellectual processing directed towards epistemological, 
ethical and metaphysical outcomes, a processing that incorporates the use of 
analysis and argument. 12 It is theoretical in nature and dependent on formal 
structures of language for its operation. It is thus limited only insofar as language 
itself is limited, in that language cannot become what it represents. To transcend 
language is to enter into another realm, a realm that is not suited to philosophy. 
Poetry on the other hand, albeit dependent also on language and therefore 
arguably limited in the same way, can nonetheless create an opportunity in which 
current forms of language may be transcended, but not at the expense of 
meaningful cognition. In the Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin context, it is argued 
that poetry has the 'power' to develop the articulation of an hitherto unarticulated 
and therefore unconceived experience of knowledge. But that this is the case does 
not reflect necessarily a deficiency in philosophy, only its contingent limits at any 
given time, and to acknowledge that philosophy is contingently limited, affirms 
12 This is a claim that is not made without reservations however since the definition 
of philosophy in a broader context need not be determined at all by its method but rather 
by its outcomes. In the context of this thesis however, philosophy is defined in terms of it 
being a discipline. The romantics too maintain this distinction for they do not refer to 
poetry as philosophy despite the fact that poetry is now operating for the sake of 
philosophical outcomes. 
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no deficiencies, but reveals only something about the contingent capacity of 
analytically driven and logically constructed thought to 'represent', (limits which 
poetry, analogously and in its turn, encounters.) 
This is not to deny however, that Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin preoccupy 
themselves with a philosophical method, for which limits are an issue. Novalis, in 
his Logological Fragments I gives an account of the history of philosophy, for 
instance, in which he claims that philosophy is 'nothing but a history of attempts 
to discover how to do philosophy' (1997, p. 47). He alludes to what is further at 
issue by drawing a distinction between what he identifies as the 'essential' in 
philosophy and what is 'contingent'. Novalis argues that particularly in later times 
philosophy has become more contingent, an aspect of which 'includes the 
polemical side' (1997, p. 48). By this he means that an aspect of philosophy 
(which persists even more strongly today) consists of a 'refutation and repudiation 
of earlier opinions' (1997, p. 48). This manner of philosophising is also a 
contributing factor to what can be described as a 'density' of concepts that stands 
in the end to obscure the very thing it seeks to contemplate. What we are left with 
is a fragmented perspective that while it gives the impression of an expanded and 
progressive understanding, is nonetheless an expansion that creates distance rather 
than proximity to the kind of knowledge that is crucial to the early German 
Romantics. What presents further as an impediment is the systematic manner in 
which philosophers have endeavoured to prove certain propositions even though 
there is no ultimate proof for propositional truth. In this respect, logic represents 
the epitome of mechanical thinking, as the 'pure physiology of concepts' as 
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Novalis puts it (1997, p.51) and cannot do more than continue to associate 
concepts. Novalis draws a further conclusion about limits in that 'the logician 
proceeds from the predicate - the mathematician from the subject' and the 
'philosopher proceeds from the copula'. On the other hand, the poet, argues 
Novalis, proceeds from both the predicate and subject', but it is the 'philosophical 
poet' he says, who proceeds 'from all three simultaneously' (2007, p. 140). 'All 
three simultaneously' refers to a synchronised engagement of predicate, subject 
and the copula. If we think of the predicate as a conclusion, we can see how a 
logician needs to work systematically towards validating that conclusion. The 
mathematician on the other hand proceeding from the subject, starts with the 
premise, that which is given. The philosopher has a more encompassing task and 
works with associating the two while the poet proceeds from a place where 
premise and conclusion are already one. The point that Novalis makes concerning 
the philosophical poet provides us with a key with which to unlock the intricacies 
of the relationship between poetry and philosophy. To proceed from all three, 
namely from the predicate, the subject and the copula, as the philosophical poet is 
expected to do, is to proceed from an all encompassing totality to which the poet 
can neither add nor subtract but only work to sustain and clarify. In other words, 
the philosophical poet is what Novalis describes as the 'en etat de Createur 
absolu' (2007, p. 140). 
These sorts of claims (above) work to demonstrate that both poetry and 
philosophy as methods are limited. Admittedly, these limitations only become 
problematic in a context where there is an aspiration to achieve certain cognitive 
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outcomes that fall outside the 'normal' scope of each discipline. For example, for 
pure aesthetic and literary purposes, poetry does not need to conjoin with 
philosophy for it is adequate in and of itself in meeting its own literary or 
aesthetic criteria. Similarly, pure academic philosophy is adequate in and of it self 
to function as a: means to facilitate and review speculative theory. However, if 
there is to be any meaningful epistemological and ethical progress insofar as it 
may be realised through a social and political wholeness then the argument that 
we are dealing with is that this is dependent on the unification of poetry and 
philosophy. 
A final point before discussing particular technical details that ground the 
symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy as processes, is that despite 
the argument that poetry and philosophy function optimally when conjoined to 
perform a uni-focused function, poetry presents nonetheless as the heuristic 
'hero', so to speak, of the relationship. This is because poetry is asked to function 
in a catalytic (not superior) way to philosophy and ultimately it is within the 
structures of a holistic poetry that profoundly philosophical outcomes are 
achieved. Having said that, however, philosophy is regarded by Schlegel, Novalis 
and Holderlin as useful also to poetry - but on another level - in that it first of all 
provides poetry with a new direction by giving it an express purpose, which it so 
desperately needs in the late eighteenth century. Secondly, as Novalis argues, 
philosophy, indeed, makes poetry its hero (1997, p. 79). By this, he means that 
'philosophy raises poetry to the status of a principle. It teaches us to recognise the 
worth of poetry'. Novalis even goes on to say that 'philosophy is the theory of 
35 I Page 
poetry', that it 'shows us what poetry is, that it is one and all' (1997, p. 79). What 
we see here is a deliberate turn to philosophy, this time for the sake of giving 
poetry a status and indeed much philosophising is needed in order to make this 
status credible and sustainable. For this reason, philosophy does not fall off the 
romantic agenda. Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin want to promote the use of a 
revolutionised poetry, which will be, according to Novalis' personal account, 'the 
transcendental poetry of the future' (1997, p. 56). What is essential to this poetry 
is that it is consciously executed to be 'organic' according to 'organic' means. The 
term 'organic' here represents a critical aspect of romantic poetry in that it 
describes its very essence - that it is 'eternally becoming' (See Schlegel Fragment 
116). More is said about this concept in Chapter 5 when it is explained in relation 
to Schlegel's formula. However, whatever the essence of romantic poetry is or 
ought to be, the relevant point here is to make a connection with the future 
manifestation of this kind of poetry (which is seen by the romantics as 
revolutionary) and philosophy. While there may have been moments in the history 
of poetic achievement of which it could be said that the essence of romantic 
poetry is achieved, these nonetheless are unconscious episodes and therefore 
inconsistent. Novalis argues that it is Logology (which is another name for an 
open ended philosophical discourse) that will (referring to the poetry of the future) 
'necessarily bring about this revolution' (1997, p. 56). 
An important task of philosophy then is to articulate the function of the new 
romantic poetry, in reference to itself and by doing so expand the function of 
poetry beyond literature and aesthetics and importantly, to enable the poetic to 
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push epistemic and ethical understanding beyond what are its current limits. The 
task is thus also for philosophy to articulate its own status and function within the 
symbiosis. And, also separately as a facilitating mechanism that will usher in the 
revolutionised poetry. 
Balancing poetry and philosophy as complimentary 'powers' 
Thus far, we have seen that a useful way to interpret the philosophic/poetic 
relationship as a unity is to think of it as a conjoining of two distinct but 
nonetheless complimentary 'powers'. To speak of poetry and philosophy as 
'powers' opens up the possibility of seeing them as two modes of activity that are 
equal, or at least mutually complimentary, in terms of strength. This 
characterisation allows a casting of the relationship more as a reciprocal 
engagement in which each component gives to and receives from the other, 
equitably. Importantly, the combining of two powers gives rise to an increase in 
potency, which is precisely what Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin want to achieve. 
However, it is not the raw juxtaposition of the two powers that resources an 
increase in strength, but their harmonious balance. Indeed Novalis claims that 
'strength can be replaced by balance' (2003, p.191). This is then the task at hand -
to replace what are powers in their own right by balance of power that rests in a 
unified poetry and philosophy, in which neither power dominates but each 
contributes, equitably, to the representation of the totality. 
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The casting of poetry and philosophy as 'powers' comes form Novalis when he 
makes the claim that the 'power to think the universal is philosophical power' and 
the 'power to think the particular is poetic power' (2003, p. 91). Novalis 
concludes that the 'universal is the pure and simply already posited' while the 
'particular is the relative posited' and that 'the former is the sphere in which 
something is posited' while the latter is the 'sphere that is posited in the former' 
(2003, p. 91). While Novalis makes these claims in his Fichte Studies it is not 
entirely clear how these relate to Fichte's version of the underlying nature of 
reality, based on a first principle arrangement in which the Absolute Self posits 
itself in opposition to itself. Nonetheless, these claims serve as a useful model by 
which to demonstrate what the relationship between poetry and philosophy looks 
like. Indeed, what Novalis's survey suggests is that poetry and philosophy are 
already innately allied. Considering their relationship in terms of interconnected 
cognitive modes in which one provides the space for the other and the other fills 
the space of the other, gives insight into what Novalis seeks to convey as their 
mutual interaction. The mutual interaction links to the idea of a totality in which 
there exists a mutually determined relation between the whole and its parts. In the 
model provided by Novalis, it appears that the parts are contained within the 
whole, which can serve as a model for integration and at the same time provide an 
analogy for the 'inner' and 'outer', which are spheres like the 'ideal' and 'real', 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin seek to integrate. The 'inner' and 'outer', in 
particular for Novalis, represents the distinction and relationship between the soul 
and the body. 13 A further analysis reveals that the 'inner' relates to time while the 
13 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on the particular 
relationship between body and soul, it is worthwhile to foot note that Novalis in particular 
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'outer' relates to space and it is the 'body', argues Novalis, that 'is an individual 
that fills out space' while it is the 'soul' that 'is an individual who fills out time' 
(2007, p. 172). Further, it is in the filling out of space that space is created, and it 
is in the filling out of time that time is created. Novalis concludes that 'time is the 
inner space while space is outer time' (2007, p. 172). In other words, what 
Novalis wants to finish up with is a situation in which 'space and time arise 
simultaneously' (2007, p. 172). 
It is this final point that reveals the conceptual pairing of opposites as belonging to 
the same continuum. Poetry and philosophy too, belong to a continuum and 
indeed, are bound by it. An understanding of the nature of totality including how 
it functions becomes a crucial factor in the understanding of how poetry and 
philosophy operate in combination with each other and as distinct aspects of the 
same process. With regard to totality, the view that is maintained by Novalis and 
equally by Schlegel and Holderlin is that 'every totality consists of two parts [ ... ] 
of the positive and the negative - of the determined and the undetermined - of the 
real and ideal' and of the 'like and unlike' (2003, p. 91). We know that the aim of 
the romantic enterprise is to represent this totality albeit within the limits of an 
infinite approximation. It follows however that in order to represent this totality, 
the two aspects, namely the undetermined and the determined aspects, are equally 
represented. This feat is not possible if left solely for philosophy to accomplish, 
works with these concepts and the relationship between them, elaborately in his Notes for 
a Romantic Encyclopaedia. In relation to this thesis, body and soul characterise once 
again a particular dichotomy that while made up of two opposing parts, nonetheless are to 
be reconciled, in their harmonious balance. 
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since philosophy leads us only to one aspect of the totality. The same is true for 
poetry. It is thus required that the task of representation is shared between poetry 
and philosophy so that the possibility to represent the totality is optimised. 
In the following section, the distinction between poetry and philosophy is further 
clarified to reveal the cognitive benefit and purpose of their symbiotic and uni-
focused relationship. The specific technical details of their respective methods and 
the product of their methods will indicate also the limits of poetry and philosophy 
as processes and as ends (in themselves), apart from their special symbiotic 
relationship. Identifying the limits in tum will serve as groundwork that will give 
meaning and qualification especially to the heuristic nature of the symbiotic 
relationship between poetry and philosophy. What the poetic process is and how it 
compares with a philosophical process, are questions addressed in dealing with 
what the related technicalities are, in terms of the actual processes. 
'Grounding' and 'inventing' - philosophy and Poetry as processing a totality 
In terms of processing the totality, Novalis explains that there are 'two ways to 
look at things - from above downward or from below upward' and that 'through 
this switch what was at first negative becomes positive, and vice versa' (2003, p. 
172). Importantly, he argues that '[b]oth ways must be used at once' (2003, p. 
172). In respect to the poetic and philosophical processes, the looking up from 
below represents poetic thinking while looking downward from above that 
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represents philosophical thinking. This claim is made in keeping with the quote at 
the beginning of this chapter, namely, 'to ground is to philosophise' while 'to 
think up is to poetise.' If we accept this, then we can surmise further that 'looking 
from above downward' represents, the 'power to think the universal' (mentioned 
earlier) while 'looking from below up on the other hand represents the 'power to 
think the particular'(also mentioned earlier). Admittedly, this association is not 
intuitively obvious but it is an association that is worthwhile with which to persist 
for it provides a means by which to discern the complimentary nature of poetry 
and philosophy in the midst of the distinctiveness between poetry and philosophy. 
Philosophy is, in Novalis' view a 'grounding' activity, while poetry is presented 
as a 'creative' activity, since to think up [erdenken] means to conceive of 
something in the sense of 'conjuring up' or more precisely, inventing. Indeed, 
Novalis is explicit about this particular connection when he argues that the power 
of poetry is equal to the 'power of invention' (2003, p. 88). 
Further clues as to what 'ground' means for Novalis are found in the following 
claims - that 'the ground is the property of the world and the world is the property 
of ground' and that 'God is ground and world together' (2003, p. 135). Novalis 
further claims that 'ground and world run parallel to each other and divide 
completely equally' and that they are 'one - consequently also in the smallest 
part, in everything' (2003, p. 135). Again, what presents quite clearly is 
persistence towards an understanding of holism, which in this instance is referred 
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to as God. Despite the fact that there is variance within the whole, this time in 
terms of world and ground, that which is varied exists nonetheless in an intimate 
intertwining with other variants but within the expanse of a totality. However, the 
idea of God (and therefore the idea of a totality), in the Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin context is also considered to be the ultimate striving of humankind. 
Indeed, it is perceived as an eternal striving to become God. 14 As far as human 
existence is concerned, the focus is on achieving a balance between the interplay 
of otherwise opposing binaries, such as ground and world. 
The concepts of 'grounding' and 'inventing' are thus two further processes by 
which to regard the distinction and relationship between philosophy and poetry. 
However, it is crucial to understand that these processes (as poetry and 
philosophy, distinctively) are not disconnected but belong ultimately to a unified 
process. Indeed the structure that characterises the bond between grounding and 
building, serves well as a model by which to represent the symbiotic relationship 
between poetry and philosophy. 
Firstly, we will take note of Novalis's instruction that, both modes of operation 
'must be used at once' (2003, p. 172) and his advice that '[t]otality and partiality 
oppose each other' (2003, p. 172). Then, returning to the idea that to philosophise 
is to ground while to poetise is to think up, we return also to a place where the 
14 See Chapter 5, Schlegel's Formula and Chapter 6, 'The moral education of 
humankind' for an interpretation of God and humankind's striving to become God. 
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relational aspects between poetry and philosophy are revealed. With respect to 
philosophy, Novalis gives us a further clue when he asks the question 'What do I 
do when I philosophise?' to which he directly answers, 'I reflect upon ground' 
(2003, pp. 167-168). Novalis then makes the remark that 'the ground of 
philosophising is thus a striving after the thought of ground' after which he argues 
that 'ground is not however a cause in the literal sense - but rather a constitution -
connection with the whole' (2003, pp. 167-168). We are now faced with the idea 
that philosophy not only 'grounds' but 'reflects upon ground' and indeed the 
'thought of ground' for which philosophy strives is the same 'ground' that 
initiates this striving. Novalis however does not want to make 'ground' a first 
principle. Rather, the aspiration is to make 'ground' something like a constitution 
connected to the whole, yet not in a causal sense. For the purpose of clarification, 
the following model may be useful: if we think of the relationship between 
foundation and edifice, while the edifice connects to the foundation, the 
foundation is not its cause. The relation in fact is reciprocally determined. That a 
foundation is functional as foundational is dependent on the edifice and vice 
versa, the edifice is dependent for its being upon what is foundational to it. In this 
case, 'ground' is relative. 'Everything, like every ground' argues Novalis 'is 
relative. It is a thing in so far as its opposite is a thing' (2003, p. 140). He then 
goes on to explain that 'ground' itself, because of it is contingent in the manner 
outlined above, is also a thing and that 'every thing is contained in a higher thing, 
or a further - more extensive and intensive thing' (2003, p. 140). In which case, 
no matter what serves as foundational, or at least, what is perceived to serve as 
foundational, is in fact an integral part of the whole. To point to the beginning or 
end of what is foundational, or to strive to define what is foundational, as though 
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it is a phenomenon unto itself, is a counter-productive exercise since all parts of a 
structure are foundational in some relational respect to all other parts. 
In the next section the theme of integral relations continues, this time with the 
focus on two key components that are common to both poetry and philosophy. 
Imagination and reflection - common to both poetry and philosophy 
To develop further the theory that poetry and philosophy are variations of 
ultimately the same process, it is important to establish what the cohesive 
elements are. By the phrase 'cohesive elements' is meant, those binding or 
common elements that support the relationship as a continuum. These are the 
imagination and reflection. While the effect of the imagination depends on 
whether it operates in combination with the mem01y or the intellect to determine 
whether the process, at either end is operating poetically or philosophically, the 
effect of reflection depends on whether it operates with the intellect or the 
imagination. The ultimate aim however is for these to concur. Viewing Novalis' 
claim, that the 'poem of the understanding is philosophy' as comparable to a 
'union of understanding and the imagination' (1997, p. 54), we can see just how 
reflection is asked to function as a reconciliatory aide in the combining of the 
intellect and the imagination. Consequently, the union between poetry and 
philosophy is also clarified. 
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In what follows, is an attempt at elucidating these concepts in their respective 
combinations and effects, but since these concepts and relations are highly 
complex, especially in the early German Romantic context, it would require a 
more in depth inquiry well beyond the scope (and purpose) of this thesis to do 
justice to them. The main objective here is, again, to present these concepts and 
relations in a manner that will support the theory that there is an inherent 
interconnection between poetry and philosophy; a connection that can become 
more obvious, with a certain focus. In addition, the discussion concerning the 
function of reflection, in particular, touches on an aspect that relates directly to the 
overall thesis topic of poetry and philosophical ascesis, in that reflection 
facilitates the raising of the self to a 'better self (Novalis 1997, p. 60). Moreover, 
reflection is inherent in the process that culminates in a 'philosophy of 
philosophy' and 'poetry of poetry'. The latter in particular, is a goal for romantic 
criticism, which, while it is beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter, is 
nonetheless dealt with in the attached footnote (see below). 15 
IS While a discussion concerning the concept ofreflection as 'romantic criticism' is 
beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter it is nonetheless worthwhile to include in a 
footnote, the fundamental aspects of this function. 
Romantic Poetry conceived in literary terms and, keeping in mind Schlegel's 
mirror-model image, functions as criticism. The innovative measures that Schlegel and 
Novalis take however, is that the work itself is inherently self-reflective, or in Schlegel's 
terms 'self-mirroring' meaning also that it is self-conscious, thereby enabling criticism as 
a matter of course. Criticism in literature predominantly concerns analysis with a view to 
gaining knowledge of the object in question, namely a literary work, so it is indeed an 
innovative move to make it possible for the literary work to function simultaneously as 
the subject and object of criticism. On a broader scale each individual work, while unique 
unto itself, nonetheless reflects also its connection and interdependence with other works. 
Schlegel gives an account of what this might look like in his Dialogue on Poetry. Here he 
uses ancient Greek poetry as a model, which he sees ultimately as a 'single, indivisible 
and perfect poem' (1968, p. 82). 'All poems of antiquity' says Schlegel, 'all join one to 
the other till from ever increasing masses and members, the whole is formed' and 
'everything interpenetrates everything else' he continues, 'everywhere there is one and 
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the same spirit only expressed differently' (1968, p. 82). This model then captures, in a 
sense, the 'progressive' characteristic of romantic poetry in that there is a gain made with 
each and every additional mass and member incrementing towards the formation of the 
whole. The only concern I have with this model is that the 'whole' is here presented as 
progressively formed; as if it is pieced together member by member. This idea does not 
fit in with the reflective function of romantic poetry where, rather than being 
progressively developed, the whole, is progressively revealed. 
There is the idea however that poetry evolves to become romantic. This we can 
gather for instance from the following fragment: 
There is a poetry whose One and All is the relationship of the 
ideal and the real: it should thus be called transcendental poetry 
according to the analogy of the technical language of philosophy. It 
begins in the form of satire with the absolute disparity of ideality and 
reality, it hovers in their midst in the form of an elegy, and ends in the 
form of an idyll with the absolute identity of both. But we should not 
care for a transcendental philosophy unless it were critical, unless it 
portrayed the producer along with the product, unless it embraced in its 
system of transcendental thoughts a characterisation of transcendental 
thinking: irt the same way, that poetry which is not infrequently 
encountered in modem poets should combine those transcendental 
materials and preliminary exercises for a poetic theory of the creative 
power with the artistic reflection and beautiful self-mirroring, which is 
present in Pindar, the lyric fragments of the Greeks, the ancient elegy: 
and amongst those modems, in Goethe: thus this poetry should portray 
itself with each of its portrayals: everywhere- and at the same time, it 
should be poetry and poetry of poetry. (Schlegel 1968, Fragment 238, 
p. 145) 
Out of the context provided by Schlegel (above) an implication emerges 
concerning the evolutionary aspect of poetry that it has had to undergo certain processes 
in order to enter into the romantic stage. As we have already seen in the previous chapter, 
poetry as ancient or modern are preliminary steps to the romantic phase, which 
technically speaking is not a phase at all, since it is where poetry comes into its own, so 
to speak. Secondly, Schlegel gives the prescription for what he understands to be the 
transcendental nature of romantic poetry that it needs to be critical and thus have the 
inherent capacity to be self-reflective. Schlegel gives some clues as to how he 
understands this is to occur - only if the author of the poem is portrayed along with the 
poem is self-reflection possible. This requires the fusing together of the ideal and real or 
the object and subject. The difficulty is however to see this as apparent in the actual 
poetic product. However, in this fragment Schlegel names Pindar and Goethe as 
exemplary poets who have achieved the transcendental in their work. While Schlegel 
does not elaborate this time on what this amounts to, we can get a glimpse of what he 
means in his notes on Sophocles whom he considers to be equal to Pindar. (On The Study 
of Greek Poetry, some of which has been touched on in the previous chapter). 
Briefly, works such as those produced by Pindar, (although Schlegel is referring 
here specifically to Sophocles), are 'self-mirroring' because they exhibit the following 
qualities: Firstly the work is meticulously organised into a unified whole - 'Everything 
evolves necessarily out of a unity and even the smallest part belongs unconditionally to 
the great law of the whole' says Schlegel (Schlegel 200 I, p. 61 ). Secondly the work is 
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The imagination as the 'effective principle'16 supporting both philosophical 
and poetic processes 
Novalis argues that the 'imagination' being the 'effective principle' is 'called 
fantasy while working on the memory' and 'the 'power of thought' when 
'working on the intellect' (2007, p. 48). The difference between memory and the 
intellect insofar as Novalis describes it is that the 'memory is a direct (positive) 
sense' while the intellect is an 'indirect (negative) sense' (p. 48). Memory is thus 
an aptitude with which to build, or to collect and preserve images, impressions 
and events, with some immediacy (direct and positive). When memory works 
with the imagination, fantasy ensues, meaning that it provides the raw material 
with which to build further images, impressions and events, that are no longer 
grounded in reality, but are 'built' upon the fragments of memory that persist. The 
intellect on the other hand is an aptitude with which to conceptualise, rationalise, 
process or to 'make sense of data arising out of this process, plus raw intuitions. 
In conjunction with the imagination, the intellect actively works with this data, but 
this time with a rational, rather than a fantastical determination. 
balanced and therefore harmonious - referring to Schlegel's formula of the poetic ideal 
discussed in Chapter 5, a work of art is well proportioned with regard to the fantastic and 
the representation of the real. A work is thus not overly and overtly sentimental, nor 
detached from reality to such an extent that it is not accessible, nor in contrast, does it 
starkly resemble the real world; the work of art as such must be a poetic reflection of 
reality, raising it to a higher level, revealing more than what formally meets the eye. 
Thirdly, the work is self-determined in that it is not mechanically forced' but 'emerge[s] 
organically' (2001, p. 61): Again falling in line with romantic expectations this is to 
allow the work to emerge unimpeded which means that it falls in line, not with the will of 
the individual creator but with the will of God. The author thus gives him/herself over, 
like a conduit, to universality and is certainly not persuaded by a whim. Fourthly, we 
must assume that the author is present in the work in that the work and the creator of the 
work are one. 
16 Novalis 2007, p. 48 
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Imagination (as does reflection) therefore features as a crucial component of both 
poetry and philosophy as processes. A clue to why this is so can be found in the 
following excerpt by Novalis in which he focuses on the intimacy of the 
relationships formed by the imagination in its varying functionality: 
The imagination will simultaneously become an (outward) direct 
sense, and an (inward) indirect sense. The indirect sense will 
become a direct sense and the self-effective - living, and the 
direct sense both an indirect sense and self-effective. These three 
transformations will and must all take place simultaneously - at 
the same time (2007, p. 48). 
In which case, while there is an effort made to maintain a distinction insofar as 
effects of the imagination are concerned, namely fantasy and thought, what is here 
implied is that the effects concur in an enmeshed reciprocity. 
This is hardly surprising in light of the following claim, also by Novalis: 
Unity - totality - in order to have totality we must start from a 
unity and this is the imagination. Totality is the product of the 
imagination. Unity is the product of totality - the unending 
determinant' (2003, p. 82). 
The function of reflection in poetry and philosophy 
Just as the variation in the manner imagination functions is dependent on the 
context in which it is operational, so too the variation in the manner reflection 
operates within philosophy and poetry is dependent on other variables that work 
in conjunction with it. The variables this time are the intellect and the 
imagination. Because it has been asserted that the imagination already has a dual 
481Page 
function one with the intellect and one with memory, we need to be aware that 
variables cluster in more ways than one. 
With respect to philosophy and poetry as methods, reflection like the imagination 
enables both to emerge. Indeed, in the context of early Romanticism, reflection 
supports the intellectual as well as the intuitive spheres. These spheres together 
give rise to, and reflect a world. Considering that romantic poetry is the synthesis 
of poetry and philosophy, we can get some insight into the significance of the 
concept of reflection from Schlegel' s Fragment 116, in which this concept is 
discussed as fundamental to romantic poetry. 
Schlegel declares that 'Romantic poetry can, like the epic, become a mirror of the 
entire surrounding world, a picture of its age' and that it can 'soar, free from all 
real and ideal interests, on the wings of poetic reflection [ ... ] it can even 
exponentiate this reflection and multiply it as in an endless series of mirrors' 
(1968, p. 141 ). The nature of reflection here reveals it self as 'signifying a 
continuous progression of ever greater intensity and power' as Stoljar so neatly 
puts it (1997, p. 6). Certainly Schlegel's descriptive phrases such as 'wings of 
poetic reflection' and the idea of 'an endless series of mirrors' present as a 
powerful evocation of an awe inspiring kaleidoscopic consciousness, not 
dissimilar to lndra 's Jewelled Net17. This analogy is made keeping in mind 
17 The image of 'Indra's Net' comes from the Buddhist Avatamsaka Sutra. The 
myth is told as follows: Far awcy in the Heavenly abode lived the god Indra Indra, the 
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particularly the romantic notion that each individual being, while an 
interconnected and interdependent member of the whole, is at the same time a 
microcosm of the entire universe. In the first instance we have a reflection that 
'mirrors an entire age' on the second level we have reflection that 'exponentiates' 
this. 'Exponentiate' provides a key to the meaning of poetic reflection, which in 
this romantic context means precisely to 'raise' to a higher power. 'To make 
Romantic' says Novalis 'is nothing but a qualitative raising to a higher power' 
and '[W]e ourselves' he continues, are a 'qualitative exponential series' in which 
the 'lower self will become one with a better self (1997, p. 60). 
In relation to philosophy, we can say that philosophy originates in reflection. In 
particular relation to Fichte's model of consciousness and his Science of 
Knowledge, which Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin all take into consideration, 
reflection retains some of the complexity pertaining particularly to this model. 
However, for these thinkers reflection starts with the subject/object relation, and 
not prior to this, as Fichte determines it is. As to how the reflective process 
begins, Novalis argues first of all that 'there has to be a non-I, in order that I can 
god of natural forces that protect and nurture life, had a problem and thought deeply for 
a solution. Indra yearned to protect and nurture life of the entire universe, as all life is all 
the same. He saw that the whole cosmos was contained in a single grain of dust. Thus, 
Indra, by some cunning, hung a net around the universe so that it stretched out in all 
directions. The net was infinite, it had no beginning and no end At each place where the 
net came together Indra placed a knot. In a gesture of extravagance that only a god can 
manage, on each knot Indra hung a beautiful jewel which contains and reflects every 
other jewel in the net. When Indra touched any jewel in the net, all other jewels in the 
web resonated. This reference was found at this site: 
http://www.indrasnet.net/philosophy.htm 
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posit the I as I' (2003, p. 7). It would seem that Novalis is following in Spinoza's 
footsteps here since in the case of Fichte, who can see that the 'non-I' is a 
necessary component in the determination of the 'I', insists that the 'non-I' finds 
its origin at the inception of the initial positing. The discrepancy represents two 
schools of thought - realism and idealism, which respectively advance two 
possible theories of the origin of consciousness - one theory that consciousness 
finds its origin in nature (realism, Spinoza) and the second theory that nature finds 
its origin in mind (Fichte). The thing that interests Novalis (and the others) 
however, is the fact that either way, the ensuing development of the 'I' depends 
on the reciprocally determined relationship that it has with the 'non-I'. Indeed, 
this last factor Novalis and the others take to be more significant then either of the 
positions just outlined and serves as the basis for their theory of unity and their 
proposal to bring realism and idealism together as reciprocally determined factors 
in the Absolute. 'It is all one' argues Novalis, 'whether I posit the universe in 
myself or myself in the universe' (1997, p. 131). More will be said about the 
fusion of idealism and realism when in Chapter 5, we look at Schlegel's formula, 
which presents as a clear attempt at reconciling the two. 
Finally, in its reconciliatory function, from the poetic to the philosophical, 
reflection returns to conceptual thinking an unarticulated sense of the un-
representable which the conscious mind then attempts to process. This last point 
may be contested since it is argued that poetry in its highest achievement goes 
beyond conceptual thinking, meaning that it goes beyond reflection; how then can 
it reflect back to consciousness anything at all from this realm? The best we can 
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do here is to refer to what Schlegel tells us and that is: 'If poetry is to become art, 
and if the artist is to have a thorough knowledge of his means and goals, their 
hindrances and subjects, he has to philosophise about his art' (1968, p. 146). 
Admittedly this perspective points to a reflection about art rather than art itself as 
being reflective, however, it is fair to say that even this implies that there must be 
a reciprocal effect in this relationship. 
In the next section, the relationship between concept and intuition is discussed. 
The aim is to show how these, as relational aspects of philosophy and poetry 
respectively, also occur in the same cognitive continuum. Indeed, when examined 
closely, concept and intuition, like poetry and philosophy are already integrated. 
The relationship between concept and intuition 
In Das Allgemeine Brouillon and earlier in his Fichte Studies Novalis goes some 
way towards exploring the relationship between concept and intuition. The 
relationship is important because it reflects a relationship between two distinct 
products of activities, which are also distinct. To put it simply, a concept is a 
thought form - a representation while an intuition is an impression that is 'felt and 
sensed' (2003, p. 120). Philosophy, as was suggested earlier, initially works with 
concepts while poetry on the other hand initially works, for the most part, with 
intuitions. Novalis advances the theory that intuition and concept together form a 
totality (2003, p. 107) and that one without the other, is only 'half the reality of a 
thing' (2003, p. 78). Moreover, Novalis argues that 'a concept to which no 
52 I Page 
intuition corresponds' is an 'empty concept' (2003, p. 77) and is thus an illusion. 
This is not to say that illusion is absolute nonsense. It simply means that it 
characterises that which is not in and of itself a totality. 
Novalis gives us a simple model by which to understand further the difference 
between concept and intuition and how they relate as co-operative components of 
this totality. He makes the claim that 'concept and intuition relate to one another 
like object and subject - atom and motion' (2007, p. 116). The immediate 
impression we are given is again, one of reciprocal detennination, where one is 
what it is in virtue of the other. Novalis builds on this model by adding that 
'subject belongs to intuition' while the predicate is a concept' (2007, p. 139). He 
then suggests that the 'path from the intuition to the concept is synthetic' while 
'the converse path - is analytic' (2007, p.139), thereby describing also an 
integration of processes that allow a unity between them to persist. 
Considering the proposition 'subject belongs to intuition' while the 'predicate is a 
concept' the following analogy may be useful: - subject and object as we know 
are, in grammar, related to each other so that in the one, namely the predicate, an 
indication is given as to what the other, namely the subject is about. When we 
refer this back to concept and intuition then we can see that what Novalis wants to 
say is that for an intuition to be meaningful in tenns of attribution it needs to be 
conceptualised. In other words the concept reflects the intuition - just as the 
predicate reflects the subject. However this model reveals something about the 
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eternal approximation of poetry and philosophy since no matter how closely 
related concept and intuition are just as a predicate can only reflect something 
about the subject, so too, a concept can only reflect something about the intuition 
and not the intuition itself. 
Intellectual Intuition - complete integration (or disintegration), of subject 
and object 
It is time to bring into the discussion the concept of 'intellectual intuition' and 
reflect upon its structure, as it presents as the ultimate integration of subject and 
object, or rather, as the heading suggests, a complete disintegration of subject and 
object. In respect to the relationship between poetry and philosophy and their uni-
focused function, it is through their integration that a demonstration of an 
'intellectual intuition' is made possible. Certainly, in respect to Holderlin's 
project, this is what he attempts to achieve within the structures of poetry. In light 
of what has so far been discussed, this thesis suggests that it is philosophy that 
correlates with the 'intellectual' aspect of 'intellectual intuition' while poetry 
correlates with the intuition itself, and that the aim is, just as it is for poetry and 
philosophy, their integration. Although, from the outset, it must be acknowledged 
that there are variations, albeit subtle variations, amongst Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin, in regard to not only what they mean by 'intellectual intuition', but as 
to what the intention is in regard to role of 'intellectual intuition'. Moreover, 
contemporary discourse exhibits also, subtle variations in the interpretation of 
'intellectual intuition,' which needs also to be discussed. 
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Jochen Schulte-Sasse argues that Fichte uses the term 'intellectual intuition' to 
describe a 'special mode of consciousness in which subject and object are 
sublated, in which the subject no longer reflects upon objects or contents'. He 
further argues that this intuition is intellectual because it is 'without sensory 
content' (1997, p. 14). Schulte-Sasse's reflection is a useful place to start a 
discussion concerning the meaning of 'intellectual intuition' in the early German 
Romantic context, for the 'intellectual intuition' Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin 
discuss in their theoretical texts, are variations of this very theme. 
However, while all three thinkers discuss 'intellectual intuition' in their 
theoretical texts, in some commentarial literary and philosophical discourses it is 
not adequately represented (excepting, perhaps Schulte-Sasse et al, 1997). For 
example Ernst Behler in his German Romantic Literary Theory, identifies it as 
something that 'implies' the 'imagination', (1993, p. 86), where it acts as a direct 
form of intellectual understanding that comes about not through a process of 
reasoning but through an intuitive apprehension. The problem with this definition 
is that it is limited to the connection that Behler makes between 'intellectual 
intuition' and the imagination. We have seen that the imagination features as an 
integral aspect of cognitive functioning that enables both intellectual and creative 
activity, but nowhere do Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin make the imagination a 
condition of 'intellectual intuition'. Novalis for instance puts 'intellectual 
intuition' on equal terms with 'ecstasy,' the 'inner phenomenon of light' as he 
calls it (2007, p. 160). We can be sure that in HOlderlin's case, as will be explored 
further in the next chapter, 'intellectual intuition' characterises a pre-reflective, 
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that is to say, a pre-separation of subject and object, kind of awareness (Holderlin, • 
1988, p. 37) which is, to be sure, a variation on Schulte-Sasse's interpretation of 
Fichte's idea of an 'intellectual intuition'. Schlegel on the other hand casts, 
'intellectual intuition' as the 'consciousness of the consciousness of the infinite' 
(Schlegel, Cited in Schulte-Sasse, 1997, p. 261). 
Beiser in The Romantic Imperative (2003) for the most part, presents 'intellectual 
intuition' in a similar way to Behler. His understanding is that in early German 
Romanticism 'intellectual intuition' is firstly an aesthetic experience but one that 
is valued for its intellectual significance. Beiser argues that intuition for the 
romantics is as much a power of reason as is the intellect, the difference being 
however, that one is immediate while the other is discursive. Beiser claims that 
'intellectual intuition' represents a reasoned understanding that is independent of 
the power of inference. With this kind of reasoning, namely intellectually intuitive 
reasoning, Beiser argues that the infinite can be perceived within the finite (2003, 
pp. 60-61). Thus 'intellectual intuition' functions in much the same way as does 
the aesthetic experience. 
However, the concept of 'intellectual intuition', in the early German Romantic 
context, is much more complicated than this, rendering the above views quite 
misleading. The problem is also that the variation between Schlegel's, Novalis' 
and Holderlin's perceptions of 'intellectual intuition' are subtle and yet profound 
which makes it difficult to pin point exactly what is meant by it. 
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In the previous section the relationship between concept and intuition was 
considered as two aspects that together constitute a totality. Based on this model, 
this thesis suggests that 'intellectual intuition' represents the ultimate balance of 
this totality, in which a perfect and integrated relation between the intellect and 
intuition exists. But while 'intellectual intuition' can be conceived of a priori, the 
actuality of it falls beyond the scope of knowledge. In basic terms, as has been 
suggested and will further be demonstrated in the following chapter, 'intellectual 
intuition' characterises absolute oneness. The temptation is to use the word unity 
but to do this is to imply that what we are describing is united in the sense that it 
is a coming together of individual aspects. This is not necessarily the case as 
Holderlin makes quite clear in his essay 'Judgment and Being' (1988, p. 37). On 
the other hand, when we look at Schlegel's version of 'intellectual intuition', we 
have a synthesis of understanding and intuition, which Schlegel argues, 'are 
contained in intellectual intuition' (Schlegel, Cited in Schulte-Sasse 1997, p. 261). 
Complicating the matter further, Schlegel claims that 'intellectual intuition' is not 
the same as what he refers to as the 'transcendental standpoint' the point of 
indifference (1997, p. 261), which, in the introduction to the thesis was given as 
the balance between consciousness and the infinite. Indeed, 'intellectual intuition', 
as far as Schlegel's transcendental philosophy is concerned, stands at one end 
opposed to what Schlegel identifies as 'objective arbitrariness' while the 
transcendental standpoint finds its place in between as the 'point that raises us 
above all that is individual' (1997, p. 261). 'Intellectual intuition' is thus an 
extreme; it is a concept derived through philosophical processing - it represents 
the ungraspable infinite or as Schlegel describes it, it is the 'sum of the whole, 
original consciousness, when it comes into consciousness - that is when it intuits 
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and understands original consciousness' (Schlegel, Cited in Schulte-Sasse 1997 p. 
260). 
In light of the previous section, one may argue that this concept is thus an 'empty 
concept' so long as it does not correspond with an intuition. It therefore makes 
sense that in order for this concept to be meaningful, it is necessary to integrate it 
with a corresponding intuition, so a totality may be achieved. Consequently, the 
'intellectual intuition' is no longer illusory but a reality. If we recall from 
Schlegel's ideas on transcendental philosophy, reality always points to the middle 
o'f two extremes, or is the synthesis, at least, of thesis and antithesis. In Schlegel's 
view, 'intellectual intuition' would be the antithesis. It is the synthesis that is 
always the reality. 
Novalis makes some comparable claims when discussing 'intellectual intuition' in 
his Kant Studies. Here he attempts to understand how 'the consciousness of my 
existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation 
to something outside of me' (200 I p. 333). 18 In the passage from which this is 
taken Novalis is thinking about a manner in which the 'I' may be able to be 
conscious of itself without the need to refer to another realm, such as the realm of 
the Absolute. He makes the following argument in which he uses the concept of 
'intellectual intuition' to represent this pre-reflective state but at the same time 
18 D. Wood (translator) Novalis: 'Kant Studies (1797)' cited in The Ph1losophical 
Forum Volume XXXII, No 4. Winter 2001p.333 
58 I Page 
offers an idea as to how to integrate 'intellectual intuition' with 'intellectual 
consciousness' which is the finite representational aspect of being: 
If I could combine a determination of my existence through 
intellectual intuition simultaneously with intellectual 
consciousness of my existence, in the representation - I am -
which accompanies all my judgments and functions of 
understanding, then the consciousness of a relation to something 
outside of me would not be required (2001, p. 333). 
Novalis further deals with this concept of 'intellectual intuition' in his Fichte 
Studies. Admittedly, the excerpts in which the concept is dealt with reveal also a 
struggle to understand it. This is because Novalis' analyses the concept in direct 
relation to Fichte's Wissenschcifislehre, where Novalis identifies it as 'something' 
that is prior to 'the first act'. He further explains that 'intellectual intuition' 
grounds the first act (2003, p. 18). The 'original act' says Novalis 'is the unity of 
feeling and reflection, in reflection' whereas 'intellectual intuition' is the unity of 
feeling and reflection outside of reflection' (2003, p. 18). In other words, while it 
is identified for what it is, it cannot itself be cognised. 
In Holderlin, 'intellectual intuition' represents pure Being in which 'subject and 
object are united altogether and not only in part' but 'united in such a manner that 
no separation can be performed without violating the essence of what is to be 
separated' (1988, p. 37), and therefore, here too, it cannot be cognised, as such. 
However, while Holderlin aims nonetheless to reveal an 'intellectual intuition' in 
and through the structures of poetry, Novalis, like Schlegel, moves towards 
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integration of the concept that cannot be intuited, with the intuition that cannot be 
conceptualised. This is the task, ultimately, for which poetry and philosophy are 
synthesised to form a symbiotic and heuristic function. 
Conclusion 
The key argument in this chapter holds the unification of poetry and philosophy as 
a process that seeks to retain a distinction between poetry and philosophy, which 
illustrates that the unification of poetry and philosophy does not consist in making 
poetry philosophical, where theory is written as verse, for example. Nor does it 
consist in making philosophy 'poetic' in the aesthetic sense of the word. It is clear 
that in the Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin context the philosophy/poetry relation 
is a deliberate conjoining that enables a companionable and heuristic relation one 
with the other, because one without the other results in a diminished capacity to 
further illumine the epistemological, ontological and ethical concerns sought in 
both. Philosophy and poetry thus operate each at their optimum level when 
combined as distinct features of a common enterprise. 
The key strategy of this chapter has been to explore the technical aspects and 
nature of the symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy. A decision 
was made about the limits of philosophy and the limits of poetry, but in order to 
avoid viewing these limits in terms of deficiencies, the focus on limits was to 
highlight how poetry and philosophy are conceivably inter-functional. Where 
philosophy ends and poetry begins is at a point where philosophy, because of its 
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very nature, is limited in experiencing the very essence of the thing that it 
represents. In relation to the thesis theme of 'poetry and philosophical ascesis', 
poetry and philosophy are thus symbiotic functions giving momentum to a 
dialectic, the achievement of an equilibrium within which rests the ascesis. We 
have seen that at all levels of the process, conceptually opposing elements that 
belong to this dialectic such as 'ground' and 'edifice, 'concept' and 'intuition' are 
also held in this balance. The imagination and reflection on the other hand, 
because of their ever changing and contingent functioning in philosophy and 
poetry, provide the sense of a profound continuum. For Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin, philosophy stands firm as the ground that gives value to the poetic 
experience, just as poetry stands firm as the edifice that validates philosophy as 
ground, yet the two together are mutually dependent like the head and tail of the 
Orouboros, providing fuel one for the other to ensure their progressive prosperity. 
Interdependent in their uni-focused relationship, poetry and philosophy thus serve 
as a model that reflects the tension existing also between consciousness and 
infinity. Getting the balance right between poetry and philosophy is thus a gesture 
that emulates the effect of the balance that gives rise to a world. That poetry and 
philosophy conjoin in a co-focused relationship gives philosophy the ongoing 
'breakthroughs' it needs, so to speak, to reach into the realm beyond the 
contingent limits of conceptual thinking at any given point, and to allow the 
possibility of a more sublime representation, or at least an alternative 
representation, of what it wants to represent. 
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Chapter 2 
POETRY and the STRUCTURE OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
... To be one with all that lives, to return in blessed self-forgetfulness into the All 
of Nature - this is the pinnacle of thoughts and joys, this the sacred mountain 
peak, the place of eternal rest ... the mind of man lays its sceptre down and all 
thoughts vanish before the image of the world in its eternal oneness ... 19 
In the previous chapter the focus was on the symbiotic relationship between 
poetry and philosophy. It was demonstrated how poetry and philosophy in the 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin view, can work together in an integrated and uni-
focused relationship. The integration, as we saw, reflects two methodologies - (a) 
philosophy and poetry each retain their distinctiveness while co-operating to 
achieve a common goal and (b) poetry and philosophy as processes are balanced 
19 Holderlin (1990) Hyperion and Selected Poems, Santner (ed.), p. 4 
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in a harmonious continuum that in the Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin view 
reflects the underlying nature of the universe, the very object of contemplation. 
Both approaches are integral to the ascetic unification of poetry and philosophy, 
and combine to secure the best means for the epistemic, ontological and ethical 
expansion of humankind. 
In this chapter, the aim is to narrow the focus and discuss how the symbiotic 
relationship between poetry and philosophy works in relation to a specific 
philosophical problem. 
The specific issue to be addressed is Holderlin's concern with the underlying 
nature of consciousness which presents as a conflict of interest, between a 
consciousness that yearns, simultaneously for identity with the totality in which it 
originates and with its own individuation. The issue originates with Holderlin's 
study of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre in which Fichte argues that the Absolute 'I' 
posits itself and through this act creates, or reflects itself as a subject in opposition 
to an object, or the 'non-I'. As a result, we have a contradiction between the 
subject/object relation and the Absolute, which Fichte insists is and remains pure, 
containing no diversity (1988, p. 149)20• While more will be said about this later, 
for the moment it is sufficient to say that it is this problem, which is a specific 
20 This very general introduction to Fichte's theory of subjectivity is extrapolated 
from the text 'Some Lectures concerning the Scholar's vocation, cited in Fichte Early 
philosophical Writings, translated by D. Breazeale, 1988, Cornell University Press. 
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ontological and epistemological issue, that opens up for Holderlin the opportunity 
to explore poetry as an alternative method for dealing with it. 
In addition Holderlin's concern that the problem is worked out in poetry stems 
from his initial understanding that Fichte 'wants to move in theory beyond the fact 
of consciousness' (1988, p. 125)21. What he means by this is that Fichte has set up 
a structure in which consciousness and the principle that gives rise to it, through 
the act of positing itself in opposition to itself, are in fact irreconcilably 
disconnected. That HOlderlin accuses Fichte of wanting to go beyond the fact of 
consciousness is to point to this very disconnection, for although Fichte wants to, 
he cannot, in theory conceive of reconciliation between the founding principle, 
namely the Absolute and its derivative, consciousness. Holderlin however, 
instead of dismissing the Absolute all together, takes up the challenge to dissolve 
21 However, it is by no means certain that this is Holderlin's ultimate understanding 
ofFichte's Wissenschaftslehre and neither is it in fact Fichte's own ultimate conclusion. 
As Frank points out in his Philosophical Foundations, once Fichte was made aware of the 
problem, he 'no longer wanted to get beyond the "fact of consciousness" within the 
framework of theory itself (2004, p. 120). In a letter to Hegel dated January 26, 1795, 
Holderlin reveals that: 
'In the beginning I suspected him very much of dogmatism; he 
appears, if I may speculate, to have stood very much on the cross 
roads, or still to stand there - he wants to move in theory beyond the 
fact of consciousness[ ... ]' (1988, p. 125). 
After he explains to Hegel just what is at stake with regards to Fichte's first 
principle, Holderlin wants to speak further about a reassurance given to him by Fichte; 
only this part of the letter is missing. Therefore we cannot be sure what Holderlin 
ultimately discerns about Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. However this does not prove to be 
problematic in the context of this thesis. Whatever Holderlin's conclusions are about 
Fichte, his initial observation of Fichte's intentions are what is at issue and remain an 
issue for HO!derlin in his poetics. 
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the disconnection, at least on an 'aesthetic level'22 in poetry. Indeed, Holderlin 
seeks to make the complexity of the problem an integral aspect of the poetic 
process, and in this way, resolve it. 
While the following chapter will deal more specifically with the process, the aim 
of this chapter is to clarify, primarily, the issue at stake, which concerns 
particularly what Holderlin identifies as the 'necessary conflict' that exists 
between opposing tendencies that he observes underpin the relationship between 
consciousness and the Absolute. In Holderlin's words this 'necessary conflict' 
consists of three antagonistic tendencies, namely '(1) the striving for pure self-
hood and identity, (2) [ ... ] the striving for significance [ Bedeutenheitf3 and 
differentiation' and finally the '(3) [ ... ]striving for harmony[ ... ]' (1988, p. 74). 
To investigate the issue, I-folderlin's own theory of poetry and Dieter Henrich's24 
interpretation of this theory, which identifies Holderlin's poetics, based on the 
above concern as entirely Fichtean, are considered. 
22 In a letter to his friend Immanuel Niethammer, Holderlin writes 'I want to 
discover the principle which explains to me the division in which is also capable of 
dispelling the conflict between subject and object, between ourselves and the world, yes, 
also between reason and revelation - theoretically, in intellectual intuition, without our 
practical reason having to come to our aid. For this we need the aesthetic sense 
[ ... ]'(cited Pfau, 1988, pp. 131-132 
23 Pfau's translation (1988), p. 74. 
24 For a more comprehensive analysis of Holderlin's encounter with Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre and other influences that shaped Holderlin's philosophical thinking 
see also Henrich's Der Grund 1m Bewuf3tsein. Untersuchungen zu Holder/in 's Denken 
(1794-1795), (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992). Of particular value also is Henrich's 
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This chapter seeks to develop Henrich's argument that Holderlin conceptualises 
the 'necessary conflict' between antagonistic tendencies basically in terms of the 
internal structure supporting Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. Henrich's close study of 
Holderlin's poetics amply argues the connection between Fichte's response to the 
problem of consciousness and Holderlin's use of the 'threefold antagonism'25 as a 
response to that same problem. However, while Henrich's study forms part of a 
strategic move to unequivocally establish a place for Holderlin in the history of 
German philosophy, between Kant and Hegel, by contrast, the aim of this chapter 
is to relate Holderlin's response more specifically to the concerns at stake in this 
thesis, namely the relationship between poetry and philosophical ascesis. This 
chapter will look at how Holderlin, in a technical and remedial sense, seeks to 
appropriate the structures of poetry for the express purpose of dealing with the 
issue at stake. However, Henrich's argument, namely that Holderlin's poetics is 
'entirely Fichtean' provides a basis from which to proceed. 
The initial objective is then to see how Fichte's 'internal structure' of 
consciousness relates specifically to Holderlin's own model of the three opposing 
tendencies inherent in the structure of consciousness, which form, as Henrich 
argues, the basis for Holderlin's poetics. We shall see that the ultimate effect 
Holderlin is after is reconciliation through balancing all three tendencies that 
discussion concerning the significance of Holderlin's text Judgment and Being in The 
Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Holder/in as an example of a critique of 
Fichte's founding principle. 
25 This phrase is used by Henrich to characterise HOlderlin's three antagonistic 
tendencies (Between Kant and Hegel, 2003, p. 228) 
66 I Page 
constitute the 'threefold antagonism'. It is this balance that ultimately reveals 
what Henrich identifies as a 'transcendental instant,' (2003 p. 229), which, this 
thesis argues, functions as a metaphor for an 'intellectual intuition'. While the 
concept of an 'intellectual intuition' was discussed in the previous chapter, it will 
be elaborated on in this chapter since it is a concept that plays a decisive role in 
Holderlin's poetics. 
Holderlin's critique of Fichte - a catalyst for a theory of poetry 
While it is not the place here to give an elaborate exegesis of Fichte's thesis, it is 
nonetheless important to give an overview adequate enough to describe at least 
the fundamental components of his Wissenschqftslehre, since it are these 
components that constitute the 'internal structure' that Henrich argues underpins 
Holderlin's poetics. 
Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre commonly known as the Science of Knowledge in 
English, explores the possibility of providing a first principle upon which an 
entire system of knowledge may be built. The system itself aims to be inherently 
coherent and progressive, where all propositions are systematically drawn from 
preceding propositions. For Fichte, the interrelatedness, or more particularly, the 
inter-locking of propositions is a crucial aspect of the science of knowledge, with 
each proposition contributing systematically to the whole. However, while all 
propositions interlock and thereby give mutual support to each other and to the 
whole, each proposition's primary relation must be to one irreducible, 
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fundamental and founding principle. This principle, because it is a founding 
principle, cannot be contained within the science of knowledge but must 
necessarily exist 'in advance of the system' (Fichte 1868, p. 16). Its only 
condition is that it is true since having propositions inter-lock with each other 
does not provide for certainty unless these propositions can be traced back to a 
founding principle that is true in and of itself. 
When Henrich refers to Fichte's 'internal structure' he is referring to the structure 
of consciousness that gives rise to this system of knowledge. It consists of the 
fundamental principle plus its immediate effects, namely subject and object. 
Henrich's term 'internal structure' appears to be closely related to Fichte's own 
term of 'inner content' except that Fichte's 'inner content' refers only to one 
aspect of the 'internal structure' namely- the fundamental principle. On the other 
hand it is difficult to separate the fundamental principle from its effects. In the 
Wissenschaftslehre 'inner content' is used to specify the connection between the 
content and the form of the science of knowledge (Fichte 1868, p. 17). Since both 
content and form constitute 'inner content', it follows that the 'inner content' is at 
once the source and object of the Wissenschaftslehre. It follows also that the 
'inner content' is the source for consciousness since the dialectic with which the 
science of knowledge as a system, proceeds, is precipitated by the onset of 
consciousness. Fichte argues that the founding principle plus every proposition 
within the manifold of propositions that constitute the science of knowledge 
consist of both content and form - 'something is known and there is something 
whereof is known' (1868, p.49). Fichte argues further that 'the science of 
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knowledge is itself the science of something and not this something itself' (1868, 
p.49). In other words, the 'something' that this science is of, must be the 'inner 
content' that gives rise to the form which is the science. If this is the case then it 
follows that it is the content itself that is the founding principle. In Fichte's words, 
'this would seem to prove that the science of knowledge, with all its propositions, 
is form of a content which existed in advance of it' (1868, p.49). In this 
roundabout way Fichte is providing a theoretical account of how a first principle 
can be legitimate. 
The significance of what has just been outlined is that the 'inner content' as the 
first and founding principle of which Fichte speaks belongs to the internal 
structure of which Henrich speaks in the following way. 
In the introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, where Fichte introduces the idea of 
a foundational first principle in which the whole content of a 'possible science of 
knowledge' lies 'but not that science itself' (1868 p. 50), he further identifies this 
principle as the 'basis for all consciousness' (p. 63) but cannot itself become a fact 
of consciousness (p. 63). Indeed it is the 'power to become conscious' (p. 51). As 
such it is a 'free act of reflection' (p. 51 ). This free act of reflection act and its 
immediate effects is represented by the equation 'I am I'. The 'I' of this equation 
represents the Absolute Ego or Self which, because of the act of positing itself, is · 
now the Absolute subject while the 'am I' on the right hand side of the equation 
represents the newly posited 'I', which is now the object. The equation itself 
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represents the event, or the 'act' of self-consciousness, in which the Ego becomes 
aware of itself through its own reflection. It is important to note at this point 
Fichte's use of the word 'act' which, as will be pointed out later in the chapter, 
carries with it significant implications in terms of appropriating a suitable method 
that is to deal with this. For the moment it is sufficient to point to Fichte's thesis 
that the act of consciousness is 'an activity [my italics] which presupposes no 
object, but itself produces it' (Cited in Breazeale 1988, p. xiv: SWI: 468)26. 
Fichte further claims that the 'I' that is posited is a reflection of the Absolute Ego, 
or a reflection of itself which he names the 'deed-act' (1868, p. 63). Considering 
the representative nature of reflection, the leap of faith that Fichte requires us to 
make is to consider the possibility that the first reflection, which he considers also 
to be an 'act of freedom' (p. 45) is not a representation of a reflection but of the 
actual Absolute Ego, since as first principle, the act of consciousness must be 
absolute. The act of consciousness thus precipitates a fracturing from which the 
emergence of a subject and object are key aspects. The Absolute Ego has posited 
itself in a simple but divisive act of consciousness resulting in an Absolute subject 
that holds itself as an object in opposition to itself. 
At this point Fichte introduces the concept of the 'non-ego', which in effect is the 
object created through the primary act of consciousness. In other words the 'I' on 
26 For a comprehensive account of Fichte's career in Jena plus translations of key 
texts see Daniel Breazeale's Fichte Early Philosophical Writings published in 1988. 
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the right hand side of the equation 'I am I', is now identified as both the object 
and the non-ego by virtue of it being in opposition to the subject. It is the interplay 
that exists in this relationship, between the Absolute and the posited subject/object 
relation at the onset of consciousness that forms the 'inner structure' of which 
Henrich speaks. 
Holderlin's concern with Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre 
The problem Holderlin identifies is that since the positions described above are 
simultaneously established, it follows that they are mutually determined. From 
this we can deduce that they are also mutually limited as well as being mutually 
limiting. Fichte also understands this to be the case since in his own words he 
argues that, 'they must hold each other in balance' (1868, p. 290). However, this 
model becomes troublesome for Holderlin in that Fichte persists with the idea that 
the self is independent and not mutually determined by the non-self because the 
self is posited originally and absolutely through itself (p. 260). In other words, the 
proposition 'I am I' is not simply a consequence of an awareness of the external 
world. Indeed the external world exists only in virtue of the self. Hereby Fichte 
wants to maintain that consciousness originates in the subject, not the object. 
On the other hand Fichte concedes that in theory 'the ego cannot posit itself, 
cannot be subject, without positing itself as determined through the Non-Ego 
[non-self]' and he adds (in brackets) 'no subject; no object' (1868, p.182). 
However, what manifests is a peculiar contradiction - the self that is posited is 
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simultaneously determined and undetermined; determined in its relation to the 
non-self and undetermined in its relation to itself. In Fichte's own words: 'The 
Ego [the Absolute Self] posits itself as infinite insofar as its activity is directed 
upon itself, or returns to itself and 'The Ego posits itself as finite insofar as its 
activity is directed upon a Non-Ego which it opposes to itself (1868, p. 266). 
With this in mind, in one of Holderlin's earliest critiques of Fichte it is obvious 
that he is grappling with the problematic aspects of Fichte's thesis. In a letter to 
Hegel he makes the following revealing remarks: 
Fichte' s speculative writings - Foundations of the Entire Science 
of Knowledge - also his published lectures about the Destination 
of the Scholar will interest you very much. In the beginning I 
suspected him, very much of dogmatism; he appears, if I may 
speculate, to have stood very much on the crossroads, or still to 
stand there - he wants to move in theory beyond consciousness; 
many of his statements show that, and that is just as certain and 
even more strikingly transcendent that if the metaphysicians so 
far would move beyond the existence of the world- his absolute 
"I" (= Spinoza's substance) contains all reality; it is everything, 
and outside of it there is nothing; hence there is no object for this 
"I", for otherwise not all reality would be contained within it; 
however a consciousness without object cannot be thought, and 
if I myself am this object, then I am as such necessarily 
restricted, even if it were only within time, hence not absolute; 
therefore, within the absolute "I" I have no consciousness, and in 
so far as I have no consciousness I am (for myself) nothing, 
hence is the absolute "I" (for me) nothing (1988, p. 125)27 
Holderlin argues against Fichte in that in theory it is impossible to get a complete 
understanding of the Absolute since the Absolute 'contains all reality', and does 
27 Extract from a letter to Hegel, Holderlin wrote during his stay in Jena , I 795, 
documented also in Holderlin STA 1959, Vol.6, pp. 168-169 
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not allow for any 'opposition' as would be required for a subject in terms of an 
object. Further, since an opposition of subject and object is constitutive of 
consciousness, the Absolute is necessarily unconscious. According to Frank, this 
reading of Fichte's Absolute is marked by Holderlin's encounter with 
Reinhold's28 Theory of Representation (1789), where 'consciousness must always 
be regarded as characterising the representation of something different from itself' 
(2004, p. 115). However, in expressing his concern at this point Holderlin is not 
rejecting the idea of the Absolute; he is merely pointing out that theory is limited, 
or more accurately, the fact of self-c_onsciousness proves to seriously impede 
accessibility to the Absolute since theory itself is a product of reflection, that is to 
say, of consciousness. What this means in terms of knowledge of the Absolute is 
that it is and remains inaccessible in its entirety (at least in theory), to the 
conscious mind. The reality is that a conscious perspective presupposes object and 
therefore is a subjective and as such, partial perspective. With this clearly staked 
out, Holderlin cannot do anything else but admit that in this context, the Absolute 
is inaccessible and therefore is 'nothing' to the conscious mind. 
28 Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823) was chair of philosophy at Jena University 
until 1795; the year Holderlin first came to Jena. However by the time Holderlin got 
there, Fichte had already taken over as chair of philosophy. Still, Reinhold proved to be 
an important influence on Holderlin and we can see that Reinhold's Theory of 
Representation published in 1789, is what held sway in so far as Holderlin's own 
philosophical development is concerned. For a detailed discussion of Reinhold including 
his relationship with Kant and his subsequent influence in Jena in general, see Karl 
Ameriks' Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical 
published in 2000. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
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Holderlin is not convinced however that an experience of the Absolute is not, in 
some way, possible. 
Considering that the problem is specifically to do with the limits oftheory29, then 
the most obvious strategy is to either employ an alternative theory or, if it is 
decided that there cannot be an alternative theory, then the step would be to move 
beyond the fact of consciousness via a means other than through the conceptual or 
theoretical. 
The following excerpt reveals Holderlin's unique strategy: 
I want to develop the idea of an infinite progress of philosophy 
and I am attempting to prove that what must be continually 
demanded of any system, the union of subject and object of the 
Absolute I (or whatever name one wishes to give it) is 
undoubtedly possible on the aesthetic level in intellectual 
intuition, but not on the theoretical level except by means of an 
infinite approximation like that of the square of the circle [ ... ]' 
(StA 1959, Vol. 6, pp. 196-197).30 
In the previous chapter the concept of 'intellectual intuition' was discussed, 
however this concept is revisited here; this time with a particular focus on the 
29 While it might be tempting to at the same time suggest that because the problem 
lies with theory, it must also lie at the same time with rationality, evidence suggests that 
rationality (or reason) is not specifically at issue when it comes to deciding upon an 
alternate strategy to Fichte's scientific approach. If we were to be convinced that 
Holderlin has anything to do with the 'Oldest Programme for a System of German 
Idealism' (1796) then we must also be convinced that reason is not limited to theory. 
Indeed the highest act of reason, according to this text is an aesthetic act. 
30 Extracted from a letter to Schiller, dated 4th September 1995. 
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significance Holderlin gives it. Interestingly, what will come to light is an 
inconsistency in terms of the essence and function of 'intellectual intuition' within 
Holderlin's poetics; however this will not be discussed until later in the chapter. 
'Intellectual intuition', as discussed in the previous chapter, is, principally a 
concept that reflects the notion of a pre-subject/object state, a condition the 
awareness of which is inaccessible to the self-conscious mind. Manfred Frank 
suggests that intellectual intuition is 'that consciousness that immediately 
understands seamless and unified original Being' (2004, p. 78). Immediacy, 
'seamless' and 'unified original Being,' are according to this evaluation, key 
characteristics of an 'intellectual intuition'. This resounds perfectly with 
Holderlin's particular assumption, outlined above, that subject and object can be 
unified 'on an aesthetic level, in intellectual intuition'. However this perception of 
'intellectual intuition' is problematic unless Holderlin expects that the aesthetic 
level is an unconscious level, which, we will discover later, it is not. What will 
become apparent is that Holderlin wants the experience of the kind of unity that 
an 'intellectual intuition' represents, to be a conscious one. However there is a 
question mark hanging over what this conscious experience actually is. Despite 
the fact that the attempt to make 'getting beyond the fact of consciousness' a 
conscious experience, it can ultimately only be a metaphorical representation and 
therefore only an approximation of an 'intellectual intuition'. 
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Gosetti-Ferencei on the other hand argues that Holderlin's view is 'that 
intellectual intuition is possible' but 'only analeptically and contingently' in 
poetic language (2004, p. 134). Gosetti-Ferencei is saying that an 'intellectual 
intuition' is, like the moral law, available only indirectly through the experience 
of something that is not an 'intellectual intuition'. The moral law, as we will see 
in Chapter 6, can be 'known' only contingently since it becomes evident only in 
the event of it being violated, the result of which is punishment or suffering (pp. 
133-134). In the same way, Gosetti-Ferencei suggests that intellectual intuition is 
only possible contingently namely that it will present itself but only negatively. 
However, to talk about intellectual intuition as being 'possible' is in a sense 
misleading. For the most part 'intellectual intuition' is presented by Holderlin as a 
pre-reflective and therefore unconscious experience of unity. This negates the 
possibility of it being realised in even the way Gosetti-Ferencei suggests. 
Certainly, in the light of a subject/object relation, we can speculate about what 
and how an 'intellectual intuition' is. Schlegel too, in his transcendental 
philosophy posits 'intellectual intuition' as arising out of the moment in 
philosophy that he identifies as 'objective arbitrariness' (Schlegel cited in Schulte-
Sasse 1997, p. 260). Further Schlegel argues that the 'I is the synthesis of 
intellectual intuition' (1997, p. 259). Clearly, what is at issue here is that the idea 
of an 'intellectual intuition' is an idea that comes to us in hindsight, not foresight. 
However, this does not support the argument that it is 'possible' as awareness, 
because, the question is, for what or whom, would 'intellectual intuition' be 
possible? 
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Frank is convinced, for example that Holderlin 'opposes in the sharpest terms, 
"intellectual intuition" [ ... ] to the act of judging and thus to the determinate 
consciousness of something' (2004, p. 125). Frank's observation is based on 
Holderlin's particular understanding of pure Being. 'Being proper' as Holderlin 
refers to it, represents 'the connection between subject and object' but in such a 
way that 'no separation can be performed without violating the essence of what is 
to be separated[ ... ]' (1988, p. 37).31 Judgment on the other hand precipitates the 
subject and object opposition, an opposition that does not exist in pure being: 
'being proper'. Judgment thus represents the onset of consciousness and ensures 
its continuity. It follows that, at some level, intellectual intuition is after all an 
'awareness' of the 'original' unity. Frederick Beiser agrees with this by 
identifying that for Holderlin 'intellectual intuition' is indeed a 'direct awareness.' 
Beiser further argues that 'intellectual intuition' for Holderlin is in fact 'a form of 
knowledge' (2002, p. 394). However, whether we call it 'knowledge' or not, one 
criterion that must be taken into account is that the original unity of Being must 
not become an object a/knowledge for then we are once more in the realm of the 
subject/object relation. 
Holderlin claims that subject and object are 'deeply united in intellectual 
intuition' (1988, p. 37). 'Intellectual intuition' however 'intuits' this union not as 
a union but as the pre-separation mode of Being, meaning that there is no 
31 See Violetta Waibel et al, in Holder/in Texturen 2 Das 'Jenaische Project' 
Wintersemester 1794195 (Schriften der Holderlin Geschellschaft Bd. 20, 1995) for articles 
related to Holderlin's philosophy including his study ofFichte while he was in Jena plus 
Waibel's Dissertation of 1997 entitled 'Holderlin und Fichte 1794-1800', published in 
2000. 
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conventional awareness of a separation and while there is no awareness of 
separation there can neither be an awareness of union, since the concept 'union' 
implies a joining of two or more elements. We must be constantly mindful of 
Hi:ilderlin's special understanding of Being so as to avoid the mistake of thinking 
that awareness of union as a joining is enough to mark the occasion of an 
'intellectual intuition'. 'Intellectual intuition' is a pre-judgmental mode of 
grasping Being and as such it cannot belong to the subject. Again, subject and 
object do not exist as entities prior to judgment in which separation occurs - they 
are one in Being and therefore we must suppose that subject and object do not 
exist in a pre-reflective awareness. Further, it cannot be said that after subject and 
object have emerged as a consequence of the onset of self-conscious awareness, 
that they are identical with each other. Nor can it be said that subject and object 
together are identical with Being. The fundamental essence of what is prior to 
judgment is, as Hi:ilderlin explains in 'Judgment and Being', altered injudgment. 
It is for this reason that 'intellectual intuition' is not something that the conscious 
mind can experience since consciousness is in fact the 'cause' or the structure of 
the differentiation. It is also the barrier that prevents accessibility to 'being 
proper'. Hi:ilderlin claims that judgment is 'the original separation' that separates 
the original 'unity' that Being is, and it is only in this act that subject and object 
'become possible' (1988, p. 37). 'Intellectual intuition' however is 'knowledge' or 
'experience' of the original unity. 
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The question is how shall we understand a knowledge that has no object? What 
does it consist of and how is it conceived of, given that it cannot be conceived of 
by consciousness, as we know it? 
Henrich agrees that Holderlin's 'being proper' is 'the being that is inconceivable 
for us is intellectual intuition' (1997, p. 86). Henrich further argues that if we 
looked closely at Holderlin's text we would detect some Kantian precepts. For 
example, because Holderlin excludes the possibility of knowledge of 'being 
proper', Henrich tells us that 'absolute being is only a presupposition' (1997, p. 
86). In response to this one can argue that, yes, while Holderlin does not (and 
cannot) assume otherwise, he nonetheless seeks to at least give an impression of 
an 'intellectual intuition' in poetry, which implies that for Holderlin absolute 
being is more than a presupposition. It is Holderlin's mission regardless of 
whether or not 'absolute being is a presupposition' to seek access to at least an 
experience of it. It may well be that Holderlin's study of Kant equips him to start 
his mission already with an understanding that absolute being is unknowable but 
the conviction that the absolute is unknowable does not 'free him from Fichte' as 
Henrich might argue (1997 p. 87). On the contrary, the un-know-ability of the 
absolute becomes the philosophical challenge that Holderlin seeks to resolve in 
poetry. Not that he wants to prove that the absolute is knowable but that we can 
have an experience of 'un-know-ability' which then in a roundabout way informs 
us, or reveals to us something more about the 'presupposition' of being. In other 
words, Holderlin wants to get beyond the 'presupposition' aspect and establish, in 
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and through a tangible experience of 'un-know-ability', made possible in and 
through poetry, a transparency that reveals 'being proper'. 
Holderlin is thus confident that 'intellectual intuition' is a condition of which an 
experience is possible on an 'aesthetic level' (1959, pp. 196-197).The big question 
now is - how does Holderlin imagine this experience to occur? The aesthetic level 
to which Holderlin refers is a level that in a conventional sense deals with 
representation, allegory and metaphor. Despite Holderlin's mission to appropriate 
poetry for philosophical outcomes he nonetheless works within the confines of 
traditional poetic structures and with the use of conventional poetic devices. In 
which case, whatever is represented through the use of language, metaphor and 
rhythm, is not identical with the thing that it represents. What Holderlin thus 
really means is that in poetry and particularly in tragedy (which Holderlin 
evaluates as ideally suitable32), an 'intellectual intuition' can be metaphorically 
represented or better still, an 'intellectual intuition' can be simulated in poetry. 
However, this is as close as we can get to experience the type of unity that 
intellectual intuition represents. The simulation of an 'intellectual intuition' 
features as an intentional outcome of Holderlin's poetry. It is represented by a 
transcendental moment that Holderlin factors into the structures of poetry and is 
precipitated by a carefully crafted dialectic that is modelled after Fichte's 'internal 
structure' that supports consciousness and hence, for Fichte, represents a complete 
science of knowledge. It is important to elaborate on what Fichte's 'internal 
32 Holderlin (1988): 'The tragic, in appearance heroic poem, is idealistic in its 
significance. It is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition' (p. 83) 
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structure' looks like, since it is this structure that provides Holderlin with the 
model to develop a theory that not only hopes to deal with the very enigma that 
this structure represents but a theory that he imagines will realise Fichte's earliest 
aspiration to get beyond the fact of consciousness within the realm of theory. A 
preliminary point to make is that in relation to Fichte's thesis we can see that the 
equation 'I am I' represents the subject/object opposition and does not exist prior 
to the separation; it is the separation. 'The question has been asked' says Fichte, 
'what was I before I became self-conscious?' to which he answers 'I was not at 
all, for I was not I' (1868, p. 70). From what was discussed earlier, it is safe to say 
that for Holderlin it is judgment that represents the active positing of the 'I' in 
which self-conscious awareness simultaneously occurs. The objective is thus to 
arrive at an experience of a pure 'I'. 
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Examining the 'Internal Structure' that supports Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre 
For Holderlin this problem represents the struggle between conscious and 
unconscious states. Below is a diagram that demonstrates more precisely what is 
at stake. 
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Fig. 1. The Struggle between conscious and unconscious states 
This diagrammatical interpretation of the internal structure portrays the conscious 
self, which is the subject, as aware of an external and determined world 
(object/non-self), of which it is part. At the same time the subject has an 
awareness on some level (or perhaps a sub-conscious memory) of itself as its own 
'creator.' To survive as a self (subject) it must maintain a relational perspective of 
itself as not only opposed to the non-self (object) but also to the Absolute, in 
which it originates; yet it nonetheless longs to reunite with its origin, which 
theoretically speaking, is it-self. Represented here then is the paradoxical nature 
of human existence as it plays itself out in the face of the Absolute and a finite 
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world of which it is part. But the paradox is exacerbated when we take into 
account Fichte's thesis that the Absolute Self is 'absolutely identical with itself 
[ ... ] the self is everything and nothing, since it is nothing for itself, and can 
distinguish no positing or posited within itself (1982, p. 233). The implication 
here is that whatever plays out in the 'posited' world is thus nothing for the 
Absolute. 
Holderlin is also aware of this paradox, hence his articulation in 'Judgment and 
Being' that the Absolute is not identical with subject and object in their 
separateness (1988, p. 38). The claim alluded to in an earlier excerpt, namely that 
'within the absolute 'I' I have no consciousness, and in so far as I have no 
consciousness I am (for myself) nothing, hence is the absolute 'I' (for me) 
nothing' (1988, p. 125) also contributes to this understanding. For this reason 
Holderlin pays particular attention to the tendency inherent in human beings that 
strives for individuality and even 'prefers to keep the chains' rather than give into 
the tendency that in the end forfeits consciousness. As Holderlin points out 'to 
know nothing and to cease to be are, for us the same' (Holderlin, cited in Frank 
2004, p. 117). Resistance to merging with the Absolute is thus a necessary 
tendency lest the 'divine within us' reunite with itself with the consequence that 
'we would feel neither ourselves nor others' (p. 117). 
By the same token, the conscious 'I', that is, the subject, cannot be anything for 
the absolute 'I'. Yet, paradoxically, the absolute 'I' is entirely dependent on the 
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subject's ability and willingness to revoke the posited world if it were to reunite 
again with itself. This suggests that the posited world, for which it is responsible, 
is in some sense a threat to the Absolute even if it is 'nothing', for reunion with 
itself cannot be realised so long as the subject is conscious and committed to the 
posited world which indeed it must be at all times, if it is to sustain itself. 
The paradox described above encapsulates what are two scenarios that stand in 
conflict with each other which represent what appears to be a necessary struggle 
that exists between the particular and the whole. Indeed, just as the posited self, 
the subject, strives to maintain itself, so too does the Absolute Self strive to 
maintain itself (Fichte 1982, p. 233). The latter striving amounts to what Fichte 
identifies to be a 'self-reverting infinite activity,' (1982, p. 233), which is an 
activity that is inherently characteristic of the Self. Because the Self posits itself 
absolutely, striving to revert back to itself must then also be infinitely active 
within the 'I' that is now the subject. What is also inherent in the subject is what 
Frank identifies as the 'drive' that acts as a 'restraint of the infinitely striving 
activity;' that which is the 'condition of becoming conscious' (2004, p. 119). 
Fichte identifies this drive to be an 'objective finite activity' (1982, p. 235). The 
implication is that both the 'self-reverting infinite activity' (striving) that is 
inherent in the subject plus the 'objective finite activity' (drive), which is inherent 
now in the object, find their origin in the Absolute. Ultimately this could mean 
that the Absolute is itself the struggle that these activities represent. Even Fichte 
argues that '[ ... ] the very concept of striving already involves finitude, for that to 
which there is no counter striving is not a striving at all' (1982, p. 23 8). To this 
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end, Fichte himself argues that the Absolute is dependent on its very striving for it 
to exist at all. The ultimate conclusion to be drawn here is (and this is precisely 
the conclusion drawn by Schlegel , Novalis and Holderlin) that the Absolute 
cannot be what it is without opposition, just as the finite self and non-self cannot 
be what they are without opposition, one to the other. 
Putting this aside for the moment, it is important to pay some attention to the fact 
that 'striving ' and ' drive ' in the above paragraph are identified as activities. 
Indeed now is the time to clarify further the concept 'activity ' for as mentioned 
earlier, there is a peculiarity inherent in this concept that has significant 
implications for the methodology employed by Fichte, namely his very scientific 
and logical approach to knowledge. 
To identify the Absolute as active activity carries with it some significant 
implications for philosophy. Indeed, with this, the limits of philosophy may 
become clearer in so far as knowledge of the Absolute is concerned. If we recall 
in the discussion in Chapter I, (p.29) where Novalis is quoted as saying that 
' originally knowledge and action are mixed ', action is identified as the mode of 
engagement for poetry, while knowledge (or theory) on the other hand, is 
identified as the mode of engagement for philosophy. In terms of what poetry can 
do for philosophy, the significance of this point is this: if we accept the Absolute, 
which we understand to be Fichte 's first and fundamental principle and which is 
at the same time the content of the entire science of knowledge, then the barrier 
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that stands between the Absolute and philosophy is the mode of engagement that 
philosophy is. If we accept that the Absolute is fundamentally activity, then it 
follows that the mode of engagement that will get closest to the Absolute must 
itself be an activity. 
With this in mind, Holderlin's mission to move beyond the fact of consciousness 
on an aesthetic level begins to make more sense. When one associates the 
beginning of philosophy with the onset of consciousness, the limits of philosophy 
become obvious; they begin and end with the onset of consciousness; the positing 
of the subject in its opposition to the object. The reflective process that philosophy 
is, finds its origin in consciousness, from where it subsequently develops a world 
of concepts. On the other hand, if we accept that the mode of engagement for 
poetry is an activity of the kind that is akin with the founding principle, then it 
may well be argued that poetry has its origin in the Absolute, by virtue of which, 
poetry must have 'access' to the Absolute. 
However, it is not clear that the argument just outlined is consistent with 
Holderlin's own understanding of what is possible for poetry. While there is no 
doubt that Holderlin aims at unity, he also aims to make it, on some level a 
conscious experience. For this reason, the unity that is hoped for in poetry remains 
allegorical because the fact of consciousness, albeit transformed or transferred or 
even deferred, has not been fully transcended. 
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The use of, and departure from, Fichte's 'internal structure' in HOlderlin's 
poetics 
Having sketched out the internal structure of Fichte's system we are now ready to 
see to what extent Holderlin retains this structure as a basis for his poetics. It was 
pointed out in the introduction that it is what Henrich identifies as a 'threefold 
antagonism' inherent in Holderlin's poetics that serves as evidence for the 
proposition that Holderlin's poetics is 'entirely Fichtean'. The 'threefold 
antagonism' consists of the interplay of three tendencies that correlate 
significantly with the model of consciousness discussed earlier. Henrich describes 
the tendencies as forming an incompatible relationship, where one tendency urges 
towards independence, another towards 'the surrender to the finite in love' and the 
third towards awareness of an 'ideal that reaches out to the origin of the world' 
(2003, p. 229). While it is true that the tendencies may be incongruous, in so far as 
they orient towards different outcomes, they nonetheless exist within a 
constellation that in itself strives for a harmonious balance. 
When one reads Holderlin's theoretical texts in which he develops his poetics one 
becomes aware of a philosophical position that is strongly reminiscent of Fichte' s 
theory of consciousness as detailed in his Wissenschaftslehre. It needs to be kept 
in mind however that Holderlin's preoccupation with this problem is to prove that 
it is possible to go beyond the fact of consciousness on an aesthetic level. 
Holderlin thus uses his Fichtean model of the structure of consciousness to not 
only structure poetry but to guide the poetic process towards a resolution of the 
paradox that this very structure of consciousness represents. To put it another 
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way, Holderlin wants to build into the poetic process a determination that gives 
rise to an experience of the indeterminable, 'intellectual intuition'. Once again it 
needs to be emphasised that the 'experience' is not an 'intellectual intuition' as 
such, which in its ultimate sense is an immediate awareness of a pre-reflective 
'being proper', but is rather a metaphorical representation of this. 
The experience is transmitted in what Henrich identifies as a 'transcendental 
instant' (2003 p. 230); it is the 'getting beyond consciousness' experience. 
Henrich argues that Holderlin's doctrine of the 'transcendental instant' is based on 
a particular passage in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre in which the positing moment 
that gives rise to subject and object contains also an 'in-between' instant - or a 
space - that makes the separation possible and prevents one dissolving into the 
other. The 'in-between' space represents for Holderlin an 'intellectual intuition'33 
since it is the element that is essentially the unifying force that simultaneously 
unites and separates subject and object. It is the moment in which Holderlin sees 
the possibility of an experience of absolute being - the 'all in all that always is' 
(See Chapter 3 for an elaboration on this point). For the moment it is sufficient to 
identify that the 'transcendental instant', although not identified by Fichte as such 
in these terms, is nonetheless very much an aspect ofFichte's 'internal structure'. 
33 Which contrasts Schlegel's perception of 'intellectual intuition', as was pointed 
out in the introduction, Schlegel's 'transcendental midpoint' is in between 'intellectual 
intuition' on one hand and objective arbitrariness on the other - between the two 
extremes of subjectivity and objectivity (See Schlegel, in Schulte-Sasse 19979, p. 259). 
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Thus in adopting the 'internal structure' that supports Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre 
Holderlin inherits the problem of the nature of the determined self in its structural 
relation to the Absolute. All components of this structure correlate with 
Holderlin's understanding of the structures that give rise to and sustain the human 
condition. For example what Fichte identifies as the 'self-reverting infinite 
activity' of the Absolute (discussed earlier) correlates neatly with Holderlin's 
understanding that part of the dynamic of being human is an inherent 'striving for 
pure self-hood and identity' (1988, p. 74). Esoterically speaking this describes the 
inherent longing of the self (subject) to be reunited with the Absolute in which it 
originates. Striving against this first tendency is the compelling nature of the 
posited self (subject) that is to be conditioned by the non-self (object) in an effort 
to seek and sustain 'significance and differentiation' (1988, p. 74). This tendency 
in contrast to the first reveals the infinite underlying nature of the self that strives 
against the self-reverting activity of the 'Absolute I' and urges instead towards 
differentiation in which independence and individuality is established. The 
alternative is a merging into the Absolute, which involves dissolution of 
independence and individuality. The third tendency however, urges towards 
harmony, or better said a reconciled state in which the former two tendencies 
come to rest. The fact that Holderlin identifies this third tendency implies that 
there is at least a potential for the restlessness of the human condition to be 
appeased albeit only for a moment. However Holderlin is clear that each tendency 
is very transient in so far as its manifestation is concerned. Indeed, the interplay 
between tendencies ensures the cancellation of each tendency as it arises and 
therefore none are in fact 'realisable' (1988, p. 74). 
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This is the tragedy of being human in the world where everywhere the finite 
reminds us of our condition, that we too are finite. Yet the stuff that supports us is 
infinite and so we strive for infinity. This is something that Fichte also determines 
to be the case: 
[T]he idea of an infinity to be thus completed floats as a vision 
before us, and is rooted in our innermost nature. We are obliged, 
as it enjoins us, to resolve the contradiction, though we cannot 
even think it possible of a solution, and foresee that in no 
moment of an existence prolonged to all eternity will we ever be 
able to consider it possible. But this is just the mark in us that we 
are destined for eternity (1982, p. 238) 
In this passage Fichte argues that as human beings, existing in a world, we can 
only go so far in being aware of the Absolute, for the struggle between the finite 
and the infinite remains real and is, indeed, irresolvable. On the positive side, and 
despite the perpetual nature of this struggle, the idea that eternity is our destiny 
nonetheless remains however unattainable it is for the temporal being. Holderlin 
similarly acknowledges that the antagonism between tendencies is indeed a reality 
and while he factors into the equation the possibility of the third tendency being 
realised in poetry (through which an experience of eternity is conceivable), he too 
understands, all too well, that this realisation cannot amount to anything more 
than a momentary experience of the original unity. 
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Accommodating Fichte's 'internal structure' in poetry 
The focus in this section will be on the technical aspects of how poetry is 
appropriated by Holderlin to accommodate the interpretation and the resolution of 
the philosophical problem discussed above. In Chapter 1, we saw how poetry and 
philosophy are united, on one level, to form an augmented method, a method, in 
fact that ultimately serves to simultaneously provide a means to, and an end in 
itself, of a philosophical ascesis. Holderlin's appropriation of poetry for this task 
is to make it a space in which the philosophical problem is simultaneously 
interpreted or re-interpreted rather, and resolved, seamlessly. 
Henrich argues, that the 'dynamism of life', which Holderlin's adaptation of 
Fichte's 'internal structure' represents, is most adequately grasped in poetry 
because 'poetry is at once successive and symbolic' (2003, p. 228) 34. 
To begin with, the term 'successive' refers to the sequential unfolding of the poem 
or more precisely to what Holderlin refers to as the 'rhythmic sequence of the 
representations' (1988, p. 102). To support a rhythmic sequencing of 
34 The idea of symbolism and succession in poetry is something that Henrich 
explores in greater detail in The Course of Remembrance (1986) in relation to HOlderlin's 
hymn Andenken. This is an excellent contribution to Holderlin scholarship since it 
explores Holderlin's poetry in close relation to HO!derlin's theoretical work: Especially as 
far as the notion of 'Remembrance' has been given philosophical consideration, Henrich 
acknowledges that Holderlin's work is at once poetic and philosophical (1986, p. 212). In 
the next chapter we will investigate further the significance of this concept in its relation 
to consciousness and the nature of becoming in dissolution. Remembrance or recollection 
is an important aspect of this process and indeed functions as the component that ensures 
continuity of consciousness. 
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representations, the succession must be both logical and teleological, for the 
poem, as has been established, is not without purpose. However, this does not 
limit the poem to being successive only in a linear way. On the contrary, for an 
adequate representation of the antagonistic conflict between opposing tendencies, 
the succession within the poetic structure is required to be circular, so that the 
beginning meets the end and a sense of unity is achieved. Indeed based on 
Holderlin's observations that the conflict between opposing forces itself reflects 
circularity in which individuation, for example, reaches its extreme at one point 
and then returns back to a centre or finds itself in neutrality, closer in proximity to 
the whole. This kind of shuffling to and fro, from one extreme to another 
Holderlin conveys in the following excerpt: 
[ ... ] parts of the united must not always remain in the same 
closer and remoter relation, so that everything may encounter 
everything else and that all receive its full right and share of life, 
and that every part during its course equal the whole in 
completeness; conversely, that the whole during its course 
become equal to the parts in determinacy, that the former gain in 
content [and] the latter in inwardness[ ... ]' (1988, p. 85). 
The above excerpt is taken out of 'On the Difference of Poetic Modes' and refers 
to the internal structure that supports tragedy. Holderlin's objective is to articulate 
the significance of relating every aspect of a poetic work to itself and to the whole 
through making it clear that the sequencing is derived from the alternation 
between unity and separation, which in this case are presented as processes. 
That poetry is characteristically 'symbolic' assists Holderlin in representing this 
very succession, which in the end is representative of the 'threefold antagonism'. 
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If 'successive' stands for an unfolding of determinants, then 'symbolism' is meant 
to capture another dimension; the whole of the dynamic process is symbolically 
represented, or the successive process itself symbolically stands for that which it 
represents, but is not that which it represents. 
In a first approximation however, the meaning of symbolism can be translated as 
allegory or representation, in a literary sense. As such it is achieved through the 
use of poetic devices including metaphor, rhythm and meter, just to name a few, 
plus other tactical appropriations of the phonetic, semantic and syntactic aspects 
of language. Certainly Holderlin does not shy away from using an extensive range 
of devices in his poetic constructions. Indeed a skilful use of poetic devices will, 
according to Holderlin's calculations, give rise to a dimension of meaning that is 
not immediately represented by the actual words in the poem. While more will be 
said in the following chapter about the significance of such poetic devices in 
Holderlin's poetry, a preliminary remark to be made here is that Holderlin uses 
these devices, ultimately, to structure 'tonal' qualities into the poem, in order to 
achieve the philosophical aspiration underpinning the poetry. To this end, 
Holderlin's 'tones' make a significant contribution to the representation of 
Holderlin's adaptation of Fichte's internal structure detailed above. Holderlin's 
theory of tones will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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A closer look at the 'transcendental instant' as metaphorically representing 
'intellectual intuition' 
Earlier in the chapter the concept 'intellectual intuition' was identified, in the 
Holderlin view, as a pre-reflective state in which a differentiation between subject 
and object does not exist. Indeed, it is a state in which the concepts of subject and 
object are meaningless. For this reason it became clear that an 'awareness' of an 
intellectual intuition, that is to say, an intellectual intuition as such, is not 
accessible to the conscious mind even though the conscious mind is (in theory) a 
determination of this 'awareness'. It was argued that in Holderlin's view, pure 
Being or 'being proper' cannot be objectified since objectification would destroy 
the very essence of what pure Being is. Holderlin in fact makes a momentous 
move when he claims that subject and object are not identical with pure being and 
herewith severely reducing the scope of human understanding as far as knowledge 
of Being is concerned. 
With the idea that 'intellectual intuition' is beyond the normal scope of human 
experience, Holderlin's expectation is that 'intellectual intuition' is possible on an 
aesthetic level, meaning that it could possibly be represented metaphorically. 
Nevertheless, as will become clear, 'intellectual intuition' under these conditions 
is not entirely what we might expect it to be, considering the above preliminary 
understanding of its function and scope. Indeed, in his practical application of his 
thesis, Holderlin reveals another dimension to what 'intellectual intuition' is, in 
terms of unity. This application is revealed in Holderlin's notes on the poetic 
genre of tragedy 
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The function of Tragedy in its conveyance of an 'intellectual intuition' 
In poetry, Holderlin turns to the poetic genre of tragedy and claims that 'all works 
of this kind must be founded on an 'intellectual intuition' which cannot be any 
other one than that unity with everything living' (1988, p. 84). What this implies 
is that, just like the Absolute functions as a founding principle for the structures of 
consciousness, so too, an 'intellectual intuition' must function as the founding 
principle for tragedy. As such Holderlin claims that 'tragedy is the metaphor of an 
intellectual intuition' (1988, p. 83). To make 'tragedy' the metaphor of 
'intellectual intuition' is to indicate that 'intellectual intuition' might be something 
that is process like, where before we were under the impression that it must 
represent something like immediacy. Literary processes that give rise to a tragedy 
are complex and underpinned by a strategy that follows, in Holderlin's case, a 
'calculable law'. In other words, structures and processes support a tragedy. It is 
not simply a thing or moment or event that occurs in a vacuum. There are certain 
actions and successions that have to be set into a work for it to be recognisable as 
a tragedy. These actions and successions in tum are set into the work by further 
supporting mechanisms including language, rhythm, and tones. Tragedy is then a 
gathering of components that make it what it is. If we can thus learn anything at 
all from a tragedy about the Absolute, it would have to be that the Absolute (and 
this has already been recognised) is like the tragedy, an orchestrated symphony of 
opposing forces. However there is still a tension between this analogy and 
Holderlin's conviction that the Absolute is not identical with the subject and 
object that it generates. He makes this point in 'Judgment and Being,' where he 
argues that 'Being must not be confused with identity. If I say; I am I, the subject 
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("I") and the object ("I") are not united in such a way that no separation could be 
performed without violating the essence of what is to be separated [ ... ]' (1988, p. 
37). 
However, there is another point to take into consideration, which serves to 
moderate the tension just explored. While we speculate that absolute unity is 
inconceivable as far as conventional awareness is concerned, it is equally valid to 
speculate, as Holderlin does that absolute separation and individuation is 
impossible (1988, p. 84). By this Holderlin is acknowledging the interconnected 
and interdependent nature of all reality. In other words, there is nothing in the 
entire universe that exists in and of itself, in total isolation and unrelated to 
anything else. That this is the case manifests itself in either the form of a 
subconscious, yet nonetheless incessant longing, or as a conscious understanding 
of one's own vulnerability in the face of an infinite and eternal process. It is 
precisely this vulnerability - one's temporality in the face of a moving, dynamic 
infinite and eternal whole, the determined falling prey to indeterminacy, the 
'becoming in dissolution' that makes tragedy what it is. The particular cannot 
remain what it is, but surrenders constantly to a perpetual state of becoming. 
With regard to the claim that tragedy is the metaphor for 'intellectual intuition' 
Holderlin points out that 'intellectual intuition', itself, is vulnerable to an inherent 
striving for individuation and separation. Unity cannot endure and the intellectual 
intuition is as prone to flux, as are the parts that it seeks to unite. This argument 
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will be taken further in the next chapter where Holderlin's study of 'becoming in 
dissolution' together with the study of the reciprocal relationship between the 
aorgic and organic modes of being mentioned earlier are discussed. Related to 
this section however it is sufficient to refer back to the point made earlier 
regarding the 'in-between' space that exists - the link between subject and object 
- the space in which the 'all in all that always is' presents. Then it makes sense to 
claim that 'intellectual intuition' too is vulnerable, just like the parts it seeks to 
unite. 
However, what needs to be considered at this point is the possibility of 
experiencing a metaphorical representation of 'intellectual intuition' insofar as it 
is a pre-reflective awareness of pure Being. What needs also to be considered, 
however, is that this experience, while in actuality unconscious, through poetic 
trickery, becomes accessible at a conscious level. 
Structured into the poem is what Henrich identifies as a 'transcendental instant,' 
which this thesis argues functions metaphorically to represent 'intellectual 
intuition'. The 'transcendental instant' is described by Henrich as an 'interruption' 
(2003 p. 229). Henrich clarifies the nature of this interruption in the following 
excerpt, this time taken from The Course of Remembrance: 
The modulation of tendencies and their tones leads only to what is 
momentarily new. Thus to reveal the totality itself an interruption 
must occur in the modulation. In this interruption the entire 
sequence is brought together, surveyed, and at once compared with 
what is new, what can already be sensed and which announces 
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itself as the other of what has come to completion. This is the 
divine moment, the transcendental instant. The poet must know 
how to calculate it and produce it. (1997, p. 136) 
While what is at issue in this particular excerpt will become more apparent in the 
next chapter, for the moment it is sufficient to work with the idea that the 
transcendental instant is the point at which a perfect balance is struck between 
antagonistic tendencies; it is but a fleeting instance but consists in the ultimate 
reconciliation of the underlying unity, in that no particular tendency dominates, 
but each is poised in such a manner that the propensity towards dominance is 
suspended. Included here ought to be the tendency that seeks to harmonise. 
However, evidence suggests that Holderlin seeks to make this moment a 
conscious experience and therefore it seems more likely that the tendency that 
seeks to harmonise has momentarily succeeded. 
For Holderlin this moment is the 'transcendental instant' as Henrich identifies it, 
because it is the moment where the perfect balance exists in and of itself 
(Holderlin 1988, p. 77). Consciousness at this point is balanced in such a manner 
that neither awareness of the self nor awareness of the non-self is present but an 
awareness of their unity is felt. This is the very same moment that Holderlin 
laments in his Hyperion is the 'pinnacle of all thoughts and joys, the sacred 
mountain peak; the place of eternal rest' where 'all thoughts vanish before the 
image of the world in its eternal oneness' - the moment that Holderlin 
acknowledges in this very same passage, that vanishes upon reflection (Holderlin 
in Santner 1990, p. 4 ). 
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For Holderlin the 'transcendental instant' is thus strictly speaking only possible in 
the moment in which the antagonism between all three tendencies is at rest; as 
soon as consciousness is active in reflection, this moment is over - it cannot 
endure, in and of itself. Imagination too, since it is an effective process, must be 
suspended in order for the 'transcendental instant' to occur. However, the 
imagination contributes to the process of cohesion and must in some manner also 
contribute to the grasping of the 'transcendental instant' so that an awareness of it 
is possible. If this was not the case, then Holderlin's efforts have been in vain. In 
any case, what is crucial to this event is the poem itself - its structure - the 
'transcendental instant' is dependent on structure. 
But, what the 'transcendental instant' stands for can be easily misconstrued, as in 
the case where an understanding comes very close and yet tells us nothing about 
the transcendental. For example, Adorno (1992), in an article entitled 'Parataxis, 
On Holderlin's Late Poetry', begins with what presents as an insightful 
understanding of how Holderlin structures his poetry and then speaks about the 
truth of a poem and how it exists. Adorno's understanding is that truth is 
'something that transcends [ ... ] structure [ ... ] not from the outside through a 
stated philosophical content, but by virtue of the configuration of moments that 
taken together signify more than the structure intends' (1992, pp. 112-113). Thus 
far, it looks as though Adorno is on the same track as we have just progressed, but 
he then makes an attempt to point to an instance in one of Holderlin's poems, 
namely 'Celebration of Peace', where the configuration oflanguage allows a truth 
to emerge that has not been directly spoken. But Adomo's perspective on 
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Holderlin's revealing of 'truth', albeit Adorno understands the manner in which 
'truth' emerges in terms of arising out of a deliberate configuration of poetic 
language, none-the-less is limited to a semantic appraisal and therefore is 
propositional, falling short of a revelatory experience of an ontological kind. From 
what has so far been discussed in terms of Holderlin's relationship with Fichte, it 
would be a mistake to think that Holderlin's poetry is limited to semantics. 
While Adorno identifies a caesura in Holderlin's poem, it is not one that can be 
construed as the 'transcendental instant' that Holderlin so meticulously calculates 
into the poetic structure. But then again, Adorno is not reading Holderlin's poetry 
as dealing with a specific philosophical conundrum - Adorno reads it 
predominantly as a literary work in which he identifies literary techniques and 
devices such as the caesura Holderlin employs to make meaning or reveal 'truth', 
but 'truth' that is related to the reality of the subject matter rather than a mystical 
revelation such as a transcendental instant in which utter unity is experienced. 
Indeed Adomo's reading of Holderlin's poetry is that 'the category of unity, like 
that of the fatherland, is not central' [to it] (1992, p. 119). On the contrary, 
Adorno claims that '[u]nity and seltbood are no more critical for Holderlin's 
hymnic work, which is itself processual and historical, than is "what remains and 
endures"' (1992, p. 119).35 In the light of our discussion so far with regard to 
Holderlin's poetics based on Fichte's thesis and his own very specific 
philosophical aspirations as a result of it, Adomo's claims appear to be founded 
35 Adorno is here referring to Heidegger's thesis regarding Holderlin's hymn 
Andenken (Remembrance) in which the last line 'what endures poet's provide' has 
formed the basis ofHeidegger's thesis that the essence of poetry is the founding of Being. 
100 I Page 
on an incomplete understanding of the task that Holderlin sets for himself. 
Adorno's reading of Holderlin's critique of Fichte's 'I' as 'something without 
object and therefore trivial' (1992, p. 122) is further proof of an incomplete study 
of Holderlin's poetics for nowhere does Holderlin make this claim himself. While 
it is true that Holderlin expressed perplexity and concern for an 'Absolute I' in 
that it contains all reality and therefore is inconceivable as has been demonstrated, 
Holderlin nonetheless worked with Fichte's 'I' as a challenge and incorporated it 
structurally into his poetry as a means to deal with it. The purpose for considering 
Adorno's example is to offer a different perspective on the purpose of Holderlin's 
poetry. For Adorno it remains in the literary aesthetic realm and he rejects, 
particularly Heidegger's claim that it has an ontological function. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate through an exploration of 
Holderlin's poetics based on his theoretical writings just how a specific 
philosophical issue is dealt with in poetry and how poetry is appropriated 
accordingly, to facilitate a special philosophical ascesis. The chapter has sought to 
provide a clear explanation of how poetry is appropriated to work within the 
boundaries and context of a symbiotic and uni-focused relation with philosophy. It 
is clear that Holderlin's poetry is underpinned by an extensive understanding of a 
specific ontological issue arising, in this case, out of his study of Fichte's 
Wissenschaftslehre. It is also clear that, after claiming that the issue of self-
consciousness in the face of the Absolute cannot be dealt with in theory, Holderlin 
makes it his specific mission to deal with it on an aesthetic level, namely in 
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poetry. Holderlin's very uniquely contrived poetics has proved to be a strong 
example of how the exploration of a philosophical problem may be pursued 
beyond the usual philosophical context in which it is conceived. 
An overview of Fichte's 'internal structure' that represents the necessary and 
reciprocal determined relationship between the Absolute, subject and object which 
Henrich insists forms the basis of Holderlin's poetics has served as a model 
against which to measure Holderlin's concerns and how he deals with them in 
theory and then in poetry. Henrich's argument that Holderlin retains Fichte's 
internal structure has been substantiated by a demonstration of how Holderlin's 
articulation of a 'threefold antagonism' does indeed accord with the model given 
as Fichte's 'internal structure'. It has been argued also that Fichte's form of this 
model in itself does not give rise to a moment where unity is experienced, but that 
the Fichtean model nonetheless provides Holderlin with a structure through which 
he goes on to further explore the possibility of such an experience in poetry. 
We have seen, in this chapter, that Holderlin envisages poetry be composed in 
such a manner as to optimise its significance in relation to philosophical 
outcomes. Here the difference between poetry and philosophy with respect to 
methodology became obvious. Poetry, while it shares with philosophy an 
obligation to articulate, for instance, the 'intellectual intuition' about which it 
speculates, is not bound by the same strictures. Holderlin's theory, for instance, 
allows an articulation of the 'threefold antagonism', as symbolically represented 
102 I Page 
in poetry, as opposed to the theoretical representation by which philosophy is 
normally bound. In terms ofresolving the antagonism, Holderlin's use of poetical 
devices such as the caesura, allows him to explore the possibility of revealing an 
'intellectual intuition' but in an un-theoretical manner, indeed, without words. 
However, what is unspoken is the effect of the appropriated language within the 
poem and we have seen for Holderlin to do this well requires skill and direction. 
Holderlin thus represents and reinterprets, innovatively, the problem of self-
consciousness, vis-a-vis the Absolute, so that it is now intuitively processed and 
indeed, moves beyond a simply individual intuitive processing to an ascesis 
within which a profound integration of the self with reality is experienced. While 
Holderlin's work can do no more than provide for an ephemeral experience of the 
integration it nonetheless expands, at least within the realm of conscious 
experience, the cognitive scope of an understanding of a 'self' in relation to and 
as an integrated aspect, of the 'whole'. By working closely with philosophy 
Holderlin gives transparency to a problem that in its conventional philosophical 
setting remains otherwise opaque. 
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Chapter 3 
BECOMING, DISSOLUTION and 
REMEMBRANCE - HOLDERLIN'S 
TONAL THEORY 
Yet, fellow poets, us it behoves to stand 
Bare-headed beneath God's thunderstorms 
To grasp the Father's rays no less, with our own two hands 
And, wrapping in song the heavenly gift36 
Speaking in reference to his beloved Diotima, Holderlin's Hyperion exclaims the 
communing power of music, 'Speech abashes. Music alone would serve; to 
become all music and united with each other in one celestial melody!' (1990, p. 
42). Although these sentiments are spoken through Hyperion 's voice, they 
nonetheless reflect Holderlin's own poetics which embraces the use of tones and 
musicality for the specific effect of unity. In the previous chapter, the key focus 
was to clarify H6lderlin's concern with the antagonistic relationship that exists 
36 Holderlin 1990, p. 195, translated by M. Hamburger 
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between subject, object and the Absolute, inherent not only in Fichte's 
Wissenschqftslehre but also inherent in Holderlin's view of the structures that 
underpin the human condition. Henrich, as previously mentioned, identifies this 
relationship as being central to Holderlin's poetics and names it the 'threefold-
antagonism ', a structure that Holderlin seeks to make integral to the poetic 
process and product, and thereby to resolve that very antagonism. The focus of 
this chapter is to inquire into the chief mechanism, namely Holderlin's tonal 
theory that works towards a poetic interpretation of this 'threefold antagonism.' 
Holderlin's tonal theory explores the complexities of tones - their variations and 
modulations - how to create them, how they interrelate and importantly, how to 
control their effects to achieve the overarching goal of unity within the structures 
of poetry. 
Because of Holderlin's fascination with tones and in particular the tonal quality of 
a work of art, some scholars will argue that Holderlin's philosophical aspirations 
are secondary to his musical aspirations. Cyrus Hamlin for example argues that 
Holderlin is essentially a composer and that Holderlin's concern rests primarily 
with 'the question of tonality' in the same way as it does with rhythm and 
harmony (Cited in Fioretos pp. 300-301). While it is true, as the introductory 
quote reveals, Holderlin does concern himself with the question of tonality in this 
manner, and indeed, his understanding is that the task of poetry is to 'wrap the 
heavenly gift up in song', we must not dismiss Holderlin's philosophical mission 
that underpins his concern with the musicality of poetry. Holderlin's key objective 
remains, to get beyond the fact of consciousness as outlined in the previous 
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chapter. However, what Holderlin's tonal theory reflects is a particular view of the 
universe as inherently musical. 
It is therefore quite correct to identify Holderlin's tonal theory as supporting a 
musicality that extends to his poetry. James H. Donelan (2002), for example in his 
article 'Holderlin's Poetic Self-Conscious'37 makes a convincing argument that 
there is a connection between Holderlin's tonal theory and music theory in 
general38• Donelan makes a particular reference to a theoretical essay written by 
Christian Gottlieb Korner. In 1795, Korner wrote an essay entitled 'On the 
Representation of Character in Music'39 (Uber Charakterdarstellung in der 
Musik). Donelan argues that this article inspires Holderlin to explore the theme of 
tones in his own brief theoretical text entitled Wechsel Der Tone.,0. Donelan 
demonstrates how this text presents as an attempt to 'emulate in poetry the 
strnctural characteristics of musical Tonartwechsel, that is, how tonal music 
defines its key center through the assertion of an opposing key' (2002, p. 137). 
Donelan explains this further in technical terms as a resolution of a 'dissonance 
into a consonance characteristic of a cadence' (2002, p. 137). Indeed Holderlin 
37 Philosophy and Literature Volume 26, Number 1, April 2002, pp.125-142. See 
Also Donelan's recent publication entitled, Poetry and the Romantic Musical Aesthetic, 
published in 2008. The chapter entitled 'Holderlin's Deutscher Gesang and the Music of 
Poetic Self-Consciousness' is of particular interest and relevant to this thesis. 
38 For a more recent interpretation of Holderlin's tonal theory and how it relates 
particularly to music, see, M. Spitzer's Music as Philosophy, Indiana University Press, 
2006 
39 A translation of this essay and commentary by Robert Riggs ofKorner's article, 
can be found in The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 81(Winter1997) pp. 599-631. 
40 This text is published in Holderlin's collected works (1962) StA Vol. 4, pp. 248 -
250 
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does explore how discord between opposing tones resolve towards the effect of a 
harmonious unity in this particular text, which is discussed in more detail later. 
In relation to Komer's essay, while the focus here is predominantly about the 
character of music, his discussion concerning tonal quality, movement of tones, 
the relationship between the individual notes and the tonic, are indeed relevant to 
Holderlin's preoccupation with poetry as musical composition but also are useful 
to the overarching goal of unity. Komer also explores an aspect of composition he 
characterises as an underlying striving for a goal of unity when he argues that: 
'In the relationship between the individual tones and the tonic, 
on which the unity of the melody is based, there appears to be 
striving for a goal, sometimes approaching, sometimes moving 
away, and finally at rest when it has been reached' (Komer, cited 
in Riggs, 1997, p. 27) 
The argument Komer makes concerning the goal of coming to rest is particularly 
relevant to Holderlin's poetics. Indeed it is precisely the goal that Holderlin seeks 
to accomplish within the structures of poetry, the goal to which the sequencing of 
alternating tones is directed. 
The significance ofHolderlin's tonal theory in terms of the symbiotic relationship 
between poetry and philosophy discussed in Chapter 1, and indeed in terms of a 
philosophical ascesis, is that it makes functional the relationship between 
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Holderlin's philosophical views of change and becoming, and so addresses the 
'threefold antagonism' within the poetic process, into which they are integrated. 
Holderlin's tonal theory describes a method that integrates the intricacies of the 
very problem it seeks to resolve. The method itself supports a refinement of 
philosophical and poetic processes that ultimately give rise to a 'transcendental 
instant' in which subjectivity is overcome, or suspended, in its integration with the 
whole. 
The strategy of this chapter is to provide a context for Holderlin's tonal theory. 
Core influences that inform Holderlin's theory of how the interrelation between 
tones works are addressed. For example, Empedocles' account of change (with 
which Holderlin was familiar) serves here as useful comparative model by which 
to frame Holderlin's own theory. In particular, the metamorphosing of tones that 
is to occur within the structures of a poem is a feature of Holderlin's tonal theory 
that reflects aspects of Empedocles' account of change. In effect, the situation that 
emerges in Holderlin's essay 'Becoming in Dissolution,' is comparable to the 
situation emerging in Empedocles' On Nature, insofar as the inexhaustible 
interrelations that give rise to a world are concerned. In Empedocles' case, there 
are four immutable elements that give rise to such a world, whereas for Holderlin, 
it is the 'all in all that always is', that gives rise to a world. While Holderlin does 
not explain how the world gives rise to a world, 'the all in all always is' 
nonetheless provides for a continuous 'worlding' that is supported by an 
undercurrent of a becoming and dissolving of relations. However, a further and 
more relevant comparison at this point is between Empedocles account of 
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becoming and the world that is a poem including the undercurrent of the 
interrelating tonal variations that support it. The undercurrent of relations that 
become and dissolve is simulated in the artwork by a series of alternating tones 
which, like Empedocles' elements, are immutable in and of themselves, but in 
relation to other tones, also create further tonal effects. Holderlin works 
specifically with three minor tones, namely passion, sentimentality and fantasy the 
sequencing of which give rise to further tones, namely heroic, idealistic or naive 
which give further rise to either the tragic, epic or lyrical mode (See Holderlin's 
'On the Difference of Poetic Modes' in Pfau 1988, pp83-87). 
Secondly, what Holderlin identifies as the aorgic/organic relation, is discussed as 
it serves as an alternate model that deals, nonetheless with essentially the same 
problem of becoming. Fundamentally this relationship characterises the reciprocal 
relationship that in Holderlin's view exists between the unconditioned and the 
conditioned, but also and more specifically, it encapsulates the relationship 
between nature and 'man'. 'Man' or more specifically, the poet, is 'organic' in the 
sense that he has the capacity to reflect, 'organise' and transform nature, so that it 
too becomes 'organic'. At the same time, 'man' through this 'cultivating' process 
becomes in tum aorgic that is, infinite and universal (1988 p. 53). In this respect, 
Holderlin's task closely resembles that of early German Romanticism. As we see 
in Chapter 6 in which the moral education of humankind is discussed, Novalis in 
particular is concerned with the transformation of nature - making nature a moral 
entity. 
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Thirdly, the unifying principle of remembrance is discussed. While it is true to 
argue that Holderlin's tones in themselves are unifying, as Donelan does41 it is 
remembrance that in the end provides the tonal constellation with its 
cohesiveness. Without remembrance at its core a composition cannot sustain 
cohesion, which would be detrimental to unity. Following this there will be a 
further discussion regarding the technical aspects of the alternating of tones as 
they work within the form of a poetic structure. 
Foundational aspects of Holderlin's Tonal Theory-
Holderlin's tonal theory deals with the tension inherent in the 'threefold 
antagonism', a tension that characterises the relationship between the subjective 
'I', namely consciousness, world and totality (See Figure 1, Chapter 2, p. 81) 
Holderlin's tones are symbolic of each of the components that contribute to the 
dynamism that underpins the structure of consciousness that this tension 
represents. Holderlin's tones represent the three tendencies inherent in the human 
condition. These are (!)the tendency to strive 'for pure self-hood and identity'; 
(2) the tendency to strive 'for significance and differentiation and (3) the tendency 
to strive 'for harmony' (1988, p. 74). As discussed previously, Holderlin works 
with these three components with the understanding that the dominance of any 
one tendency is always at the expense of the other two, but that none of the 
tendencies can dominate indefinitely over the other two. There is thus a constant 
movement between tendencies; a movement Holderlin seeks to emulate in poetry 
41 Donelan (2002),p. 136 
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through tonal modulation. Holderlin's poetics further deal with the intricacies of 
how these tones are created, how to refine them and how their modulation and 
interrelating works to affect the ultimate goal of unity. 
Hamlin42 observes that HOlderlin's tonal theory 'seeks to define and control a 
dynamic process of thought and experience,' which is embodied in the 'language 
of the poem [ ... ] through a sequence of tones which move through stages of 
development, reversal, retrospective and self reflection' (2000, Cited in Fioretos 
p. 293). 
Hamlin's interpretation correctly identifies the core elements that belong to 
Holderlin's theory of tones and also recognises that Holderlin's tonal theory seeks 
to control a dynamic process of thought and experience. Importantly however, the 
dynamism that these elements create, as they constantly mutate, serves to emulate 
the dynamism of life itself and, in particular, the human condition. This is 
Holderlin's ultimate concern. 
With this concern, Holderlin is careful to devise a mechanism that supports the 
representation of the 'threefold antagonism' within the structures of poetry. His 
mechanism embodies a matrix of tones that gives the poem its structure and 
42 Cyrus Hamlin explores Holderlin's tonal theory in an essay entitled 'The 
Philosophy of Poetic Form, Holderlin's theory of Poetry and the Classical German Elegy' 
(2000). 
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purpose. The technicalities associated with creating and refining tones provide the 
moving force underpinning Holderlin's theory of becoming, and it is through this 
theoretical foundation that Holderlin develops the technical structures that support 
the possibility of transformation through engagement with the poetic product. 
Holderlin's philosophical position concerning the intricacies of the underlying 
nature of reality instruct his tonal understanding, in particular the mechanism that 
supports the matrix of tonal variations within an artwork, the final aim of which is 
unity. The mechanism that supports the transformation from one tone to another, 
and indeed the effects of these transformations, includes the unifying principle of 
remembrance, a principle designed to maintain coherence and symmetry and to 
facilitate a seamless progressive unfolding of a poem's content. 
In what follows, three key philosophical underpinnings to Holderlin's tonal theory 
are discussed, namely the theory of becoming in dissolution, the theory of the 
aorgic/organic relation and the concept of remembrance. The first two are 
variations of the same theme while the third serves importantly as a unifying 
principle. 
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(a) Becoming in Dissolution 
Holderlin develops his tonal theory in two key theoretical texts, namely 'On the 
Operation of the Poetic Spirit' and more explicitly in 'On the Difference of Poetic 
Modes'. The other source is the already mentioned brief text 'Wechsel der 
Tone '.43 However, Holderlin's text 'Becoming in Dissolution' provides also a 
vital key to understanding how the interrelation of tones work, in particular tonal 
alteration and the effect of movement between tones. 
In respect to the theory outlined in 'Becoming in Dissolution,' Pfau argues that 
the 'concepts of the title echo Fichte's terminology when he discusses the formal 
character of the 'reciprocal determination between "I" and "non-I'" (1988, p. 
172). Pfau then gives a comparable excerpt in Fichte's thesis in which this is 
indicated: 
'[t]he form of reciprocity is no more than the mutual intrusion, as 
such, of the components upon each other. The matter is that in the 
components, which ensures that they can, and must, so intrude. -
The characteristic form of reciprocity in the relation of efficacy is a 
coming-to-be through a passing away' (Science of Knowledge 
Fichte 1794-95 p. 165 cited in Pfau 1988, p. 172). 
Considering terms like 'reciprocity' and the phrase 'coming-to-be through passing 
away' it is clear that this passage does echo Holderlin's theory of becoming for 
43 For an alternate analysis of Holderlin's tonal theory see also, John Daverio's 
article, 'The "Wechsel der Tone" in Brahms's "Schicksalslied" in the Journal of the 
American Musicological Society, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Spring, 1993), pp. 84- 113. Daverio 
discusses the possibility of a link between Holderlin's tonal theory and Brahms' 
composition Schicksalslied in which the composer has paid particular attention to achieve 
a 'tonal unity' according to a progressive 'tonal plan'. For the purposes of this chapter 
however, Daverio provides a useful exegesis ofHolderlin's tonal theory. 
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these ideas are also present in Holderlin's 'Becoming in Dissolution' and are ideas 
that we have seen support Holderlin's interpretation of Fichte's internal structure 
in terms of his own 'threefold antagonism'. However, Holderlin's theory of tones 
also bears significant resemblance to aspects of Empedocles' account of change. 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter, and indeed this thesis, to elaborate 
extensively on this connection, it is nonetheless pertinent to the overarching quest 
of elucidating Holderlin's tonal theory. 
In On Nature, for example, Empedocles, too, gives an account of the nature and 
process of becoming as it occurs in the physical world in terms of entities coming 
into being and then passing away, or dissolving back into their origin. A brief 
overview of Empedocles' account is as follows44 : there are two aspects of the 
whole of nature that Empedocles considers, namely the one and the many and that 
the relationship between the two is reciprocal in that the many give rise to the one 
and the one gives rise to the many. The whole and the many exist in virtue of the 
continual intermixing of four fixed elements. These are water, air, earth and fire. 
These four elements are the basic stuff of the universe and of things. Each thing 
that comes into being does so according to a particular configuration of these four 
elements just as each being dissolves because of the reconfiguration of these 
elements. However, these elements do not come together nor do they dissolve of 
44 The interpretation of Empedocles' account of change is extrapolated from the 
translations of by Arthur Fairbanks, (ed. & trans). The First Philosophers of Greece 
(London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1898), pp.157-234 and by W.K.C. Guthrie, who also 
gives an excellent exegesis of Empedocles' fragment in A History of Greek Philosophy, 
Chapter 3, Cambridge University Press, 1965, pp. 122-265. 
114 I Page 
their own accord; they are simultaneously unified by love and dissolved through 
strife. Love and strife are thus significant forces that underpin the interplay and 
exchange of the four elements. As far as becoming and dissolution is concerned, 
this is only possible by virtue of the constant alternation that occurs between love 
and strife. Neither love nor strife remains dominant indefinitely but each will give 
way to the other in a constant striving for dominance. When one is o.r becomes 
dominant, the other is or becomes recessive. In Holderlin, this interplay is echoed 
in the following claim that '[r]econciliation is there, even in the midst of strife, 
and all things that are parted find one another again' (1990, p. 133), a theme that 
underpins also the aorgic/organic relation discussed later. 
Empedocles also factors variance into the process - variance in the degree to 
which one is dominant over the other and variance in the degree to which one is 
recessive. That the process of becoming is cyclic in nature is due to boundaries 
inherent in the process itself. There is a point at which for example, dominance 
and recessiveness reach their respective peaks and then are necessarily attracted to 
strive towards their respective counterpoints. This idea is explored also in 
Holderlin's theory of the aorgic/organic relation. 
While the evidence is not substantial enough to argue that Holderlin shares with 
Empedocles precisely the idea that the universe is made up of four immutable 
elements that mix and separate to give rise to the becoming or to the dissolution of 
a world, there is no doubt that the two accounts of becoming (or change) bear 
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some resemblance. Holderlin's exploration of the movement that coming in and 
out of being represents, which in Holderlin's theoretical texts is the movement 
that occurs reciprocally between potentiality and reality, describes a similar 
movement that supports the reciprocal relationship between the one and the many. 
The 'one' for Holderlin is the eternal and infinite 'world of all worlds, the all in 
all which always is' (1990, p. 96). The many are the manifold of worlds 
(including entities) that arise each moment out of the decline and dissolution of 
worlds. A world is simply a configuration of relations and the transition from one 
form of world to another or from one moment to another is given motility through 
a re-configuration of relations. 
An example of a world that Holderlin explores from the outset in the theoretical 
text 'Becoming in Dissolution' is the reciprocal relationship between 'fatherland, 
nature and man' (1988, p. 96): 
The declining fatherland, nature and man, insofar as they bear a 
particular relation of reciprocity, insofar as they constitute a 
special world [ ... ] and a union of things and insofar as they 
dissolve, so that from the world and from the remaining ancestry 
and forces of nature, which are the other real principle, there 
emerge a new yet also particular reciprocal relation just as that 
decline emerged from a pure yet particular world (1988, p. 96) 
What stands revealed in this excerpt is the perpetual nature of the exchange 
between relational components that precipitate transition. The particular 
constellation in question - man, fatherland and nature - Holderlin explores for the 
relational aspects that constitute change in which a world either recedes or 
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emerges. For example, the 'decline or transition of the fatherland' (1988, p. 96), 
describes a transitional effect that occurs through continual relational exchanges 
that take place from moment to moment, but always in the present. Holderlin 
makes the point also, later in the same text, that 'from nothing there follows 
nothing' (1988, p. 96) which intimates that, because there is something, namely 
reality, there has always been something. However, reality itself is subject to 
perpetual transformation, so while there is always reality, it is a reality that is 
constantly changing. 
While Holderlin does not speak explicitly about the mixing and separating of 
immutable elements such as air, water, earth and fire as does Empedocles, 
although these concepts do come up in his poetry, he works with this reality 
which he refers to as a 'living existence' or an 'all in all that always is' mentioned 
above (1988, p. 96). For Holderlin this 'all in all that always is', is the reference 
point-the 'origin' (in a Heideggerian sense) of the world45 . Holderlin does not go 
as far as naming what origin consists of except to say that it is infinite and eternal. 
Referring back to the structure of consciousness discussed in the previous chapter, 
the Absolute represents the infinite and eternal and is the 'source' or origin of the 
subject/object relation. We know from previous discussions that what is eternal 
and infinite is not, according to Holderlin, identical with the subject/object 
relation - in which case neither is it identical with 'world' in the context just 
described. 
45 Like Heidegger, Htilderlin's understanding of origin is that it is other than a first 
principle. It is a-historical because it is always present albeit obscured by world. 
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The 'all in all that always is,' relates to the structures that support and constitute 
the transition from receding to emerging in the following way: the source, or the 
'all in all that always is,' is P.Osited to exist, argues Holderlin in 'all time - or in 
the decline, the instant, or more genetically, in the becoming of the instant and in 
the beginning of time and world' (1988, p. 96). In other words, the 'all in all that 
always is' rests fundamentally in the 'in-between' that links one moment to the 
next, the instant in which the receding moment and the ensuing moment meet in 
the cross-over in which the change occurs. This transitional moment is but an 
instant in which actuality dissolves into potentiality and potentiality in tum 
dissolves into actuality, but for Holderlin in this instant, which is at once a 
becoming and a decline, the 'all in all which always is' [the Absolute] presents 
itself (1988, p. 96). This is because the 'all in all which always is' is itself 
undetermined and while sourcing the particularity of the emerging world - it is 
not identical with that world. This is arguably the same view that Holderlin holds 
concerning the difference between the Absolute and the subject/object relation at 
issue in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. 
Related to this is Holderlin's proposition that the 'possibility of all relations is 
predominant in the transition' (1988, p. 96). What this means in theory is that 
anything is possible and that the principle of causation is not necessarily the 
determining factor that makes it possible for a world to arise. This theme will be 
revisited in Chapter 7, when discussing Novalis's 'Magical Idealism'. Novalis 
too, takes thinking to a point where causality loses its exclusive power over the 
emerging reality. 
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The significance ofHolderlin's concern with a theory of becoming is, however, its 
relation to his tonal theory. The special use of tones, as previously argued, is 
critical to Holderlin in the formation of a work of art that is ultimately a totality 
and within which transformation occurs. 
(b) The aorgic/organic relation as a conceptual framework underpinning the 
tonal theory 
In Holderlin's theoretical texts, the aorgic/organic factor presents as a reciprocally 
determined cyclic movement between humankind and nature and serves in this 
context as a model for the cycle of becoming that also informs Holderlin's tonal 
theory. However Holderlin's discussion around this particular model of becoming 
is complex46 and not fully developed but it is nonetheless important that an 
attempt at an interpretation of this model is made so that a more complete 
understanding of Holderlin's theory of becoming and hence his tonal theory is 
achieved. 
From Holderlin's texts at least this much is clear, namely that the terms 'aorgic' 
and 'organic' describe two distinct modes of being. When Holderlin describes 
something as aorgic he is referring to nature that is characteristically identified as 
being un-organised insofar as it is unlimited and indeterminate. As such, nature is 
46 Indeed, some will argue, as Arnaud Villani does in an essay entitled 'Figures of 
Duality', that Holderlin's texts in which the aorgic/organic factor is discussed, 'are 
radically unintelligible in an asymbolic logic in which neither Greek logic, nor an 
Empedocles as the living emblem of contradiction experienced at its most intense, are 
conceivable' (Villani cited in The Solid Letter, 1999, p. 195). 
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cast as aorgic as opposed to 'organic'. 'Man' on the other hand is 'organic'. The 
term 'organic' represents for Holderlin almost the opposite of what we understand 
by this concept today. Rather than it meaning untreated or unprocessed, it 
represents that which has been treated with the organising and reflecting principle 
of the spirit and of art (as explained by Pfau 1988, p. 168). 'Man' as poet is in a 
position to apply this principle (of which more is said in the following chapter) to 
nature and in so doing, transforms it, or more simply put, 'organises' it to become 
'organic'. 
This idea is developed in the essay 'The Ground for Empedocles' where Holderlin 
makes an important distinction between nature and art. He argues that 'Art is the 
blossom, the perfection of nature' and that 'nature only becomes divine in 
conjunction with the diverse and harmonious art; when everything is entirely what 
it can be' (1988, p. 53). Art is thus the medium through which perfection is 
possible. Without art, nature is incomplete or falls short rather of its own 
perfection. 
Holderlin also tells us that 'the more organic, artistic man is the blossom of 
nature' while the 'aorgic nature, when it is sensed purely, by the purely organised, 
purely and uniquely formed man, affords him the feeling of perfection' (1988, p. 
53). From this we can extrapolate that 'man' is the artist and in virtue of this, 
'man' is 'the blossom of nature', meaning that nature is perfected in 'man' but 
through the medium of art of which he himself is part (see Chapter 4 for a detailed 
120 I Page 
discussion on the function of the poet). However, just like a blossom belongs to a 
tree and is indeed dependent on that tree for its existence, so too 'man' belongs to 
and is dependent (for 'his' perfection) on nature. But just like the blossom that 
eventually gives over to become a tree, so too 'man' must surrender himself and 
return to nature. For this reason, Holderlin goes on to argue that while perfection 
is indeed the goal or destiny of nature, and therefore 'man', it is not something 
that is as such 'for knowledge' (1988, p. 53). 'If it is to be known' argues 
Holderlin, 
'then it must present itself by separating itself in the excess of 
inwardness where the opposed principles interchange so that the 
organic, which surrendered itself too much to nature, and which 
forgot its essence and consciousness, transcends into the extreme 
of autonomous activity and art and reflection, whereas nature, at 
least in its effects on reflective man, transcends into the extreme 
of the aorgic, the incomprehensible, the non-sensuous, unlimited, 
until the progression of the opposed reciprocal effects the two 
originally united meet again as in the beginning, only that nature 
has become more organic through the forming cultivating man, 
through form giving drives and forces as such, whereas man has 
become more aorgic, universal infinite' (1988, p 53)). 
With this, Holderlin gives an impression of a cyclic movement that constitutes the 
attraction and resistance between the two opposing forces, the aorgic and organic. 
The cyclic nature of this movement is controlled by the extreme limits of these 
opposing forces so that a point at which the two are at extreme ends is the same 
point at which they are united 'as in the beginning.' The movement however does 
not allow for any particular point to hold sway and therefore 'knowledge' of 
perfection is not possible as such since it occurs only at the point at which the 
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aorgic and organic are unified in a total eclipse, so to speak. The perfection is 
captured in this eclipse which belongs to the 'in-between' instant, discussed 
earlier, in which the 'all in all that always is' presences. Holderlin describes this 
moment characteristically as the 'birth of the highest hostility,' which is at the 
same time the place where the 'highest reconciliation' is possible (1988, p. 54). 
That this is so can only be in virtue of the fact that we are dealing with a cyclic 
movement, wher~ the beginning and end are ultimately indistinguishable. If we 
were to demonstrate this by way of a diagram then we would imagine a circle 
where at one point two arrows join at their base but point in opposite directions. If 
we firstly imagine that the arrow on the left side, is the aorgic and the arrow on 
the right is the organic then if we also imagine a movement in which the arrows 
move away from the point at which they start, in opposing directions, away from 
each other but around the circumference of a circle, it would be the case then that 
the two arrows would meet to cross over at the 180-degree mark and again at the 
360-degree mark. This last cross over point will be the point at which they are 
united 'as in the beginning'. At the 360 degree mark, the aorgic and the organic 
have come full circle, so to speak and it is at this point where the aorgic has 
gained the highest individuality while the organic has gained the highest level of 
universality which Holderlin explains is the 'product of the highest struggle' 
(1988, p. 54). However, also at this point the aorgic has become the organic while 
the organic has become the aorgic and the cycle must start again, each having 
gained what the other has lost- each having 'become' through dissolution. 
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Admittedly, this exegesis is only a rudimentary interpretation ofHolderlin's thesis 
but it nonetheless serves the purpose of highlighting the cyclic nature of the 
relationship and in particular, the interplay between the aorgic and organic modes 
of being. In relation to Holderlin's tonal theory, a similar cyclical interplay 
between tonal variations, and the whole, is at issue. The tonal variations strive 
towards a peak, at which point they must surrender towards transformation into 
becoming what is their opposite. In Wechsel Der Tone, Holderlin makes this quite 
clear as follows: 
Does the ideal catastrophe not resolve itself into the heroic in 
that the natural tonic key becomes an opposite? Does the natural 
catastrophe not resolve itself into the ideal in that the heroic tonic 
key becomes an opposite? Does the heroic catastrophe not 
resolve itself into the natural in that the ideal tonic key becomes 
an opposite?47 
Ultimately Holderlin's aim is to capture a symbolic, yet cognitive experience of 
'intellectual intuition', as discussed in the previous chapter. Now - with the 
aorgic/organic factor in mind we can expand on this by saying that the 
'intellectual intuition' is similar if not identical with the 'in-between', the 
transitional point (however undetectable to the conscious mind) that links one 
moment to the next, which is the same place in which the aorgic and the organic 
eclipse. This instant cannot be objectified and therefore suffers the same fate as ' 
'intellectual intuition', in that it cannot be 'known' - hence the aim is for a 
47 Translated from the German by Donelan (2002). 'Lost sich nicht die idealische 
Katastrophe, dadurch, daB der natiirliche Anfangston zum Gegensatze wird, ins heroische 
auf? Lost sich nicht die natiirliche Katastrophe, dadurch, daB der heroische Anfangston 
zum Gegensatze wird, ins idealische auf? Lost sich nicht die heroische Katastrophe, 
dadurch, daB der idealische Anfangston zum Gegensatze wird, ins natiirliche auf?' (StA 
IV, 1, 238) Cited in Donelan (2002), p. 135 
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metaphorical rendition of an 'intellectual intuition', which at least provides the 
conscious mind with an experience of the unity for which it longs. 
(c) The unifying principle - Remembrance 
While to some extent, love has been identified as a unifying principle, particularly 
in Empedocles' theory of change, and as we will see later, also in Schlegel's 
formula, in Holderlin there is an additional principle, which shares in this 
function. This is 'remembrance', which features as an integral aspect of the 
process of becoming in dissolution, and by virtue of this, informs Holderlin's 
tonal theory. 
In providing an initial interpretation of remembrance, a turn to Heidegger, who 
claims a particular affinity with Holderlin on this point, would seem appropriate. 
In Elucidations of Holder/in 's Poetry, Heidegger makes the following claim: that 
'poetry is remembrance' and that 'remembrance is founding' (2000, p. 172). 
These claims offer some genuine insight into the function of remembrance 
relevant to the current context. However Heidegger also makes claims such as: 
'Remembrance is a poetic abiding in the essence of what is fitting to poetic 
activity, which, in the secure destiny of Germany's future history, festively shows 
the ground of its origin' (2000, p. 171 ). This type of claim focuses on historical or 
teleological outcomes for a particular nation, and therefore ignores Holderlin's 
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poetic intentions, which, as has been demonstrated, are clearly entwined with his 
philosophical aspirations. However, because Heidegger has given the concept of 
remembrance considerable attention, it is useful to acknowledge his particular 
understanding, vis-a-vis Holderlin's use of this idea and to extract from 
Heidegger's interpretation some of the nuances that do help clarify what 
Holderlin's intentions are for the use of this concept. 
Heidegger's interpretation of remembrance is influenced by his interpretation of 
Holderlin's hymn by the same name (Andenken). In particular the last line of the 
hymn which reads, 'what remains is founded by poets', has come to serve, at least 
in the Heideggerian interpretation, as the guiding principle underpinning the 
nature and function of remembrance. What is also significant about this line is that 
it provides us at once with a closure to the hymn and with a philosophical and 
vocational statement in respect to the function of the poet. Heidegger's 
interpretation of this line informs his thesis that the essence and function of poetry 
is the 'founding of truth' a claim he makes earlier in an essay 'On the Origin of 
Art' ( 1992, p. 199). Heidegger' s concept of truth and his concept of Being are (or 
become over the course of his thinking) indistinguishable. Indeed poetry in the 
Heideggerian context is clearly a founding activity, the object of which is Being. 
Founding and remembrance belong together to perform the same function. Indeed, 
the two functions are practically identical and in relation to his quest for Being, 
remembrance, or better said 'original remembrance' (2000, p. 265) is a decisive 
recollecting that brings forth, or reveals truth of Being, or Being, itself. That this 
is the case relates back to Heidegger's initial interpretation of Being to mean truth, 
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or more correctly, Alethea, a concept Heidegger adopts from the ancient Greek, 
translated roughly to mean disclosure or un-concealment. Being however is 
undisclosed since it is veiled in obscurity by the historical development of 
philosophy since Plato, in particular metaphysical inquiry. It is thus the task of 
poetry, the essence of which is remembrance, to recollect or more esoterically to 
summons Being and thereby 'found' it. This interpretation fits quite well with 
HOlderlin's own understanding regarding the task of poetry. For example in 
'Becoming in Dissolution' Holderlin points to a moment where at a certain point 
in the sequential unfolding of the cycle of change, there 'emerges by way of 
recollection [ ... ] a complete sentiment of existence [Lebensgefiih[j'48 (1988, p. 
98). What HOlderlin could be referring to, is the 'transcendental instant' discussed 
in the previous chapter, in which an experience of pure being becomes accessible 
to the conscious mind. Recollection, in this example, thus functions in a similar 
way as remembrance does in Heidegger's quest for Being.49 
Apart from Heidegger's inquiry into Being, founding is a means by which to 
establish or ground something while remembrance is about recollecting. In 
relation to Heidegger's quest for Being, it is Being that is, through the act of 
remembrance, simultaneously recollected and founded. Remembrance is thus a 
48 Pfau, in his translation of Holderlin's text, has translated Lebensgefuhl as 
'sentiment of existence'. His argument is that Holderlin's attempt to develop the concept 
of Lebensgefuh/ for his own purposes resembles Rousseau's argument in 'Fifth Reverie' 
(1988, p. 173). 
49 This concept is also discussed in the next chapter in relation to the poet's task, 
which is to facilitate remembrance so that consistency and coherence in a poem is 
ensured. 
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combination of two particular processes not unlike the augmented method that 
results from the unification of poetry and philosophy as discussed in Chapter l. 
Here it was established that the objective was to unite philosophy as grounding 
activity with poetry to not only form a totality but to perform in combination, as a 
totality. 
Holderlin develops the concept of remembrance in his study of the process of 
becoming in dissolution. Here it is endowed with a technical function that 
Heidegger overlooks. The key objective in 'Becoming in Dissolution' is to gain 
insight into the transitional movement that supports the structures of change, 
which in turn supports the unity of existence. Holderlin highlights the exactitude 
of the moment in which the decline of one moment and the incline of the next are 
at their most intimate in their reciprocally determined relationship. Holderlin 
works with this study on a larger scale in poetry where the intention is to capture 
an overall transition from one moment to the next in the form of a progressive 
unfolding of events, thoughts and impressions occurring over a period. Poetic 
devices that Holderlin works with are designed to make the overall transition 
occur seamlessly, yet, noticeably, and in such a way that an overall impression of 
unity is made available to experience. On an even larger scale Holderlin explores 
the cycle of becoming in relation to the emergence of a particular world, for 
example, including the special determinations that make and dissolve such a 
world. As discussed earlier, Holderlin provides the example of the reciprocal 
relationship between fatherland, nature and man in his essay 'Becoming in 
Dissolution'. This is a rather important example Holderlin uses to demonstrate the 
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mechanics of the underpinning structures that support change that, at the same 
time, enable continuity and coherence through recollection. Fatherland in this 
relationship represents a particular 'ancestry' and features as an underlying 
principle, in conjunction with the 'forces of nature' and the existing (and therefore 
dissolving) world, which is the totality of the reciprocal determination of 
fatherland, nature and man. Ancestry presents as residual, even in the decline or 
transition, and is that which prevails in the dissolution of world. 
It is out of these structures that the function of remembrance arises and, when 
compared to Heidegger's interpretation outlined above, this function is relatively 
pragmatic. Although, while it is easy to miss, the text reveals a subtle hint that 
remembrance also has a higher function. Where the concept is discussed is in the 
following excerpts: '[ ... ]the possible which enters into reality as that reality itself 
dissolves, is operative and effects the sense of dissolution as well as the 
remembrance of that which has been dissolved' (1988, p. 97). A little further, 
Holderlin argues that, '[i]n the perspective of ideal recollection, then, dissolution 
as a necessity becomes as such the ideal object of the newly developed life, a 
glance back on the path that had to be taken' and that 'from the beginning of the 
dissolved and thus, as explanation and union of the gap and the contrast occurring 
between present and past, there can occur the recollection of dissolution' (1988, p. 
97). If we take recollection and remembrance to mean the same thing, we can see 
that firstly a connection is made between that which has been dissolved and the 
remembrance or recollection of that which is dissolved which occurs in the newly 
developed life. This indicates that remembrance is about retaining in some form, 
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that which must dissolve to allow the new reality to emerge. Without 
remembrance for example, one moment will simply pass into another and nothing 
of that previous moment remains to sustain the next. Remembrance thus provides 
continuity and coherence, which Holderlin insists is as important in the artwork as 
it is in life and is especially needed to fulfil the function (in poetry) that gathers 
the segments together into a coherent whole. Secondly Holderlin makes a 
distinction between the remembrance of the 'dissolved' and of 'dissolution' itself. 
It is in the making of this distinction that remembrance is given a higher function. 
If indeed remembrance functions to re-collect dissolution itself, and not merely 
that which is dissolved, then we have a provision that allows for a glimpse into the 
interstice of two consecutive moments. 
It is appropriate at this point to look at Henrich's interpretation of the concept of 
remembrance. 
In The Course of Remembrance, Henrich deals with the concept of remembrance 
extensively, also like Heidegger, in particular relation to HOlderlin's poem entitled 
'Remembrance' (Andenken). Although, unlike Heidegger, Henrich interprets 
remembrance to be a structured course in which disclosure and recollection are 
reciprocally determined in the unfolding course of the artwork. In this manner, 
that which is recalled is brought into the present and not kept at a distance. The 
course of remembrance is however not just about recollecting that which is past 
but is equally about 'recollecting' the future. The point at which the reciprocally 
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determined unfolding of disclosure and remembrance occurs can be described as 
an event in which a mutual attraction occurs between the future and the past so 
that they are gathered into the present (Henrich 1986 p. 216). We can see that 
Henrich's interpretation pertains to the artwork and does not incorporate an 
ontological function as such, or, not at least in the manner in which Heidegger has 
appropriated remembrance to function ontologically in the recovery of Being. 
It appears however that Holderlin has a twofold function in mind validating, to a 
degree, both Heidegger's and Henrich's theories. Keeping in mind Holderlin's 
mission, namely to deal with the underlying structures that support consciousness, 
we can see how Heidegger's interpretation is thus valid. 
The intricacies of the tonal undercurrent supporting the goal for unity 
In this section, the aim is to expose the intricacies of the tonal undercurrent 
supporting the goal of unity within poetic structures. Using the term 
'undercurrent' to describe the tonal activity is to emphasise the almost illusory 
nature of tonal effects. Each tone that becomes manifest within a poem is 
supported by tonal variations other than the tone that resounds. 
Holderlin's theoretical text 'On the Difference of Poetic Modes' is essentially 
about the distinction, but also the relationship between the various tones that 
permeate a poem. Holderlin's key objective in this text is to clarify the intricacies 
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of his tonal theory, which includes an articulation of how tones work in relation to 
other tones and importantly how they work within the structure of the poem. 
Tones are set into an artwork through the semantic quality of the text, and through 
a particular appropriation of language which involves careful structuring of 
particular words and phrases. Holderlin argues that this must be done according to 
a 'lawful calculation' (1988, p. 101) or 'poetic logic' (1988, p. 109).50 The 
structuring incorporates phonetic, syntactical and semantic variations so that not 
only do the meanings of words contribute to the setting of the tone, but the 
'sound' and the rhythm, created phonetically and syntactically respectively, also 
contribute significantly to the setting tones. In addition, symbolism too, is an 
important structural feature in Holderlin's work that adds a hidden layer of 
meaning to the overall significance of the work. 
Through the careful combining of all these components, which would require, we 
will assume, a particular understanding of their value in relation to each other, 
both minor and basic tones become manifest within the artwork. While from 
Holderlin's writings, the precise nature of how this works is not helpfully clear, 
the intention appears to be this: A poem is (or ought to be, rather) a unified whole, 
one within which the struggle of the 'threefold antagonism' is inherent. The 
individual minor tones arise and dissolve in and out of each other, but within a 
framework designed to uphold their basic unity. From Holderlin's notes, we can 
5° For an interesting argument concerning that calculative dimension in HOlderlin's 
poetry see Jean-Luc Nancy's 'The Calculation of the Poet', an essay published in The 
Solid Letter. Nancy deals with the nature of the calculable law, which allows for no 
approximation. Holderlin calculates into the poem that which is incalculable - ironically, 
for this to occur, the process must be exact. 
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see for example that passion, as a minor tone dissolves into fantasy, also a minor 
tone. Fantasy in tum dissolves into sentiment, which is a minor tone and 
sentiment dissolves once more into passion. However, this sequencing operates 
also at another level. For instance, if the language itself is sentimental, the effect 
is passion. If the language is predominantly passionate, then the effect is 
fantastical. Therefore, the appropriation of language is such that each phase of a 
poem, namely the sentimental dissolving into the passionate, the passionate 
dissolving into the fantastical, and the fantastical dissolving into the sentimental 
once more, are structured in such a way as to give rise to a corresponding effect. 
Cyrus Hamlin in an essay entitled 'The Philosophy of Poetic Form ... ' explains it 
thus: 
In a musical composition the interrelationship of tones 
constitutes a dynamic system of sound which is essentially self-
referential and autonomous. In the case of a poem by Holderlin, 
by contrast, the dynamics of modulating tones serve the 
cognitive and reflective purposes of the language as figurative, 
or metaphoric, form, so that the essential referent of the poem, 
regardless of its particular content or subject matter, is always 
the movement of thought which constitutes it and which it 
symbolises or represents. In this way the poem, conceived by 
H6lderlin to be a modulation of tones through a dialectical 
structure of metaphor (die durchgehende Metapher, to use the 
phrase from Holderlin's marginal note about the structure of Der 
Rhein (SA 2; 2: 730), constitutes a system of verbal signs, which 
signifies through a complex sequence of tension and conflict, as 
progress and regress (again borrowing Holderlin's own terms), 
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the movement of poetic thought itself. (Cited in The Solid Letter, 
Fioretos (ed) p. 301)51 
From a previous account of Hamlin's thinking, we know that he understands 
Holderlin's work in terms of musical composition and that he considers Holderlin 
himself to be, in a musical sense, a composer. However, in this instance Hamlin 
wants to emphasise that there is nonetheless a distinction between a musical 
composition and a poem when it comes to the function of tones. In the above 
excerpt, Hamlin argues that the distinction revolves primarily around the 
communicability of language and how tones are set into the work to support or 
facilitate this communicability. To this end, Hamlin argues that tones in a musical 
composition function as an interrelated unity only to serve the structure in which 
they are contained and in doing so give rise to a 'dynamic system of sound'. As 
such a musical composition is 'self-referential and autonomous', meaning that the 
organised tones are the structure that constitute the musical composition. Each 
tone in fact is self-referential in terms of the sound or key that it is, in virtue of 
itself. Tones structured into the poem, on the other hand, are not self-referential 
but serve the process, or movement of reflective thinking. A tone is achieved 
through 'verbal signs', namely language. The interrelationship of tones in a poem 
is thus conveyed through a dialectical sequencing supporting the struggle, the 
becoming and dissolution between tones that this interrelationship represents. 
51 Cyrus Hamlin's key objective in this essay is to demonstrate how Holderlin's 
tonal theory is set into the elegy entitled 'Meno's Lamentation for Diotma'. 
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The distinction that Hamlin makes is plausible to a degree; however even in a 
musical composition, tones may be set into the work to function in a similar 
manner to the tones Holderlin seeks to incorporate into the poem. In the Holderlin 
context, tones are complex in their make-up of metaphor and other poetic devices 
and work to convey a mood, of which there can be a variety within the structure 
of one poem. A musical composition, in the same way, lends itself to this kind of 
setting of tones. This is particularly the case in classical compositions where a 
piece follows a sequencing of tonal qualities and variations that move through 
episodes from passion and excitement to melancholic meandering. In this case, 
tones are not merely self-referential but serve to support a movement, also, one 
could argue, of poetic thought. 
This aside, Holderlin's poetic calculations that support the implementation of 
tones are based on his understanding of how poetry is categorised into three kinds 
of poetic modes. These are the lyric, epic and the tragic. Each of these categories 
is identified as such according to the 'basic tone' (or mood) each represents. For 
the lyric, the basic tone is naive; for the epic poem, the basic tone is heroic and 
for the tragic, the basic tone is idealistic. Naive, heroic and idealistic are in turn 
created through the strategic interplay of the minor tones - passion, sentiment and 
fantasy. Curiously, Holderlin limits the minor tones to these three values which, 
in themselves, like Empedocles' elements, give rise to an effect when configured 
and re-configured in relation to each other and in relation to the basic mode. 
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Technically speaking the tonal movement is contained within the structure of the 
poem, although this does not limit its effects. The effect extends beyond the poem 
and is enduring. The poetic structure itself however represents a unity and 
complete unto itself. For Holderlin unity is only possible by virtue of there being 
components that can be united. Similarly, dissolution is only possible in virtue of 
unity - for 'how could dissolution be felt without union [?]' asks Holderlin in his 
essay 'Becoming in Dissolution' (1988, p. 96). The tones that Holderlin seeks to 
weave into the poetic structure are thus subject to both unity and to dissolution. 
Unity however holds sway, for whatever comes into being is newly united. 
In respect to the tonal movement, Holderlin aims for a poem to express a basic 
tone; this is the tone that sets the mood for the poem, which can be, as mentioned, 
naive, heroic or ideal. The intricacies of the movement that belong to 
Empedocles' cycle of becoming come into play in the manner in which these 
tones are set into the artwork. The basic tone, for example, arises from the 
underlying movement of minor tones that support it. The movement of the minor 
tones consists in their becoming and dissolving which, according to Holderlin's 
calculations, creates an impression ofa major (or basic) overtone. It is precisely in 
the nature of the becoming and dissolution of these tones where a clear correlation 
can be made between Holderlin and Empedocles. 
Included in 'On the Difference of Poetic Modes' (1988) is an example of how 
tones are arranged to give rise to a certain effect. Indeed Holderlin attempts to 
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devise templates, so to speak, to guide the fonnation of poetic structures. He puts 
together a sequential arrangement that is to function as a mode by which a 
particular tone is set into an artwork. Focusing on tragedy, for example, Holderlin 
has in mind the following sequence. Firstly, he establishes that the basic tone is to 
be idealistic. The idealistic tone itself is brought about 'by means of passion' 
(1988, p. 87). Holderlin then lists under the heading of 'language' from left to 
right, a series of minor tones as follows: 
'language 
Fantasy Sentiment Passion Fantasy 
Sentiment Passion Fantasy 
pref. by means of passion. 
Effect 
Sentiment Passion Fantasy Sentiment 
Passion Fantasy Sentiment' 
There are further sequences represented in Holderlin's text but it is unclear from 
Holderlin's notes just how they follow on from the above. However, what the 
sequencing of the above minor tones reveals about Holderlin's theory of poetry is 
that the movement represented, in its dialectical unfolding, is cyclic. 
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Holderlin offers an explanation in the theoretical component in the same text, 
where he explains how this cyclic nature of the sequential movement in a poem 
works in terms of the relationship that exists between the whole and its parts. If 
the poem is the whole then the minor tones are its parts, united, nonetheless, but 
moving harmoniously within the whole - each particular aspect of the poem 
follows a path in which every other aspect of the whole is encountered. Holderlin 
speaks in terms of tangibility and fusion when it comes to the interrelationship 
between the parts and the whole (1988, p. 85). There are specific points at which 
the tangibility of the whole is most profound, points at which the fusion of the 
parts is strongest. The strength of this tangibility is however immediately 
challenged by the ensuing separation of the parts. The highest unity is then also 
the most vulnerable in that it must give over once again to separation to the point 
where, as Holderlin describes it, 'the parts are in their most extreme tension, 
where they resist each other most strongly' (1988, p. 86). From this point, there is 
a return to the centre - a sequential folding into itself, where, argues HOlderlin, 
' [ ... ] these parts at this place in the whole - cancel one another and a new unity 
originates' (1988, p. 86). 
The theory advanced by Holderlin is clearly suggestive of limits and boundaries 
insofar as the value of a tone reaches its peak and then recedes into dissolution, 
the act that gives way to the emerging new tonal value. For example, the 
movement of fantasy in the sequence outlined previously finds its transformation 
in sentiment; sentiment, in turn, finds its transformation in passion, while passion 
finds its transformation in fantasy. 
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Relating this to Empedocles' account of change, there are clear parallels to be 
drawn between the account of the interrelationship of tones within a poem, (as just 
outlined) and Empedocles' cycle of change. Empedocles' Fragment 17 for 
example, demonstrates the relationship that exists between the one and many and 
is comparable to Holderlin's theory of the relationship between the whole and its 
parts as described above. Empedocles discusses the movement that exists between 
the many coming together in love to be one and then growing apart again through 
strife. This aspect too, HOlderlin explores in his theory when he discusses the 
growing apart in terms of 'extreme tension', conflict and resistance (1988, p. 86). 
A second parallel that can be drawn is that Empedocles' cycle of change and 
Holderlin's tonal theory concern the limits and boundaries of the manifold. As far 
as nature is concerned, inherent boundaries impose a peak limit on a particular, 
after which it must surrender to a decline. In a similar way, the poem imposes 
peak limits on the individual tones. The sequencing of the three minor tones (as 
set out in the example above) provides the poem with such structural limitation. 
However, just as existence is eternal and infinite in terms of Empedocles' 
understanding of the inexhaustibility of combinations of relations that are possible 
between the four immutable elements, so too, in poetry, the relations between the 
respective minor tones is inexhaustible. In which case, the possibilities of creating 
a world within the structures of poetry are endless (1988, p. 96). 
Conclusion 
The significance of this chapter in terms of the overall thesis, namely the 
relationship between poetry and philosophical ascesis is Holderlin's attempt to 
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integrate philosophical inquiry into a poetic structure whereby the means, namely 
the tonal configuring and the end, namely the configured unity, are the same. In 
other words, the method that is Holderlin's theory of tones constitutes already a 
totality that in the end supports and sustains that very same totality. This is a 
crucial point that sits at the heart of the kind of philosophical ascesis this thesis 
seeks to define, that in the end, the method and the outcome are united in an 
integrated and reciprocal relation. Moreover, not only is Holderlin's poetics 
informed by philosophical considerations, such as the cycle of becoming and the 
structures of consciousness, but they are incorporated into a method that reflects 
at the same time the symbiotic and uni-focused integration of poetry and 
philosophy, the effect of which is a philosophical ascesis. While it has not been 
possible to provide an extended analysis of Holderlin's formula, simply because 
Holderlin's notes are incomplete and difficult to decipher, it has been possible to 
demonstrate, to an extent, what Holderlin has in mind and for the purpose of this 
thesis, this is adequate. Having said that however, there is scope for further study 
of Holderlin's method, and in particular, Holderlin's efforts to articulate the 'in-
between' of the transitional phase from one instant to the next, deserves greater 
exploration, even for its own sake. Further, this thesis is limited to the analysis of 
theory and falls short of extending the inquiry to include a scrutinizing of 
Holderlin's tonal theory in a comparative manner against his poetry. Indeed it 
falls short of being able to advance conclusively, a thesis that denies or confirms 
the success of Holderlin's key objective, namely to get beyond the fact of 
consciousness with a metaphorical representation of intellectual intuition. While 
Holderlin himself argues that this is possible on an aesthetic level, it cannot be 
proven in the context of this thesis. Moreover, even if one were to attempt such a 
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task it would be problematic, in that Holderlin's work is meticulously calculated. 
The phonetic, semantic and syntactical, as well as the rhythm and form of a poetic 
piece, are all contributing factors that give rise to the tonal undercurrent which in 
tum supports unity, and importantly gives rise to the very important 
transcendental instant in which three antagonistic tendencies come to rest. At best, 
and in hindsight of Holderlin's project, a reader can give a sympathetic 
interpretation of Holderlin's poetry, but cannot prove that Holderlin has attained 
his goal. 
In the next chapter, the task is to discuss the preparation and function of the poet. 
The focus will be again on Holderlin, but with the aim of bringing out what is 
relevant also to the thinking of Schlegel and Novalis, and that is the attainment of 
an objective state of mind that will allow the flow of an autonomous emergence of 
totality. 
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Chapter 4 
The PREPARATION and FUNCTION 
OF THE POET 
This chapter is a sequel to the previous two chapters which dealt specifically with 
Holderlin's response to Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre In that response, Holderlin 
develops a theory of poetry in relation to the problem of consciousness, and also 
the method designed to deal with that problem. We have seen that Holderlin 
develops a theoretical means by which to appropriate the structures of poetry to 
create a mirroring of the 'threefold antagonism' that consciousness represents, in 
his view, in the face of the Absolute. We have also seen that Holderlin further 
seeks to incorporate into poetry a 'transcendental instant' within which is 
achieved a complete balance between opposing tendencies. It was argued that in 
effect, this 'transcendental instant' is the caesura, or the interstice, through which 
an 'intellectual intuition' may be glimpsed. 
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What has not yet been adequately considered, however, is that the method 
employed by Holderlin to allow the 'transcendental instant' to emerge from 
within the poetic process (and this is true also of Schlegel and N ovalis )52, requires 
that the poet be integral to the poetic process in a special way. What this further 
requires is that the poet sacrifice his subjective self and become a channel, so to 
speak, enabling the poetic process to proceed unimpeded in order that the goal of 
unity in and through the integration of the self with reality, may be accomplished. 
The poetic process is complex, and involves not only a comprehensive 
understanding of poetic structuring in and through the application of a tonal 
theory (see previous chapter), but it must also facilitate the release of what 
Holderlin determines to be the 'poetic spirit'53 • Indeed, the poetic process is 
52 Although this chapter deals predominantly with Holderlin, Novalis, is equally 
determined, as is HOlderlin to make the poet an integral part of the poetic process. Indeed, 
Novalis's conviction is that poetry is like mysticism in the sense that it 'represents that 
which cannot be represented' and that poetry (and hereby, the poet) 'sees what cannot be 
seen' and 'feels what cannot be felt.' These are ideas that clearly parallel Holderlin's 
view. In addition, Novalis further acknowledges that the poet, in order to fulfil the task of 
poetry in this way, must be 'truly bereft of his senses' and that everything 'takes place 
within him (1997, p. 162).' Elsewhere Novalis insists that 'the poet may absolutely not 
appear an egoist' (p. 165). This, we can see, is clearly reminiscent of Holderlin's 
direction that the poet overcomes his subjectivity, a process discussed in this chapter. 
Further to this end, Novalis makes the point that the poet must in the 'truest sense' 
present 'subject object- mind and world' (p. 162). This fits in with the romantic quest for 
holism and again, Holderlin similarly understands that this is what is required. Yet, there 
is a noticeable difference in how each poet presents their theory of the technical aspects 
that underpin the poetic process. Holderlin, for example provides a more comprehensive 
overview on what is required of the poet to achieve his goal. To this end HOlderlin, unlike 
Novalis processes the technical aspects of the poet's task more precisely to fit in with his 
metaphysical understanding of the universe. 
See also Schlegel's Literary Aphorism 238 , in which he seeks to explain the 
nature of transcendental poetry which is conditionally analogous to transcendental 
philosophy, if' it portrayed the producer[ ... ]' (1968, p. 145) 
53 Discussed in Holderlin's essay entitled 'Operation of the Poetic Spirit' in Pfau 
(trans.) 1988, pp. 62 - 82 
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wholly dependent on this release, which can only happen if the poet, as subject, 
integrates with the subject matter, and thereby becomes part of the object of 
contemplation. 
In direct relation to the problem of the 'threefold antagonism', the release of the 
poetic spirit appears to enable a thread of communication and resolution between 
the opposing tendencies that this 'threefold antagonism' represents. In Chapter 2, 
a diagram was introduced that served to demonstrate just how the dynamism of 
the interplay between the opposing tendencies worked, by placing the three 
aspects of the tension, or the 'threefold antagonism', in a special relational 
proximity with each other. This chapter introduces an augmented version of this 
diagram (See Fig 2, p. 159) one that now includes a 'transcendental' perspective 
that allows a possible reconnection between the three opposing tendencies. The 
key objective then of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between the poet 
and facilitation of the poetic process. A significant factor underpinning the 
incorporation of the poet into the poetic process is Holderlin's belief that poets are 
destined to deal with the struggle that the separation of subject and object at the 
onset of consciousness represents. The idea is that poets share together in a loyal 
determination to ensure that on one hand the power of differentiation does not 
obscure the Absolute to such an extent that it is no longer present within the scope 
of human awareness and on the other, that it does not annihilate the individual. 
The discussion addressing this point includes an engagement with David 
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Constantine's54 article entitled 'Translation and Exegesis in Holderlin' (1986), in 
which Constantine challenges Holderlin's vocational aspirations to represent the 
gods. Following this, the function of the poet in relation to the sanctification of 
nature in and through poetry is addressed after which the discussion turns briefly 
to Martin Heidegger, within whose theory of poetry Holderlin's vocational 
aspiration to be the poet destined to stand between mortals and gods, is taken 
more seriously. Finally, the discussion will address the more technical aspects of 
the poetic process that ensures the conditioning of the poet to enable the 'poetic 
spirit' to emerge unimpeded. In terms of this thesis, this chapter provides valuable 
argument on how poetry, and particularly the processes that underpin it, including 
the preparation and function of the poet, is conducive to facilitating a 
philosophical ascesis. 
Shaping the 'holy image' - a brief overview of the poet's vocation 
Holderlin operates with the sincere conviction that the poet stands apart from 
other mortals to perform a function that requires diligence and proficiency for its 
proper execution. The poet's task is to mediate between gods and mortals. In his 
poem entitled 'The Poet's Vocation' Holderlin affirms what is at stake when it 
comes to defining the poet's task. Here he draws a clear distinction between what 
the proper concern is of the poet in comparison to that of other human beings: 
54 David Constantine is not entering into the Holderlin discourse as a philosopher 
but from the perspective of literature and criticism. Constantine is a poet and a translator 
and has become familiar with Holderlin's work through the avenues of translating 
Holderlin's poems into English, literary criticism and through researching his biography. 
Nonetheless, his argument presents as a challenge and particular in this chapter is one that 
needs to be addressed. 
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Not that which else humankind's care and skill 
Both in the house and under the open sky 
When Nobler that wild beasts, men work to 
Fend, to provide for themselves - poets 
A different task and calling have been assigned. 
The Highest, he it is whom alone we serve, 
So that more closely, ever newly 
Sung, he will meet with a friendly echo. 
The perspective conveyed in this poem is that it is the poet's task to serve 'he' that 
is the 'Highest'. The entity that 'he' refers to is identifiable throughout 
Holderlin's poetry as God. In Holderlin's theoretical writings God is not 
mentioned as such but is referred to indirectly as either the 'all in all' or the 
Absolute and infinite and is comparable, in part, also to the concept of 
'intellectual intuition' which Holderlin seeks to gain in and through poetry (See 
Chapter 3). Other concepts such as 'divine', 'sacred' 'holy' and 'heavenly' (not 
found in the above example), are also used throughout Holderlin's poetry to 
signify, again in part, the essence that God is. This essence, when conceptualised 
in this way as 'divine' or 'holy', requires poetic articulation for its revelation; 
however, the poetic articulation is limited, in that it can do no more than offer 
'signs,' so to speak, that point to, or disclose God. These 'signs', and herewith the 
disclosure of the divine, become manifest in and through the careful manipulation 
of the language and structure of the poem (see previous chapter). Importantly, as 
Holderlin understands it, revelation is only possible if the subject matter is given 
over to what Holderlin refers to as 'ideal treatment' (See HOlderlin's 'On the 
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Operations of the Poetic Spirit', 1988, pp. 62-82). By 'ideal treatment' Holderlin 
means the poetic process that integrates the subjective self of the poet with the 
very thing that is contemplated. Indeed the 'ideal treatment' of a subject ensures 
that the poet's personal bias does not interfere with the process of revelation. 
Instead the poet mediates through a process of neutrality. This is not only the task 
of the poet but it is something a poet, in a vocational sense is compelled to do. To 
this end, Holderlin clearly devotes himself to revelation of the divine, or as he put 
it in a letter to a friend, 'to the holy image which we are shaping' (Cited in 
Hamburger 1966, p. 14). 
This last quote however may serve unwittingly to support an argument advanced 
by David Constantine concerning the illusory dimension to Holderlin's God, his 
'gods', or the divine and holy. The argument put forward by Constantine puts into 
question the very vocation of the poet as mediator when he argues that the 
'conditions in which a poet might credibly claim to be acting as God's mediator or 
interpreter did not exist in Holderlin's life and times' (1986, p. 389). Indeed 
Constantine argues that Holderlin 'labours to create a God of whom he might be 
the interpreter' (1986, p. 389). Moreover, Constantine argues that Holderlin's 
creation extends to the community that he addresses as well since the 'condition 
of Holderlin' s poetry is, precisely, the absence of God and community' (1986, p. 
389). It is true that Holderlin's poetry, indeed, explores the theme of the absence 
or flight of the gods. Heidegger's theory of Holderlin's poetry and vocation 
explicates this theme, although he gives Holderlin more authority as a poet and 
does not accuse Holderlin of creating a God for the sake of fulfilling his task as 
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mediator, which, if we are to accept Constantine's argument is also imagined 
alongside the creation of his God. However, while the inference in Constantine's 
argument is clearly one that has Holderlin inventing a God in a fantastical way, 
much like, say, a unicorn, Heidegger's interpretation is more fittingly about the 
evocation and invocation of a God, or gods (or Being, rather) that exist(s), albeit 
in obscurity, in virtue of humankind's oblivion to it. The poet's task is to point the 
way to Being through the recovery and invocation of the gods. 
Heidegger's interpretation of the poet's task is not without issues and these will be 
discussed a little later, but focusing on Constantine for the moment, what is 
clearly lacking in his argument is an understanding of the philosophical 
aspirations that underpin Holderlin's poetical aspirations, including what he 
perceives to be the poet's vocation. Constantine argues that Holderlin's 
poetological essays for example, in which h_e attempts to describe the poetic 
process, are 'strange and difficult' (1986, p. 390). This much we can agree with, 
however, when Constantine argues that these essays do not contribute to an 
elucidation of the poetic process, we can see that he has overlooked the link 
between these essays as poetological and Holderlin's philosophy, in particular his 
theory of consciousness and the nature of the subject/object relation in the face of 
the Absolute. Constantine's interpretation of Holderlin's work is thus limited to 
the actual poetry from which he extrapolates Holderlin's perspective on the nature 
and function of the poet. 
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On the other hand, when Constantine describes a poem as entirely metaphorical 
(p. 393) he is touching on a point that Holderlin himself concedes to. Indeed, it is 
the case that Holderlin works with the poem, completely as metaphor. Even the 
effect - the representation of an 'intellectual intuition' in and through the 
'transcendental instant' - is metaphorical. However, this does not mean, 
necessarily, that what is represented in and through metaphorical expression is 
fictitious, which Constantine implies it is. Despite this, Constantine gives an 
indication at least, as to what could be at stake, philosophically. He tells the reader 
that 'poems are not the mere vehicles by which truths are served up for us to take 
away' and that it is probably better to 'think of the poem as a means by which a 
realisation may take place than as a means by which some possessable thing is 
communicated' (1986, p. 394). The problem with Constantine's argument is, 
however, that he does not identify a correlation between 'the realisation that may 
take place' in the poem and the 'thing' that this realisation is of. In other words 
for Constantine, poetry is only about illusions and can tell us nothing about the 
underlying nature of reality. Holderlin on the other hand is driven by an 
ontological persuasion that an 'intellectual intuition' may be possible on an 
aesthetic level and is doing his utmost to make the illusion work towards this 
experience. In other words, for Holderlin a correlation does exist between the 
metaphor and that which it represents, even though that what is represented 
conventionally is unknowable. 
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The Sanctification of Nature in and through Poetry 
In addition to the attention Fichte's internal structure and the 'getting beyond the 
fact of consciousness' (as outlined in previous chapters) receives in Holderlin's 
poetics, the poet's vocation extends to include the task of 'perfecting', or 
sanctifying nature in and through poetry. The task of sanctifying natµre and 
Holderlin's attempt to achieve a metaphorical representation of an 'intellectual 
intuition' are related insofar as they are effects of the same poetical process and 
require the same preparation of the poet. However, in Holderlin's poetics, the task 
of sanctifying nature presents as an additional task and as such appears unrelated 
to the mission of getting beyond the fact of consciousness. On the other hand, 
getting beyond the fact of consciousness is a prerequisite if the poet is to sanctify 
nature within the structures of poetry and, indeed, the union of subject and object 
that is the same union that constitutes holiness and makes nature divine. However, 
because the connection is not immediately obvious, it is worthwhile addressing 
this particular aspect of the poet's vocation separately, although with a view to 
reconciling it with HOlderlin's philosophical inquiry into consciousness and the 
Absolute. In many respects, on a philosophical level, what Holderlin is attempting 
to do with nature is much the same as what Schlegel and Novalis attempt to 
achieve in and through the reconciliation of ideal and real states within the 
structures of romantic poetry. On an abstract cognitive (some might say, mystical) 
level Holderlin's attempt is to reconcile the self with nature - to be one with 'her' 
and thereby cease the yearning for unity, which he perceives is the plight 
underpinning the human condition. It is through this reconciliation with nature, or 
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indeed in terms of an ascesis, through the integration of the self with reality, that 
nature and mortal being become, or are revealed as 'holy'. 
Reminiscent ofEmpedocles, Holderlin's character Hyperion surmises that 'Nature 
- suffers no loss as she suffers no addition' (1990, p.46). Nevertheless, while 
nature will change in appearance from day today, she cannot, Holderlin's 
Hyperion argues, 'dispense with what is best in us' (1990, p. 46). Indeed 
Holderlin's Hyperion continues, 'She [nature] will be a mere patchwork [ ... ] 
neither divine nor complete if ever you are lacking to her' (1990, p. 46). 
Hyperion 's view is based on Holderlin's theory of nature that sees it as 
incomplete without it having been perfected in art. Holderlin argues that: 
[ ... ] nature only becomes divine in conjunction with the 
diverse yet harmonious art; when everything is entirely what it 
can be, and one combines with the other, compensates for the 
shortcomings of the other, which that one must necessarily 
have in order to be entirely that which it can be as a particular, 
then there exists perfection and the divine rests in between the 
two (1988, p. 53) 
'The divine rests in between the two' says Holderlin - the question is, however, 
where exactly is Holderlin pointing? What are 'the two' in-between which the 
divine rests? 
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A little further in the same text Holderlin argues that the 'more organic, artistic 
man is the blossom of nature' (1988, p. 53). This is said after Holderlin has 
already indicated that 'art is the blossom of nature'. Art and artistic man are thus, 
we can assume, each a part of the same process. Art, of which 'artistic man' is an 
integral part, is both the blossom and the perfection of nature - however if art is 
'the perfection of nature' then this 'perfection' cannot be identical with the 
'divine' because Holderlin argues that nature becomes divine in conjunction with 
art, the perfection of nature. The divine thus rests in the juncture that is the 
coming together of nature and art. Indeed, both art and nature as separate entities 
each have their respective ontological shortcomings, which the combining of the 
two, alleviates. Like the ideal and the real, which come together in a continuum in 
Schlegel's formula (See Chapter 5), art and nature too, belong to a continuum and 
just like ideal and real states are reciprocally determined, so too are art and nature. 
The 'in-between' that Holderlin is pointing to is in the balance between art and 
nature - where, as Holderlin suggests, 'there lies the struggle of the individual', 
the moment in which the 'organic' [artistic man] discards its subjectivity' and the 
'aorgic discards its universality' (1988, pp. 53-54). This much was discussed in 
the previous chapter, when the aorgic/organic relationship was explored. The 
relationship between art and nature, too, is based on the aorgic and organic 
relationship and therefore is cyclic. For this reason, Holderlin intimates that the 
'organic artistic man' is a product of his time. In regard to Empedocles for 
example, Holderlin describes him as a 'son of his heaven and his time' and of 'his 
fatherland [ ... ]' (1988, p. 54). What this suggests is that the poet is, 
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phenomenologically speaking, quite rare. The relationship between nature and art, 
based on Holderlin's theory of the aorgic/organic relation, suggests that the 
sanctification of nature, while it is ongoing, is nonetheless subject to a decline and 
incline in intensity. The time when the intensity is at its greatest is precisely that 
time when nature and art are at the extremity of polarisation, because (as was 
argued in the previous chapter) it is at this point that they are each impelled by the 
tension pulling them back towards each other. 
Holderlin is convinced that Empedocles is a product of such a tension. Indeed 
Holderlin views Empedocles as 'a son of tremendous oppositions of nature and 
art' (1988, p. 54), which means that Empedocles is, at the same time, 'a man 
within whom these oppositions are united so intimately that they become one 
within him' (1988, pp. 54-55). This thus makes Empedocles a perfect vehicle for 
the reflection of the divine. 
The holy occurs, as discussed so far, midway between nature and the 'blossom of 
nature' - art. It has been suggested that this structure presents as a continuum. 
Within a continuum, the two aspects are more than connected - they are degrees 
of the same thing.55 
55 For an interpretation of 'nature' based on Heidegger's treatment of Holderlin's 
Hymn 'Wie wenn am Feiertage', A. Schuwer in an article entitled, 'NATURE AND THE 
HOLY: On Heidegger's Interpretation of Holderlin's Hymn "Wie wenn am Feiertage'" 
cited in Research in Phenomenology, Volume 7, Number 1, 1977, offers a useful 
perspective that elucidates this connection. Schuwer clarifies Heidegger's interpretation 
of 'nature' by presenting it in a particular mutually dependent relationship with the poet. 
That nature attracts the poet so that the poet can 'name' it. Nature is the educator of the 
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Heidegger's perspective on the function of the poet 
While it is beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter to give a comprehensive 
account of Heidegger's perspective on the function of poet, it is nonetheless of 
value, to give at least an appraisal of Heidegger's particular concern with 
Holderlin56• 
In his Elucidations of Holder/in 's Poet1y, Heidegger identifies Holderlin as 'the 
poet who is responsible for founding the essence of poetry and that 'this essence 
of poetry belongs to a definite time.' Further, Heidegger insists that this essence is 
poet, in the sense that it draws out of the poet the need to 'name' nature. It is the 'naming' 
through which nature is made holy. 'Nature' here is analogous to Being. Heidegger 
argues it is the task of the poet to disclose Being in and through the language of poetry. 
56 While it is not the place here to critically engage with Heidegger, insofar as 
discussing, for example, the validity of his elucidations of Holderlin's work, it is 
nonetheless worthwhile to mention, at least in this footnote, that what is missing in 
Heidegger's interpretation of Holderlin, is an understanding of the intensity with which 
Holderlin deliberates over the poetic process. What is also noticeably absent is a regard 
for Holderlin's more specific philosophical agenda. Instead, Heidegger has chosen to 
limit himself to Holderlin's poetry and letters to family and friends, in which an account 
of philosophical achievement is less evident. In contrast to his theoretical writings that 
support his poetics, Holderlin's poetry is substantially more esoteric, incorporating quite 
definite allusions to an exclusive relationship between the poet (not necessarily 
Holderlin) and the 'divine', God, the holy, or the gods. Heidegger tends to deal with 
Holderlin's poetry semantically and extracts from a select few poems, evidence that 
supports his view that Holderlin is destined to deal with what Heidegger describes as the 
'founding of Being'. For a more thorough critical analysis of Heidegger's interpretation 
of Holderlin's poetry and Holderlin as a poet see Jennifer Anna Gosetti Ferencei's 
publication Heidegger, Holder/in and the Subject of Poetic Language: Towards a new 
Poetics of Dasein, published in 2004. Amongst her views is also, that Heidegger 
neglected some significant philosophical aspirations that are essential to Holderlin's 
poetics. Gosetti-Ferencei's study is an attempt to clear some of the misconceptions of 
Holderlin's poetics that we find in later Heidegger that are related to poetic subjectivity. 
Her aim is to bring Holderlin's poetics into line with Heidegger's earlier study of Dasein 
and the 'facticity of human existence' which Gosetti-Ferencei argues are consistent with 
Holderlin's poetics (2004, p. xii). 
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as such 'historical in the highest degree, because it anticipates a historical time; as 
a historical essence; however it is the only true essence' (2000, pp. 64-65). The 
'historical time' that Heidegger is referring to is the epoch characterised by a 
double deficiency of 'gods' - gods who have fled, and gods that are yet to come 
(2000, pp. 64-65). In an essay entitled 'What are Poets For?' Heidegger explores a 
similar theme, this time with trepidation, as he makes claims about the function of 
the poet in 'destitute times', where 'not only is the holy lost as the track toward 
the godhead' but 'even the traces leading to that lost track are well-nigh 
obliterated' (2001, p. 92). Heidegger thus claims that to be 'a poet in destitute 
times' means: 'to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods' (2001, p. 92). 
However, parallels between Heidegger's and Holderlin's thinking on what the 
task of the poet is, are better drawn from Heidegger's more theoretical accounts of 
what poetry is and what its function is in terms of strengthening our ontological 
grasp of Being. For example, Heidegger discusses the concept 'fourfold'57, which 
is the gathering unity of four contrasting archetypal elements signifying the 
reciprocal relation between the temporal and eternal modes of existence. 
Heidegger identifies these modes as mortals, gods, heaven and earth which 
together act as the contingency in which and against which beings 'are'. This 
fourfold structure is comparable to Holderlin' s 'threefold antagonism', at least in 
some significant respects. In much the same way as it is the poet's task to achieve 
a 'transcendental instant' or a metaphorical impression of an 'intellectual 
57 See, in particular, Heidegger's 'The Thing' published in Poetry, Language 
Thought, 2001, where this concept is explored. 
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intuition'; it is the poet's task in the Heideggarian context to reveal the point of 
the gathering, which is the event of Being. Arguably, this too can be construed as 
a transcendental moment for it rests not in one particular place but in the midst of 
the harmonious balance between the gathering of opposing forces. 
But while there are similarities, Heidegger tends to present the scenario in much 
more esoteric terms whereas Holderlin is, in his approach, inore genuinely 
convinced that this is in fact the task (in the world) that he is required to fulfil, a 
task that requires, technical processes which include the conditioning of the poet. 
Holderlin's approach is technical because he is dealing with philosophical issues 
that he believes can be dealt with in and through poetic structures. Heidegger too 
deals with the philosophical issue of Being but wants to move away from a 
scientific or technical means of dealing with it whereas Holderlin, (as do Schlegel 
and Novalis), wants to incorporate a high degree of the calculable as an integral 
desideratum within their method. 
The poet's orientation - releasing the 'Poetic Spirit' through the overcoming 
of subjectivity without losing consciousness 
In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that a significant factor 
underpinning the integration of the poet into the poetic process is HOlderlin's 
conviction that poets are destined to deal with the struggle that the separation of 
subject and object, at the onset of consciousness, represents. Moreover, from the 
inquiry into Holderlin's project, we can discern that it is particularly Holderlin's 
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concern that poets share together in a loyal determination to ensure that, on the 
one hand, the power of differentiation does not obscure the Absolute to such an 
extent that it is no longer present within the scope of human awareness, and, on 
the other, that the awareness of the Absolute does not annihilate the individual. 
This perspective requires that the poetic act needs to be very specifically oriented. 
In terms of the structure of consciousness based on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, 
Holderlin, as we know, has developed a theory that deals with and incorporates 
the threefold antagonism, named as such to emphasise the three opposing 
tendencies that underpin this structure. If we can think of the poet first of all as the 
subject, that is to say, the conscious being that stands in an opposing relation to 
the non-self and to the Absolute then we have gained a platform from which to 
develop the poetic orientation. 
Holderlin argues that within its normal cognitive range, the subject (or, more 
specifically, the poet as a consciously aware being) is unable to conceive of itself 
as poetic. Alternatively, and more precisely, the 'subjective I' cannot operate in 
accord with what Holderlin determines is the 'poetic spirit'. What Holderlin 
means by 'poetic spirit' is, on this occasion, the inherent 'drive' that compels the 
poet to poetise. As such, it emerges also as the restless creative drive that ensures 
the possibility of unity and the sanctification of nature. Indeed the poetic spirit 
reveals itself through the incessant longing that Holderlin (as do Schlegel and 
Novalis) identifies so strongly as being characteristic of the human condition, but 
perhaps even more characteristic of the person destined to be a poet. Within the 
'threefold antagonism', we can think of the poetic spirit as representing the 
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tendency that seeks pure self-hood and identity with the one. The tendency 
operates in opposition to the tendency that seeks differentiation and in opposition 
to the tendency that seeks to harmonise these two tendencies. 
But while Holderlin may describe the poetic spirit as 'an unchecked power' 
struggling 'impatiently against its fetters' longing 'to return to the unclouded 
aether' (Holderlin Cited in Frank 2004, p. 116), he nonetheless insists that the 
pure form of the spirit is 'conscious neither of itself nor of nothing' and that for it 
'there is no world' (2004, p. 116). For this reason, the poet must arrive at an 
objective position that allows the poetic spirit on one had to be unleashed, and on 
the other hand, the position extends to allow the poet to provide decisive direction 
for the spirit. In other words, the poet's objectivity includes a conscious engaging 
of the spirit in such a way that the spirit in fact gains consciousness in and through 
the poet's empathy with the spirit, and its unconscious orientation which is to 
unite with itself. 
To facilitate this process, the first step is to relocate the poet's own conscious 
awareness, since it is this aspect of the subject that stands as an impediment to the 
release of the poetic spirit. Holderlin offers instructions as to how to do this in the 
following excerpt: 
Posit yourself by free choice into a harmonious opposition/ with 
an outer sphere just as by nature you are in harmonious 
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opposition with your self, yet unrecognisably so, as long as you 
remain within yourself (1988, p. 74)58 
Holderlin is asking the poet to project conscious awareness into a space that is 
outside the normal range of cognitive experience. What Holderlin is here 
envisaging is a deliberate and virtual 'beyond the known' experience, so to speak, 
whereby subject (self-conscious awareness) posits itself in opposition within 'an 
outer sphere.' It may be argued that this manoeuvre, as far as manoeuvres are 
concerned, resembles somewhat, Fichte's first principle for a science of 
knowledge - the positing of 'I am I'. However, this time the starting point is at the 
location of the subject (that is the posited 'I', or the 'am I', if we refer to Fichte's 
first principle). It is this 'am I' that now posits itself into another sphere in 
opposition to itself. The difference is however that this is a secondary manoeuvre 
and will have a different result, vis-a-vis perception of the oppositional, in terms 
of what is consciously perceivable at this new location. Rather than seeing itself 
as subject in relation to the non-I, it is now aware of itself in opposition to itself 
and as such can observe itself as a reciprocal component of the antagonistic 
relationship between Absolute, Subject and Object. This newly posited relation 
58 The above quote is extracted out ofHolderlin's essay 'On the Operations of the 
Poetic Spirit' written around about 1800. This essay in conjunction with a series of 
aphorisms consolidated in Pfau 1988, under the heading of 'Reflection' offers the reader 
a guide to what is involved in the transformation from ordinary being in the world to 
poetic being in the world, a transformation that is absolutely necessary if one is to 
succeed and be distinguished as a poet. It is within the context of these texts that the 
above 'instruction' is postulated. 
158 I Page 
then becomes the object of contemplation for the self that has created it. In other 
words, Holderlin's challenge is for the poet to act conversely to the 'I am I' 
principle posited by the Absolute 'I' by stepping out of the relation that this 
manoeuvre creates but without dissolving back into its source, the 'Absolute I'. 
From this new location, conscious awareness is no longer an impediment that 
stands between subject and object; instead, there is a shift of consciousness, which 
looks something like this: 
............. 
.. ······· SUJBECT .. ······· 
.. . . 
.... :.:·~·~·: .. •.t .. 9.;~· .. -. .. .,....... • •••••••• - •••••• ::: • 
• ?!'~~ ~ ::~ .. : ·==: ~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ . . 
., . ~ 
. . ~ 
~ . . 
~ . 




: . am "I" : "non-I" . . . 
·• ·. : 
\ ··(SubjecJf (Object) 
·- ·. .:" ,_ · ... :.. .:: 
--....,,. ..:::.......... ..-::=· 
··;:•!!!!!ttl " •••••••••• ••• • 
········ ········ 
···•·•········ 
Fig 2. 'SUBJECT' - Newly posited - 'outer sphere' 
Admittedly, this interpretation of Holderlin's intentions is not without its 
problems. For example, it must be kept in mind that the Absolute for Holderlin is 
the 'one and all' and therefore, arguably, this 'newly posited outer sphere' in fact 
achieves nothing, since the new location cannot itself be part of this unity, and so 
all we have done is caused further fracturing. Indeed, if we were to follow this 
model to its logical conclusion we would find that this fracturing could prove to 
be endless. 
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On the other hand, an important consideration is that while the Absolute remains 
the essential or utter unity, it is at the same time (according to Fichte's model), the 
ground that gives rise to the separation in which subject and object exist. This 
means that the Absolute is itself responsible for the fractioning - the very 
fractioning that it seeks to dissolve. A further implication is that not only is the 
particular drawn into a struggle between itself and its source; the source itself is 
this struggle. To add to the problem, Holderlin, as discussed in Chapter 2, does 
not see the Absolute as identical with subject and object in their opposition, which 
means that so long as we have subject and object, we do not have unity in the 
essential sense that belongs to the Absolute. Holderlin believes that the Absolute 
is pre-conditioned unity, the essence of which is necessarily altered at the point 
where separation occurs. However, while it ('absolute Being' as Holderlin calls it, 
1988, p. 38) is not identical with subject and object, it nonetheless must belong to 
this relationship in an essential way. As far as being human is concerned, this is 
evident by the incessant yearning for unity, which is observed to be characteristic 
of human existence. At the same time, yearning for unity presents as an eternal 
yearning with the implication that unity is eternally unachievable. 
However, the poet's task from this new position (see figure 2 above) is to 
facilitate a conscious experience of unity, not an unconscious one, for this would 
entail the dissolution of the subject. The aim, in other words, is not to dissolve the 
subject, but to transcend it so that consciousness encompasses the subject in its 
antagonistic relationship with itself, world (self and non-self) and the Absolute. 
The poet's task is thus to facilitate the third tendency (discussed in Chapter 3) 
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whereby a harmonious balance between striving for unity and striving for 
individual selfhood is attained. Hereby, the particular retains its dignity, while at 
the same time affinity with the whole is experienced.59 
Returning to the release of the poetic spirit, it is the poet's task, from this newly 
posited objective location to take 'control of the spirit' (Holderlin 1988 p. 62 and 
p. 63 footnote). Essentially, this means that the poet must provide proper direction 
for it; to channel it by means of a new objective consciousness towards a balanced 
and conscious reunion with itself as present in the Absolute, subject and object, 
inclusively. 
This new objective consciousness functions further to allow the poetic spirit to 
merge with itself but with a recollection of its own path. To make sense of what 
this means we need to understand the important aspect of Holderlin's poetics that 
deals with the coherency of a poem. Holderlin's aim is always to manipulate the 
artwork so that it holds together, harmoniously. In the Holderlin context, 
coherency is just as much about symmetry as it is about proper sequencing and is 
applicable to all levels of an artwork, from its physical written appearance right 
down to the syntactic, semantic and rhythmic qualities of the work. Achieving this 
type of stringent coherency is determined by the very conditioning of the poetic 
spirit of which the poet has taken charge. The poet ensures that the poetic spirit 
59 Cf. Schlegel's and Novalis' aspiration to bring both the ideal and the real into the 
same space. 
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becomes much more than a creative impulse but bestows it with the power of 
recollection, or remembrance. Recollection then acts as the 'thread' that holds the 
whole together in the manner just described. 
If the poetic spirit is released unconditionally, then the likely consequence is that 
the artwork is incoherent and as such cannot serve the purpose Holderlin has 
assigned to it. In the following excerpt, Holderlin is very explicit about the effect 
the conditioning of the poetic spirit will have on the artwork. 
If the unified (to the extent that it can be considered by itself) 
shall not cancel itself as something undifferentiable and become 
an empty infinity, or if it shall not lose its identity in an 
alternation of opposites, however harmonious they may be, thus 
be no longer integral and unified, but shall disintegrate into an 
infinity of isolated moments (a sequence of atoms as it were) - I 
say: then it is necessary that the poetic spirit in its unity and 
harmonious progress also provide for itself an infinite 
perspective for its transaction, a unity where in the harmonious 
progress and alternation everything move forward and backward 
through its sustained characteristic relation to that unity, not only 
gain, objective coherence for the observer [but] also gain [a] 
[[translator's insertions]] felt and tangible coherence and identity 
in the alternation of opposition; and it is its last task, to have a 
thread, to have a recollection so that the spirit remain present to 
itself never in the individual moment and again in an individual 
moment, but continuous in one moment as in another and in the 
different moods, just as it is entirely present to itself in the 
infinite unity which is once the point of separation for the unified 
as such, but then again also the point of union for the unified as 
the opposed, finally is also both at once, so that what is 
harmoniously opposed within it is neither opposed as something 
unified nor unified as something opposed but as both in One, is 
felt as opposed in unified manner as inseparable and is invented 
as something felt. (1988, p. 71) 
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The crucial assignment with regard to contributing to the 'thread' that holds the 
whole in unity is for the spirit to 'provide for itself an infinite perspective' which 
means that the poetic spirit retains its own self presence in all its strength during 
the course of the sequential gathering of opposing moments. In one sense, we 
know that spirit is already unified and in virtue of this unification we may assume 
that spirit is already coherent; but because it presents as something that is at least 
driven, to reunite with something that appears to be apart from itself, the 
implication is that spirit too is divided as a consequence of the differentiating 
episode that separates subject from object and from its source. The difference 
however lies precisely with spirit being 'conscious neither of itself nor of nothing' 
because, unlike the subject, spirit is unaware of itself as an individuated entity. It 
is thus the crucial task of recollection, or remembrance referred to above, to allow 
spirit to emerge consciously connected with itself. 
To elaborate further, recollection plays a key role in providing the bearings by 
which one can make sense of the world, in this case the artwork, but is equally the 
provider of identity so we don't feel ourselves to be incoherent. As such, 
recollection or remembrance, as discussed in the previous chapter, is the 'thread 
builder', so to speak, that promotes and sustains coherence and consistency, and 
thereby gives the impression of an overall all, or perhaps better said, an 
underlying unity. Without recollection one moment will simply pass into another 
and nothing of that previous moment remains to sustain the next, in which case a 
loss of bearings and orientation will ensue for the observer of the art work, and the 
art work itself in this case, but similarly for the individual conscious being in the 
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world at large. Interestingly, this concept appears to be based on Fichte's 
understanding of the same process outlined as follows: 
The positing self, through the most wondrous of its powers [ ... ] 
holds fast the perishing accident long enough to compare it with 
that which supplants it. This power it is almost always 
misunderstood - which from inveterate opposites knit together a 
unity; which intervenes between elements that would mutually 
abolish each other, and thereby preserve them; it is that which 
alone makes possible life and consciousness. (Cited in Henrich p. 
230, Fichte GgW, pp. 350-) 
We have thus established the significance of relocating conscious awareness so 
that from its newly elevated position its work with the poetic spirit is achieved and 
the capacity for poetry to represent a harmonious whole is optimised. 
To recapitulate the poet's orientation: the poet, by virtue of engaging in the poetic 
process, becomes aware of the poetic spirit as a mode of being inherently inclined 
agains~ the mode of differentiation, which is characteristic of the individual 
human condition. The poet accordingly needs to have mastered a high degree of 
understanding about how the spirit 'reproduces' itself, so to speak, in the manifold 
of particulars, and how it manifests itself in an intricate web of relations, without 
destroying or reducing itself as 'spirit'. This understanding is derived from the 
structure sketched out earlier in which the subject stands in the middle so to speak 
(although contained in both), between world and the Absolute, feeling the pull 
from both ends, but striving for a harmonious allegiance to both. Spirit, despite 
the separation of subject and object, exists as a continuum in all three conditions. 
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But as mentioned earlier, it struggles against 'fetters.' The implication here is that, 
it too is split and that these fetters must represent the nature of the division that 
occurs at the onset of consciousness where subject and object are created in a 
world that is experienced as external to the Absolute. Spirit is, so to speak, caught 
up in the differentiating process and is thus divided along with subject and object 
and so long as a distinction between subject and object remains, there will be a 
restless spirit. Even though spirit in and of itself is unconscious and therefore 
knows no boundaries, it nonetheless has boundaries imposed on it. Take away the 
boundaries and spirit will join with itself, seamlessly. However, as mentioned 
early, the aim of poetry is to provide a conscious experience of unity and this can 
only be achieved if the poet lifts the subjective barrier, but without forfeiting 
conscious awareness. In doing so the poetic provides for consciousness the 
manner by which it can merge without losing itself through recollection, the 
possibility of which is provided by the new objective consciousness. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with the function and vocation of the poet. The requirement 
of a profound preparation and proficiency on behalf of the poet has added strength 
to the overall argument that poetry and philosophy are integral to an ascesis 
through which the self is given over to the totality that it contemplates. Indeed, the 
preparation and the function of the poet in the Holderlin method, reveals a more 
traditional understanding of ascesis, where it describes a method that involves 
training, and a degree of 'self-denial', insofar as overcoming the limits of 
subjectivity is concerned. This concept of the 'transcendental perspective' is a 
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result of a calculated shift of consciousness, or a deliberate positing out of the 
subjective sphere into an objective realm. The shift of consciousness belongs 
initially to the poet but, as we have seen, is transferred to the poetic spirit. Indeed, 
an important dimension to the poet's task is to provide the poetic spirit with 
consciousness and therewith, guidance. However, the poet is unable to do this 
from the original subjective location since here consciousness acts as a hindrance 
to not only the poetic spirit's emergence but also to its own ultimate unity. 
Holderlin thus instructs the poet to first take a conscious leap and step outside this 
relation in order that the spirit is 'unleashed', so to speak. Metaphorically 
speaking, consciousness is, in this case, like a dam that blocks the flow of water. 
Once, the 'dam' of consciousness lifts, the spirit naturally merges with itself but 
because the spirit is itself unconscious, the poet, from the new and elevated 
perspective, must take control of it. This means that the elevated consciousness is 
now also acting on behalf of the spirit, giving it articulation in a world, so to 
speak. 
The sacrifice of the subjective self, that this integration represents, functions first 
and foremost as a mechanism by which to prevent any personal bias or self-
interest from entering into the poetic arena. To this end Holderlin will argue that 
the poet, if inclined to be partial, emotional or creative for the sake of creativity, is 
in danger of producing poetry that is nothing but 'empty affectation' or worse 
still, produce poetry that is predominantly a reflection of the poet's vanity 
(Holderlin 1988, p. 66). This type of poetry, if we can still call it that, will not 
achieve the goal of unity. To avoid this, the poet is expected to be consciously 
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attentive to the intricacies of the poetic process and in particular, how they relate 
to the specific philosophical goal of unity. 
For this reason, while there is a dimension to the poetic process that requires 
mediation, that is, to facilitate the poetic spirit, at the same time it is not at the 
expense of consciousness. Indeed, not to be biased by the limits of conventional 
subjectivity requires a conscious and continuous effort on the part of the poet. As 
we have seen in the previous chapter, the poet's execution of the poem is a 
premeditated event and follows a carefully calculated theory. In order to 
maximize the effects of the various poetic devices employed to deal with the 
specific issues at stake, particularly in the application of tonal theory, the poet 
must be in command of the various poetic devices. Poetry does not happen of its 
own accord and indeed, the poet is mindful of every utterance, and with the sound 
knowledge of every effect. Indeed there is nothing in the poem that is 
unintentional; nor is the effect of the poem incidental. It may well be the case that 
ultimately, the un-representable, qua un-representable, is beyond the jurisdiction 
of the poet, nonetheless the poet commands the sphere in which this un-
representability is, paradoxically, enabled to 'magically' appear.60 
The chapter has sought to show how Holderlin's poetic process based on his 
metaphysical view of the universe, is, in tum, also based on his observation of the 
60 See Jean-Luc Nancy's essay 'The Calculation of the Poet' in The Solid Letter, 
Readings of Friedrich Holder/in 2000, for a comprehensive analysis of this particular 
point. 
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structures of consciousness augmented by a disciplined perspective on what 
needs to happen if we are to get beyond consciousness - for it is here where the 
experience of unity is possible. While this view indeed serves as the base, another 
more abstractly cognitive (mystical) level is uncovered where we have seen how 
Holderlin interprets the task at hand as incorporating an undertaking to make 
nature divine and to reunite the gods with humankind. 
While the two aspects are, as argued here, variations of the same task, it initially 
appears as though they are quite different. When we read Holderlin's poetry, for 
example, the technical aspects of the process and the philosophical underpinning, 
namely the structure that represents conscious being in the world in the face of the 
Absolute, have fallen away and what we are left with are the mystical elements of 
poetry. 
While some philosophical discourse has ·gone some way in exploring these 
mystical elements (i.e. Heidegger), it is at the expense of the more technical and 
philosophical aspects of Holderlin's- poetics that are considered in this thesis. 
Holderlin's techniques strive to enable a 'transcendental instant,' in which a 
metaphorical representation of an 'intellectual intuition' is accomplished, yet not 
at the expense of consciousness. The transcendental moment is thus the 'heavenly 
gift, wrapt up in song' that the poet presents to mortals so that they too can 
experience the infinite. This is indeed the task of the poet. 
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Chapter 5 
SCHLEGEL'S FORMULA61 
A philosophical ascesis in an equation 
Hans Eichner62 in his 1956 article entitled 'Friedrich Schlegel's Theory of 
Romantic Poetry'63 and again in the 1970 publication entitled Friedrich Schlegel, 
61 
'Schlegel's Formula' in the singular does not indicate that Schlegel works only 
with one formula. Throughout his notebooks, there are various formulae and symbols, 
some of which function quite clearly as shorthand while others stand out as more 
significant. 
62 In his research and study of Schlegel, Eichner worked extensively with 
Schlegel's original notebooks, which on this occasion prove to be extremely valuable in 
terms of bringing to our attention the particular formula, which is the subject of this 
chapter. In his discussion of this formula, Eichner includes a short analysis of the 
underlying philosophical presuppositions that support the structure this formula 
represents, but he has done it in such a way as to make it palatable for an audience that is 
predominantly preoccupied with the history of literature. Even so, Eichner deserves 
recognition for this attempt and reference to his work is justified and not out of context. 
Indeed he is noted in Friedrich Schlegel's Philosophische Lehrjarhre 1796-1806, 1963 p. 
xxxv, as having discovered the significance of the particular formula at stake in this 
chapter. 
63 Published in PMLA, Volume 71, No. 5, December 1956, pp. 1018-1041 Hans 
Eichner's work I consider to be still very relevant and a very valuable resource to the 
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introduces the reader to a 'strange and bewildering' formula, the interpretation of 
which he claims 'would virtually amount to an exposition of Schlegel's poetics' 
(1956, p. 1026). Eichner's concern with Schlegel's formula is to do with how it 
concisely reflects both the definition of romantic poetry and the theory that 
supports it. Eichner, insightfully, alludes to the formula's complexity in that it 
reflects the early German Romantic aspiration for a 'universal' poetry that is 'the 
synthesis of all simple forms and modes of poetry' (1970, p. 65). Eichner's 
reflections further include a brief explication of the philosophical speculations and 
influences that inform Schlegel's formulaic approach. Eichner's concern is to 
explore Schlegel's assertion that romantic poetry is, (even more so than classical 
poetry), the 'ideal' poetry; an assertion that is borne out of metaphysical concerns 
rather than literary concerns.64 
While Eichner provides a discerningly philosophical account of the various 
components of Schlegel's formula, it is by no means an exhaustive account. It is 
the aim of this chapter to extend upon Eichner's analysis by focusing on the 
various components of the formula, and by highlighting their inter-functional 
relation. Moreover, the aim is to deal specifically with how the formula reflects 
and supports a philosophical ascesis. In this respect, Schlegel's formula represents 
a complete synthesis of poetic and philosophical processes, built on the 
integration of ideal and real states. These states combined and interrelated give 
English speaking student of early German Romanticism and has made accessible, 
information that otherwise may have been overlooked. 
64 Please refer to Hans Eichner's 'Friedrich Schlegel's Theory of Romantic Poetry' 
PMLA, Vol 71, No.5 (Dec. 1956 pp. 1018-1041). 
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rise to the 'transcendental poetry' of which Schlegel speaks in his Literary 
Aphorism 238 (1968, p. 145), the ultimate purpose of which is to facilitate a 
universal progression towards ideal moral being. Schlegel's formula is therefore 
entirely prescriptive which in the romantic context demonstrates a deliberate 
turning away from defining poetry through descriptive means. Schlegel argues 
that a 'definition of poetry can only determine what poetry should be and not what 
poetry actually is' or else, 'the most concise formula would be: Poetry is that 
which at some time and some place was thus named' (1968, p.140). Thus Schlegel 
is making the point that defining poetry can only be a prescriptive act, if it is to 
avoid being merely an act of cultural cataloguing which, of itself, would give no 
impetus to the moral development of humankind (which is crucial to the Romantic 
philosophical project). Schlegel constructs his formula to function as a 
prescriptive means that supports the attainment of the 'poetic ideal' within the 
structures of poetry. 
This chapter will proceed, then, by first giving an overview of the intellectual 
conditions and context from which Schlegel's formula arises, which includes a 
discussion of how Schlegel integrates both philosophical and literary ideas in the 
construction of his formula. 
In establishing this context, there is a brief reference to a recent interpretation of 
Schlegel's work by Michel Chaouli, who argues that Schlegel's method 'emulates 
a process and a logic found in eighteenth century chemistry' (2002, p. 108). The 
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significance of this reference is to highlight a particular methodological aspect of 
early Romantic theory that works towards the fulfilment of the more general 
aspiration to unify science and art, to which unification of poetry and philosophy 
belongs. 
Following this is a discussion concerning the formula as a representation of the 
integration or a synthesis of ideal and real states. The synthesis transforms into 
what Schlegel perceives to be the 'transcendental', a term that Schlegel reserves 
for the express purpose of describing this particular connection between the ideal 
and the real. The transcendental points to the balance of these states which 
Schlegel, (as do Holderlin and Novalis), argues is not beyond the realm of 
experience, but contained within it. Indeed, in Schlegel's view, the transcendental 
is a space in which subject and object join into a self-reflective totality. Included 
here is an exploration of the strategy Schlegel uses to deal with the discrepancy 
between Fichte's theory of consciousness and Spinoza's infinite monism that this 
formula seeks to dissolve. 
Finally, there is the explication of each component of the formula, starting with 
the 'poetic ideal' and the philosophical aspirations that underpin it. In this section, 
a discussion concerning Schlegel's concept of irony is included since irony is a 
complex term that Schlegel adapts to fit his ontological position and therewith 
imbue the formula also with the functionality of reflecting the underlying nature 
of reality, which Schlegel perceives to be characteristically ironic. 
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Schlegel's Formula - Conditions and context 
In the intellectual background to Schlegel's formulaic approach are to be found 
key influences and conditions that provide some insight into the argument that 
Schlegel employs, other than those that are philosophical, that validate his 
approach to dealing with the integration of ideal and real states. Indeed, Schlegel's 
literary interest and study of poetry informs his formulaic approach as much as his 
philosophical speculations and aspirations do. 
Within literature, Schlegel identifies characteristics pertaining to particular 
periods, which helps him to identify a variety of genres in literature. Historically, 
these genres are categorised according to a particular dominant trait as fantastic, 
sentimental or mimetic. Schlegel's formula is constructed to integrate these 
genres, each one contributing to the overarching function and structure of a 
transcendental poetry that is designed to hold the ideal and real, and all other 
binary oppositions underpinning reality, in balance. 
If we recall that Schlegel' s 'mission' as stated in fragment 116, it is to combine 
not only the 'separate genres of poetry' but to 'put poetry in touch with 
philosophy and rhetoric' (1968, p. 140) then it makes sense that these genres are 
of particular interest to Schlegel. This is precisely how Schlegel wants his formula 
to work, namely to fuse together these three genres - the fantastic, the sentimental 
and the mimetic - in combination with philosophy and rhetoric. The rhetorical 
aspect is incorporated, as Chaouli correctly argues, to 'take the place of the 
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argument', and enable the form to become the content (2002, p. 30). Indeed the 
quest is, as Schlegel himself suggests, for a work to become self-reflective or self-
critical which means that instead of the work being the object of criticism, it is its 
own object. This is possible through the process that enables the portrayal of the 
producer along with the product (Schlegel 1968, p. 145) a process reminiscent of 
Holderlin's theory of how the poet is an integral part of the poetic process. The 
objective is that the work is a representation of a totality and by virtue of this, 
'speak,' as it were, for itself. The three genres compact to represent the two 
perspectives which Schlegel is seeking to reconcile concerning the underlying 
nature of reality - idealism representing the realm of consciousness and realism 
representing the realm of nature. Mimesis works as the imitation of nature while 
fantasy works to represent consciousness. Sentimentality represents the 
conjoining function and compacts with both the fantastic and the mimetic to 
reconcile nature and consciousness. 
In a broader context, the development of romantic theory includes a rebellious 
opposing of scientific means, yet Schlegel, like Novalis, appears strongly to 
embrace scientific processes. Reading like a mathematical equation, for example, 
Schlegel's formula is clearly suggestive of this. Indeed Schlegel tells us that 
transcendental philosophy must have a strong affinity with mathematics (1963 KA 
XVIll, s81: 907, p. 105). We can therefore assume that transcendental poetry too, 
must have such an affinity. Indeed the influence of science in the development of 
romantic theory is a topic currently discussed in contemporary philosophical 
discourse. Chaouli's The Laboratory of Poetry: Chemistry and Poetics in the 
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Work of Friedrich Schlegel (2002)' serves as a prime example of such discourse. 
The focus in this work is on Schlegel's use of concepts and language that Chaouli 
argues are explicitly based on a particular scientific lexicon, namely chemistry, 
and how Schlegel makes deliberate use of them to represent the organic, eternally 
becoming nature of romantic poetry (2002, p. 2). Chaouli looks further at how 
chemistry is at play in Schlegel's fragmentary writing and how fragments are 
open-ended to allow for a chemical interaction between them with the aim of 
facilitating an evolutionary process of knowledge. Chaouli's image of a 
'Laboratory of Poetry' based on his reading of Schlegel 's work, lends itself quite 
well to capturing the experimental nature of the romantic enterprise, and pointing 
to its relationship with science. It is in this way that Schlegel 's formulaic approach 
stands revealed. Chaouli's thesis presents as a prime example of contemporary 
thinking that understands the 'science' behind romantic poetry, albeit pseudo-
science, but nonetheless as an integral component of a method that is to 
'romanticise the world'. What Chaouli uncovers is the consistency with which 
Schlegel's poetics incorporates concepts and imagery overwhelmingly 
reminiscent of the idiom particular to chemistry.65 This is of course true also of 
Novalis, who also consistently and explicitly employs a scientific idiom. One 
need only look through his Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia to see that this is 
65 While Chaouli concentrates on Schlegel's poetics, which is largely extrapolated 
from the Athendum 1798-1800, Fragments, Schlegel's lectures on transcendental 
philosophy (1800-1801) are, surprisingly, quite systematically organised betraying a 
conscientious effort to present ideas in a logical and scientific manner. The ideas 
themselves are further based on calculative methods such as the manner in which 
Schlegel systematically works through the various epochs of philosophy for instance and, 
for example how he arrives at the idea of reflection after a thoughtful consideration of the 
process. E.g. 'If we carry abstraction over to analysis, the result is the concept of 
discursive [raissonement]. On the other hand if we carry analysis over to abstraction the 
result is the concept of intuitive [etc.]' (F. Schlegel, cited in Schulte-Sasse 1997, p. 256) 
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the case. Although his main aim is to bring the many and varied branches of 
learning together, he does at times think of romantic poetry as scientific and in 
tum identifies the sciences, in particular algebra, as poetic (Novalis 2007, p. 57). 
However, the significance of highlighting the embrace of the scientific view is to 
emphasise once more the nature of their project as philosophical ascesis. Science 
provides rigor and the regulation required to galvanise the integration of poetry 
and philosophy. 
Returning to Schlegel, Chaouli argues that 'the images and concepts of chemistry 
are borrowed and alluded to so frequently as not only to leave no doubt as to the 
importance of this theme in his writings' but he continues, 'also to put into 
question the notion of borrowing, of allusion itself. Further, Chaouli argues that, 
'Chemistry does not only provide the metaphors[ ... ] but in some ways it takes the 
place of poetry itself (2002. p. 37). What Chaouli most likely means is that the 
language of chemistry provides a conceptual framework through which, in 
Schlegel's hands, poetry itself can be seen as like a chemical process, or, perhaps 
better-said, poetry is a transformative process in which, in this case, an integration 
of the self and reality occurs which is uniquely compounded. In any case, 
romantic poetry is itself an outcome of the fusion, mixing and saturation of which 
Schlegel speaks in Fragment 116. In conjunction with this, the aim is for romantic 
poetry to be, 'eternally becoming', which requires the poetic process to continue, 
ad infinitum. 
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Having identified that at least the metaphor of 'chemistry' is hard at work in the 
theoretical underpinnings romantic poetry, Chaouli asks a very pertinent question, 
namely, 'what is the specific conceptual problem that chemistry is supposed to 
help solve?' (2002, p. 39). 
The suggestion in this chapter is, that regardless of whether one accepts that 
Schlegel's theory of poetry is based particularly on an understanding of chemical 
processes, there is nonetheless a 'combinatorial method' that features as an aspect 
of Schlegel's poetics. Schlegel employs this combinatorial method for the express 
purpose of achieving an organic totality in which the balance between ideal and 
real states holds in a continuum. We can say that this is the conceptual problem 
'chemistry is supposed to help solve'. The emphasis however is on 'conceptual' 
and Schlegel's use of the chemistry lexicon is strategic and analogous. That is, 
there is clearly an aim to indicate with the use of this language the possibility of a 
poetry that is in some sense a product analogous to a 'chemical reaction'. 
On the other hand, while Chaouli is quite right to alert the reader to the many 
instances in Schlegel's writing where he seems deliberately to use a word from 
the chemistry lexicon to articulate his own project of constructing an organic 
totality, there is evidence also to suggest that Schlegel understands the chemical 
process as a destructive process. In one particular fragment (Im Winter 1800-
1801 ), for example, Schlegel suggests that the chemical process induces 
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formlessness through a false combustion.66• Further, Schlegel tends to separate 
the chemical process from other more binding processes such as galvanism and 
magnetism which he understand as positive principles in nature comparable to 
genius amongst humankind.67Indeed, the analogous use of the processing 
concepts of chemistry are viewed only as destructive in the sense that they are 
used to dissolve an antagonism that exists between two particular experiences of 
the world; a dissolution that ironically expands on both experiences through the 
particular manner of combining them. Fragment 116, for example, contains 
concepts that are reminiscent of the type of chemical lexicon Chaouli suggests 
underpins Schlegel's poetics of which 'to mingle and amalgamate', to 'fill and 
saturate' are prime examples (Schlegel 1968, p. 140). However, it is also correct 
to think that in using these concepts, Schlegel has in mind the binding processes 
of magnetism and galvanism, which he presents in a comparative way to chemical 
processes. In this respect, it is apparent that, through the use of variously chosen 
scientific concepts, Schlegel's aspiration is to 'fuse together' poetic and 
philosophical processes for the sake of creating a continuum in which 
consciousness and infinity co-exist. 
The strategy now is to analyse Schlegel's formula component by component with 
a view to revealing the richness of philosophical content and intent that underpins 
66 From my reading of the following the German: 'Der chemische PROCESS ist 
das base Princip, Rilckkehr zur Formlosigkeit, F ALSCHES Verbrennen, vorgeiliges. -
(KA XVIII l 963: s60:634, p. 179). 
67 From my reading of the following· Elektrizitat, Galvanismus, Magnetismus in der 
Natur was Genie im Menschen zusammen das gute Princip, wie der chemische ProcefJ 
das base. -(KAXVIII 1963, s58:619, p. 177) 
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the formula. Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is important to 
briefly summarise how the formula, taken as a whole, represents an attempt to 
dissolve an antagonism that exists between two rival theories concerning the 
underlying nature of reality, namely idealism and realism. In the analysis of the 
formula, what will become apparent is the extent to which Schlegel has purposely 
entwined philosophy and poetry into a uni-focused and inter-functional 
relationship for the express purpose of dealing with epistemic, metaphysical, and 
ethical issues. To this end, the formula underpins an ascesis that culminates in a 
harmonious and symmetrical representation of the poetic ideal, representing an 
'infinite approximation' of God (the 'Absolute'). 
A formula with which to dissolve a discrepancy between idealism and realism 
In general terms, Schlegel's formula presents as a summary of his understanding 
of how the 'transcendental' is operative in both poetry and philosophy and how 
the fusion of both transpires to an even greater possibility of a genuine 
transcendentalism. The 'transcendentalism' Schlegel aspires to constitutes the 
bringing together into a harmonious balance, the two polar positions from within 
the history of German philosophy, namely Fichte's idealism and Spinoza's 
realism. Schlegel's conviction that there is reciprocity at play between ideal and 
real states stems from Schlegel's critique of Fichte's idealism and Spinoza's 
realism in which each, idealism and realism respectively, inadequately represents 
the underlying nature of reality. The ultimate effect of Fichte's thesis is that 
consciousness gives rise to the external world, while the effect of Spinoza's thesis 
is that the external world gives rise to consciousness. Schlegel's response to this 
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discrepancy is to argue that the external world and consciousness of the external 
world are in fact mutually determined and therefore are both real, or at least both 
belong to reality. Schlegel therefore does not argue against the possibility of 
either state but argues against the possibility of only one exclusive state. 
Schlegel's critique thus reflects a commitment to a fusion between these two 
opposing states, which is essentially, what Schlegel's formula represents. 
Beiser identifies the following statement made by Schlegel in his lectures on 
transcendental philosophy that 'the minimum of the ego is equal to the maximum 
of nature, and the minimum of nature is equal to the maximum of the ego' 
(Schlegel, cited in Beiser 2002, p. 458) as essential to Schlegel's formula 
underpinning his philosophy. Clearly, from this statement we can discern that 
Schlegel is abstaining from committing to one state or another. Beiser uses this 
statement to argue that if this is the case, then neither state is qualitatively 
absolute and that the polarities - nature and ego - operate as a continuum (2002, p. 
458). This much has already been determined, that Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin work with the idea of totality as a continuum. Indeed the analysis is 
reminiscent of Holderlin' s theory of how the aorgic/ organic factor operates within 
a continuum, where two opposing forces draw together just as they separate since 
the opposing directions in which they travel are circular and thus there will be a 
point at which they meet (See Chapter 3). Similarly, 'the more we proceed in one 
direction' argues Beiser 'the further removed we are from the other' until we 
reach the middle where the two opposites are 'perfectly balanced with one 
another' (2002, p. 458). This midway point is the point in-between consciousness 
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and infinity, at which point Schlegel posits that 'reality', persists. Reality as such 
is the balance between nature and consciousness where they come together to 
form a world (Schlegel KAXII 1964, p. 25). Further, Schlegel argues that insofar 
as Fichte's philosophy characterises consciousness as reflection, and Spinoza 
characterises nature as the infinite, that such characterisation relates more 
particularly to speculation (1964, pp. 25-26). In between the concepts ofreflection 
and speculation, lies what Schlegel identifies as 'divination' (1964, p. 26). 
Clearly, the project Schlegel is undertaking is to establish a midway point, or a 
common ground, between two positions. To make 'divination' the midway point 
between reflection and speculation, in particular reveals something about what 
Schlegel is attempting to achieve since this midway point, too, holds the ideal and 
the real in perfect balance. In terms of how to understand divination, however, this 
would be the fusion between the intellectual and the intuitive, which is not the 
same as an intellectual intuition but rather is the 'transcendental standpoint'. We 
know from Schlegel's lectures on transcendental philosophy that 'intellectual 
intuition', like 'the infinite', is a concept that arises out of 'objective arbitrariness' 
(1964, p. 23), ,the first phase in philosophy. The aim, now that there are two 
identified positions, is to find the middle ground. 
In exploring the breakdown down of the formula, we will see what this middle-
ground, or balance, represents in terms of the poetic ideal, and in terms of God, 
and how the ideal and real come to be represented in the poetic form through the 
integration of fantasy and representation. 
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Breakdown of Formula 
Schlegel's formula reads as follows: 
The Poetic Ideal = 110 yFSM (l/o = God 68 (see footnote) 
0 
The aim in this section is to give a clear analysis of each of the formula's 
components - the poetic ideal, the middle component of the equation, (which 
represents a fusion of fantasy, sentimentality and mimeses) and finally 'God'. The 
strategy is to discuss these variables within the philosophical context from which 
they have originated and also to consider how they provide a methodological 
insight into the kind of ascesis identified in this thesis. 
As foreshadowed in the introduction, this process will uncover a rich 
philosophical depth that serves as an immediate statement of the method by which 
Schlegel hopes to achieve a unification of philosophy and poetry. What will also 
become apparent is precisely how this fonnula sustains the thesis that the 
conjoining of poetry and philosophy is integral to a philosophical ascesis in which 
knowledge of the Absolute can be more fully approached. Even from the initial 
68 German: Das poetishe Ideal = 110 ..f-SM <110 = Gott (F = Fantastischen, S = 
Sentimentalen and M = Mimischen) (KA XVIII, p. xxxv) 
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presentation of the formula, we can see that Schlegel's placement of the 'poetic 
ideal' at the beginning of the equation, followed by his engagement with a special 
conjunction of variables in its mid-section, and then concluding with God, 
indicates the ascetic nature of engaging with this formula. 
The Poetic Ideal 
To talk in a meaningful way about the poetic ideal is to discuss it teleologically, in 
terms of an indicative model or direction. The idea of a poetic ideal arises, in 
some respects, out of necessity, or at least because of a perceived need to give 
poetry, in the context of late eighteenth century German literature, a new, more 
meaningful direction. Schlegel gives preliminary consideration to the poetic ideal 
in his publication On the Study of Greek Poetry. 69 The task Schlegel sets himself 
in this essay is to convince the reader that if 'modem poetry', is to avoid the 
pitfalls of bending to an ever-demanding aesthetic appetite, it requires a new 
directional approach. Already here we can see how Schlegel seeks to appropriate 
poetry with a view to expand the scope of aesthetics or to push beyond its bounds 
or indeed, to impose restrictions on it by 'grounding' the poetic process (as was 
argued in Chapter 1) to the task of extending the epistemic, ontological and ethical 
understanding of humankind. Schlegel justifies this by arguing that if artists 
continue to satisfy the need for pleasure that this will eventually lead to poetry 
plunging into the depths of the bizarre and shocking. To support this argument, 
Schlegel claims that 'with every pleasure the desires become only more violent; 
69 The translation used in this thesis is the 2001 version, by S. Barrett, based on the 
original 1797 edition. 
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with every allowance the demands rise ever higher [ ... ] (200 I, p. 21 ). In terms of 
direction then, Schlegel offers a means by which poetry can, if underpinned by a 
certain philosophical foundation, determine its way to what he decides must be 
'objectivity' (2001, p. 47). 
Schlegel later announces that 'there is a poetry whose One and All is the 
relationship between the ideal and the real: it should thus be called transcendental 
poetry[ ... ] (1968, p. 145). 
In a preliminary way in the introduction, it was pointed out that the term 
transcendental refers to, as Schlegel indicates in this quote, the relationship 
between the ideal and real. What Schlegel wants to achieve is a totality in which 
both the ideal and the real exist, but joined in a continuum. What the 
transcendental stands for in this context is a type of objectivity that arises out of 
an acceptance of both ideal and real states as valid, but where neither is favoured. 
Indeed, this is the 'point of indifference' Schlegel argues exists between 
consciousness and the infinite, (which will be further elaborated on later in 
relation to Schlegel's concept of irony). In order that this is possible, Schlegel, as 
mentioned earlier, requires that the ideal and real are understood as elements 
constitutive of a continuum rather than as independent absolutes. Only in this way 
can there be a movement from one to the other and back again. Schlegel insists 
that these states exist in a reciprocally determined relationship, which means that 
to strive for one without the other is a striving away from totality. These 
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conditions underpin Schlegel's understanding of the transcendental in philosophy 
and poetry. The infinite is infinite but is, at the same time, infinitely finite. 
Consciousness which consists of the relationship between (using Fichte's 
language) the 'I' and the 'non-I', originates in the infinite. In turn the infinite 
originates in consciousness, specifically through the fusion of the 'I' and the 'non-
I' _10 
The transcendental midpoint arises as the poetic ideal manifests itself in poetry as 
objective beauty. The concept of beauty, and the romantic concept of self-
determination in which something emerges according to its own laws, are 
intimately connected. Objective beauty can only be a product of its own self-
determination for much the same reason that (as Schlegel points out) 'life only 
comes from life, vitality generates vitality' (1968, p. 47). Objective beauty in 
poetry is only possible if the poet mediates the poetic process through 
relinquishing personal interest in the subject matter and indeed integrates with the 
object of contemplation. Objective beauty thus cannot be determined through a 
subjective experience that involves personal taste nor found simply in 'the eyes of 
the beholder'. Beauty exists independently, yet not abstractly, because beauty can 
only become apparent in an object. 
70 Extrapolated from my own reading of Schlegel's fragment - 'Aus dem 
Unendliche entsteht das Bewuf3tseyn, wenn das Unendliche unendlich endlich wird, Und 
wenn im Bewuf3tseyn des Ich und Nichtich, und die Vereinigung der Beyden erreicht ist, 
entsteht das Unendliche' (KA XII, p. 25) 
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The extent to which beauty is the poetic ideal is further evident in the following 
passage by Schlegel: 
What theory promised, what one sought in Nature, what one 
hoped to find in each individual idol; what is it other than a 
highest form of aesthetic? The more often the innately human 
longing for complete satisfaction was deceived by the particular 
and the changeable (towards whose representation art has thus 
far been exclusively directed), the more intense and restless it 
became. Only the universally valid, the abidingly, the necessary 
- the objective - can fill this immense gap; only the beautiful can 
still this ardent yearning. The beautiful.. .. is the universally valid 
object of a disinterested pleasure, which is equally independent 
of needs and laws, free and yet necessary, wholly purposeless 
and yet unconditionally purposive (Cited in Chai 2006, p. 42 KA 
Ip. 253). 
Leon Chai (2006) uses the above excerpt, taken from Schlegel's On the Study of 
Greek Poetry, to illustrate Schlegel's characterisation of modem poetry as 
'interesting'. While 'interesting' may seem an unsophisticated term to use, to 
characterise modem poetry, Schlegel's use of the term highlights the 'aesthetic 
vitality' that supposedly underpins poetic creativity, particularly in modem 
poetry, as being basically steeped in subjectivity or more precisely, 'self-interest' 
(2001, pp. 96-97). In his Literary Fragment 37, Schlegel argues that so long as a 
writer remains 'interested' in a subject he cannot fail to produce a partial and 
therefore limited perspective. If a thought is 'to be soberly expressed' argues 
Schlegel, the writer must be in some sense detached from it. To be detached 
requires a withdrawal of self-interest (1968, pp.124-125). Self-interest may be in 
the form of personal emotions, affectation, or fantastical aspiration simply for the 
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sake of fantasy. This type of self-interest must not be what is guiding the artist to 
productivity. Like Holderlin, Schlegel's goal is to arrive at specific outcomes and 
as with Holderlin, Schlegel understands that these outcomes are dependent on an 
initial conditioning of the poet, which includes overcoming subjectivity so that a 
work of art can emerge, naturally, so to speak, and be self-determined. Again 
reminiscent of Holderlin's poetics, Schlegel too argues that the highest goal for 
the poet must be to practice a certain degree of self-restraint, 'for wherever we do 
not restrain ourselves, the world will restrain us; and thus we become its slave' 
(1968, pp.124-125). 
Self-restraint however, is not the same as self-denial. The subject is to remain an 
important, albeit integrated aspect of the poetic process. Moreover, for the sake of 
an ascesis, the subject is essential to the integration. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, objectivity constitutes the integration of self and object. For this reason, 
like Holderlin, Schlegel advises against an emotional outpour whereby the artist is 
only interested in expressing him or her self. This kind of directive, which Novalis 
might say is 'blatant egotism' (2007, p. 127), is destructive in that it blocks 
objectivity. While the result may be interesting, in terms of the artwork attracting 
an emotional response, it is certainly not poetically ideal, for it misses the point of 
unity. In practical terms, the durability of such works of art is negligible for they 
do not satisfy the principle of universality nor do they meet the task of quietening 
the incessant yearning for the infinite. 
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However, in On the Study of Greek Poetry, Schlegel argues that while objectivity, 
or objective beauty, as far as the poetic ideal is concerned, is not explicitly on the 
agenda of modern poetry, it is nonetheless, subliminally already there. Modern 
poetry as any other aspect of human activity in the world is subject to and part of 
a historical unfolding towards revelation of the Absolute or 'the all in all that 
always is'. Schlegel thus identifies modern poetry to be somewhere in the interim 
stage between classical poetry and the ideal of romantic poetry in which 
knowledge of the Absolute reaches its highest peak. The task is thus to 'bridge the 
gap', so to speak, between these two ideal positions. However, the way Schlegel 
understands it is that modern poetry, albeit that it has this potential, is not actually 
striving towards any ideal. It is essentially aimless in its direction. On the other 
hand, Schlegel acknowledges that modern poetry has an important pedagogical 
role to play in the transition from the classical to the romantic. While Schlegel 
suggests that modern poetry is passing through a 'crisis in taste,' he nonetheless 
argues that 'from what the modems want, we must learn what poetry should 
become' and 'from that which the ancients did, what poetry must be' (1968, p. 
129). Schlegel goes on to argue that beauty, although a problematic concept, in so 
far as its 'validity and applicability is for now undecided' is nonetheless an 
outcome that the individual will eventually achieve. Indeed 'the predominance of 
the individual leads of its own accord to the objective' argues Schlegel (2001, p. 
35). In addition Schlegel understands that 'the interesting is the propaedeutic for 
the beautiful' and, he says that 'the ultimate goal of modern poetry can be nothing 
else than the ne plus ultra of beauty; a maximum of objective aesthetic perfection' 
(2001, p. 35). 
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Schlegel looks to antiquity for examples where the ideal of beauty has been 
attained. Sophocles for example is hailed as one who has 'thoroughly perfected' 
the ideal of beauty. Schlegel gives a clue to his understanding of beauty when he 
describes Sophocles' work as having its components 'thoroughly law-governed' 
and that the 'individual components of beauty[ ... ] are organised symmetrically' 
(2001, pp. 62-62). 
In Schlegel's view, 'law-governed' thus concerns the internal symmetrical 
configuration of the artwork, which must be unaffected by the artists personal 
taste or imposition of regulations that prescribe a structure and form for the 
artwork (apart from the structure that Schlegel's formula provides of course). The 
individual components of beauty can be identified as consciousness, and the 
infinite, and the symmetry of both which is a unified whole. Schlegel gives an 
added dimension to these by speaking in terms of multiplicity, unity and totality 
(2001, p. 57) and it is these, symmetrically organised, that gives rise to 
objectivity. The symmetrical arrangement of these occurs in accord with each 
component having the 'same unconditioned value' (2001, p. 57) within the whole. 
Schlegel admires and respects the ancient Greek poets for their ability to 
coordinate these components successfully and in doing so attain the ideal of 
beauty. However, while Schlegel may look to antiquity with respect and 
admiration he does not have the inclination to emulate the achievements of the 
ancient poets, nor is he inclined to pick up where they left off. As far as Schlegel 
189 I Page 
is concerned, ancient poetry is complete unto itself. Indeed the poetic ideal that 
Schlegel argues is the destiny of the modern era differs from that of the ancients 
in that it must incorporate a degree of historical realism: 'Any play you see' says 
Schlegel, 'if it has a witty plot you can be almost sure has a true story as its 
source' (1968, p. 100). Schlegel advances thus the theory that romantic poetry 
differs from ancient poetry in that it originates partly in true historical knowledge, 
whereas ancient poetry remains firmly entrenched in mythology (1968, p. 100). In 
addition, 'romantic' is not a term to describe a particular genre - it is an element 
which, says Schlegel, 'maybe more or less dominant or recessive, but can never 
be 'entirely absent' (1968, p. 101). Therefore he concludes that all poetry should 
be romantic, be it tragedy, elegy, lyrical prose or verse, and it should be able to 
strike a romantic chord, so to speak, and to elevate the subject matter beyond the 
realm of relativity so that it is objectively revealing and thus universally valid. 
A seemingly contradictory situation arises, however, when one takes into account 
Schlegel's claim that '[a] perfect project should simultaneously be entirely 
subjective and entirely objective' (1968, p. 134). The immediate question that 
comes to mind is how is it that something can be 'entirely' subjective and at the 
same time be 'entirely' objective; is it not the case that one 'entirety' cancels out 
another? That objectivity encompasses an entire realm of subjectivity is difficult 
to grasp, even in terms of an integrated reality of subject and object. How should 
one contemplate this seeming contradiction? 
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This question is best answered by introducing Schlegel's concept of irony, a term 
that belongs decisively to the conceptual framework supporting the poetic ideal of 
objectivity. 
'Irony' as informing the poetic ideal 
Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert argues that 'irony is a sort of play that reveals limitations 
of a view of reality that presumed to have the last word. With the use of romantic 
irony, Schlegel showed that there was no last word' (2007, p. 168). This 
perspective certainly helps to clarify the above seemingly contradictory 
integration of that which is simultaneously 'entirely' subjective and 'entirely' 
objective, in that it highlights the open-endedness of reality. The term open-
endedness is used to suggest that both the subjective and the objective are valid 
perspectives. It reiterates the dialectical and reciprocal interplay between the 
totality of the eternal and the finite; the Absolute and the limits of consciousness. 
However, what is still ultimately the goal is that these two perspectives are held in 
a harmonious balance, and so we need to think of an overarching objectivity that 
encompasses this dialectic. In his lectures on transcendental philosophy, Schlegel 
refers to a point of indifference [Indifferenz-Punkt],71 which exists in the balance 
of these two perspectives. Schlegel uses the point of indifference to emphasise 
precisely the reciprocal nature of this relationship. Consciousness and infinity 
71 Extrapolated from my own reading of the German text: 'Realitat ist der 
Indifferenz-Punkt zwischen beyden. Nur fur das BewujJtseyn hat das BewujJtseyn Realitat 
aujJer dem BewujJtseyn Das BewujJtseyn ist nothwending, weil ich durch em mbgliches 
BewujJtseyn zugleich ein wirkliches setze, und das ist nothwendig, was durch seine 
Mbglichkeit wirklich ist (Schlegel, KAXIL p. 6). 
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exist in virtue of each other and in virtue of this relation, they validate each other. 
Millan-Zaibert's comments serve as a useful preliminary understanding of irony, 
for it is indeed the case that Schlegel's irony serves to function as a poetic device 
that reveals the best approximation of the underlying nature of reality, which as 
disclosed through the representation of the reciprocal interaction discussed above, 
is ironic. 
Using the concept of irony in this way we can see that Schlegel makes a clear and 
decisive move away from a traditional understanding of irony that functions 
purely as a literary device. In keeping with his own metaphysical perspective, 
Schlegel gives irony a new philosophical meaning. This is not to say that irony is 
no longer a literary device; on the contrary, irony becomes for Schlegel a 
necessary ingredient in the formulation of what today is regarded as 
characteristically romantic literature. In fact, it has been suggested that the 
concept ironic and 'romantic' (as in the context of early German Romanticism) 
are 'identical' (Behler 1993, p.141) or, so very close in meaning that a work 
which is devoid of irony is simply not a romantic work. In which case, a work that 
is devoid of irony, does not meet the poetic ideal. 
Metaphysically speaking, Schlegel argues that 'irony is a clear consciousness of 
an eternal agility, of the infinitely abundant chaos' (1968, p. 155). By this, 
Schlegel means that irony reflects and makes apparent something very 
fundamental about the universe, namely, that the universe is itself ironic. It is 
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ironic because of the 'eternal agility of the infinitely abundant chaos' the 
unconditioned or 'that confusion out of which a world can arise' argues Schlegel 
(1968, p. 155). That the unconditioned should be characterised as eternally agile 
refers to the fact that the Absolute is dynamic and perpetually giving rise to 
conditioned particularity existing temporally within an eternal network of 
becoming. Irony arises from the fact that the particular does not share in the same 
eternal agility from which it originates, since it has a finite existence, yet it is 
dependent on that 'eternal agility' for its very existence. A further infusion of 
irony arises from the fact that the infinite, by the same token, is dependent, on the 
limited particularity of the finite for the contrastive basis from which an 
awareness of the infinite (contra the finite) can even arise. Indeed the infinite 
becomes the object of consciousness while consciousness becomes the subject of 
infinity and the two combined, form a closed sphere.72 
This is the irony of which Schlegel speaks and which he wants to emulate in 
poetry, in which case poetry must deal with this reciprocity, this eternal agility 
within the sphere of being a representational event. In relation to the contradiction 
referred to earlier between the all-encompassing objectivity and the all-
encompassing subjectivity, it is beauty that is the manifestation of the balance 
between objectivity and subjectivity. This is because perfect symmetry, the point 
of indifference, finds its expression in beauty. On one hand, it conveys the eternal 
72 Extraploated from my own reading of the German text 'Das einzige Objekt des 
Bewufitseyns ist das Unendltche, und das einz1ge Pradikat des Unendlichen ist 
Bewufitseyn. Die Beyden Elemente machen eine geschlossene Sphare ... ' (Schlegel, 
KAXII, p. 6). 
193 I Page 
and universal and on the other, it conveys finitude. The two come together, as 
does everything else, in a symmetrical alliance but not at the expense of what each 
is. Beauty like the infinite is dependent on the particular; indeed it cannot be 
revealed without it. 
But to explore the concept of irony a little further, particularly in relation to how it 
serves to reveal the Absolute, or the abundant chaos as it was characterised in the 
previous paragraph, it is useful to refer to an article by Georgia Albert entitled 
'Understanding Irony: Three essais on Friedrich Schlegel' (1993). In this very 
comprehensive analysis of Schlegel's theory of irony Albert points out that 
Schlegel alludes to irony as the 'epideixis of the infinite, of universality, of the 
sense of the universe' (KFSA XVII/:128 cited in Albert 1993, p. 827). In deciding 
on the significance of this reference, Albert alerts the reader to an excerpt from 
the introduction to Schlegel's translation of the Epitaph of Lysias, in which 
Schlegel relates the concept of epideixis to a kind of speech that 'lets the ability of 
the orator shine before an assembly of listeners or readers' (KFSA 1: 141, Cited in 
Albert p. 828). Albert acknowledges that the link is not immediately obvious but 
ultimately by drawing a parallel between the function of irony and the function of 
epeidixis in Greek literature, he demonstrates that irony is in some sense proof of 
the Absolute. That is in Greek literature, the content of the speech is unimportant 
in comparison to what it demonstrates; likewise is the content of irony. That is to 
say, the particulars that determine the ironic are irrelevant to the demonstration of 
the Absolute, just like the content of the speech is irrelevant to the demonstration 
of the speaker's oratory skills. Albert makes an even more direct link by arguing 
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that 'irony means infinity by representing it [ ... ] by reproducing its structure' 
which he goes on to identify as the structure that is 'the paradox of constitutive 
and irreducible self-contradiction, of a simultaneous co-presence of mutually 
exclusive elements' (1993, p.828). 
In a second attempt at presenting irony as expressing the fundamental nature of 
the Absolute, Albert cites Schlegel's claim that irony takes on the form of a 
'permanent parabasis' (Fragment 668, KFSA XVI!!: 25 cited in Albert 1993, p. 
840). The original meaning of this concept again derives from ancient Greece 
where it is used to characterise a disruption in a play. The chorus disrupts the flow 
of the narrative by turning to the audience, and, according to Schlegel supposedly 
'in the name of the poet' (1993, p. 840) steps up close to the edge of the stage and 
speaks in a rude and unexpected manner to the audience (1993, p. 840). The 
allusion to irony as permanent parabasis is thus an illustration of irony as a 
continuous interruption, but as Albert quite rightly identifies, it is equally a 
demonstration of the conflict between the real and the ideal. In a play, the 
interruption achieves the purpose of reminding the audience that what they are 
viewing is in fact fiction. That the chorus moves close to the audience and speaks 
to them about things that are totally unrelated to the plot, but reveal in the process 
something about the author of the play. If we relate this to ontological revelation, 
for example, we can for ~ moment suppose that the author of the play is the 
Absolute and the characters are all particulars engaged in the plot of existence 
itself. As the particulars engage and interact in cultural, religious, political and 
social activities, irony interrupts 'the plot' so to speak, and reveals something over 
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and above the normal everyday engagement with the world. On one level, just as 
the function parabasis in the play reveals the author of the play, so irony reveals 
something about the underlying principle of existence. On a more immediately 
perceptible level, irony demonstrates time and again that certainty is relative and 
subject to contradiction while absolute knowledge is inaccessible. This is because 
as Schlegel argues, 'it contains and incites a feeling of the insoluble conflict of the 
absolute and relative,· of the impossibility and the necessity of complete 
communication' (1968, p. 113). 
Indeed this is the function of irony, and in relation to where we started, namely, 
the poetic ideal, we can see how it, through its expression, serves to help shape 
this ideal. 
The middle component ... 1/0'1 FSM(O 0 
The FSM, divided by the 0, is a combinatorial formulation representing the fusion 
of absolute fantasy, absolute sentimentality73 and absolute mimesis which in their 
73 
'Sentimentality' is the English translation of the German 'Sentimentalitat', yet as 
we will see later when it is discussed more fully, the English translation does not 
adequately represent the meaning in the Schlegel context. Indeed, even the German word 
Sentimentalitat has proved to be problematic for Schlegel. In his 'Letter about the Novel', 
Schlegel seeks to clarify dissociate the meaning of the word, with its more common 
usage. He argues - 'Forget for a moment the usual notorious meaning of the sentimental, 
by which one understands almost everything which, in a shallow way, is maudlin and 
lachrymose and full of those familiar noble feelings whose awareness makes peo~ 
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respective and individual representations are what Schlegel identifies as 
poetischen ideen (KAXVI, p.148) but in their compounded structure, which is 
constitutive of interdependent relations, represent in unity the poetic ideal. The 1/ 0 
stands for infinity (Unendlichkeit, eg. Schlegel, KAXVII 1963, p. 156)) and the 
symbol 0 on its own, as it is placed below FSM, stands for 'absolute', (according 
to Eichner, 1957, p. 12) or 'pure' [reines] (eg. Schlegel, KAVIII, 1963, p. 237). 
The word absolute is itself often enough placed in front of fantasy, sentimentality 
and mimesis throughout Schlegel's notebooks and used in this way to indicate the 
individual element in its purest form. From this we can draw the inference that the 
FSM with the symbol representing 'absolute', must then indicate that the 
composite, while structured according to inherently reciprocal relations, retains, as 
a composite, the characteristic of absoluteness. 
When thinking of what 'absolute' means however, in the context of early 
Romanticism, it must be kept in mind, that while it signifies the 'highest and the 
ultimate' (as Novalis notes, 2007, p. 195), it remains relative, at least when 
instanced as a particular. Even though romanticism is about making 'absolute' 
(Novalis 1997, p. 124) and poetry, (again, according to Novalis) is the 'truly 
absolute real' (1997, p. 117), none-the-less, an absolute of anything, in and of 
itself, is unattainable. 
without character feel so unspeakably happy and great' (1968, p. 99). More will be 
revealed about Schlegel's use of the word as the chapter unfolds). 
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We can speculate that for this reason Schlegel places the mathematical 'root' 
symbol strategically against the FSM combination in order to emphasise the 
infinite process of creativity and the infinite and eternal Absolute. Indeed, the 
'root' symbol is given the index of infinity (1/0), so as to express the sum as 
infinitely squaring the root of FSM/O. The equation may thus be read as the 
infinite square root of the combination of absolute fantasy, sentimentality and 
mimesis is equal to the poetic ideal and to God. 
The effect of the equation, including the mathematical symbolism74, is an 
impression of 'infinite approximation' or the 'eternally becoming' essence of 
romantic poetry as prescribed by Schlegel in Fragment 116. Thus, the 'poetic 
ideal' that marks the beginning of this equation is for Schlegel equal to (=) the 
infinite root of FSM - fantasy, sentimentality and mimesis and at the same time is 
equal to God. While it is plausible to infer from this that the poetic ideal must 
have the characteristic of eternally becoming, how this theory sits in the face of 
what is also perceived as the indivisibility of the Absolute presents as problematic. 
In Holderlin, for instance it is clear that the Absolute is indivisible and that 
judgment - the source of subject and object - is an activity that destroys in 
74 Eichner prefers to read the equation stripped of its 'pseudo-mathematical 
symbolism' (1970, p. 65 and suggests further that the 'root' symbol may be left to 
speculation. However, I have chosen to include the mathematical symbolism as a 
significant aspect of the equation, for it emphasizes the nature, in particular, of the 
'infinite approximation' characteristic of romantic poetry. Further evidence to suggest 
that Schlegel's use of mathematical symbolism is purposeful can be found in his literary 
aphorisms, for example, when there is one in which he argues that a 'good preface must 
be the root and the square of the book at the same time' (1968, p. 121). Admittedly, the 
interpretation of this may also be left to speculation, it is nonetheless fitting to think that 
the root sign, particularly when indexed with the symbol for infinity, represents, what I 
have expressed it does, infinite approximation' or the 'eternally becoming' essence of 
romantic poetry. 
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essence what the Absolute is. For this reason Holderlin concludes that subject and 
object are not identical to the Absolute. It is the same for Schlegel and Novalis -
divisibility is characteristic of 'world' and indeed is the source of 'world' but not 
of the Absolute. For this reason it would be problematic to accept the equal signs 
in this equation as suggesting identity with God. Indeed, the 'poetic ideal' is not 
identical with God. What is at work in the realm of the poetic ideal is the 
representation of God but not the becoming of God or God itself, albeit that God 
is the ultimate destiny of humankind.75 God as the conclusion to this equation will 
be discussed a little later. 
75 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to venture into the exploration of 
identity theory in regards to this problem it is worth while however to point to Frank's 
mention of the 'identity theory of predication', in relation to Holderlin's and Schelling's 
thinking. The idea is that in 'predicative propositions that which is signalled by the 
subject-term, does not mean the same thing as (hence is not identical to) that for which 
the predicate stands' (Frank 2004, p. 90). If we assume that Schlegel's equation is a 
predicative proposition, then we could perhaps apply these rules. This would mean that 
God is predicated to the poetic ideal but not identical with it. If we call the poetic ideal A 
and God B then to say (according to the rules Frank has identified) A= B or rather A is B 
then what we are really saying is that A is in part Band in part not B. Frank explains that 
this is the case because of the synthetic quality of what A is. What needs to be taken into 
account in this instance is also whether or not the predication is formal or contingent -
can we have a poetic ideal without God? Or vice versa, can we have God without the 
poetic ideal? To be sure, we cannot have either without the centre of this equation and 
that is the actual dynamism that gives rise to the poetic ideal that represents God. 
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Fantasy76, Sentimentality and Mimesis 
From the way the equation is presented we can deduce that fantasy, sentimentality 
and mimesis are compounded in a reciprocal regulatory relationship. Fantasy and 
mimesis are representational in their function and as such originate with the 
imagination: fantasy is functional as productive, and mimesis is functional as 
reproductive. Sentimentality (which Schlegel also identifies as love) is the 
unifying force that binds these two together. Fantasy represents the ideal and 
mimesis represents the real. 
In On the Study of Greek Poetry, Schlegel at one point identifies fantasy as the 
'organ' of poetry. In other words it is the form in which poetry finds its 
expression. Independently, that is, apart from Schlegel's equation, fantasy 
describes a particular genre of poetry where the imagination is used without 
constraint in an effort to conjure imagery that is as far as possible, unrelated to 
reality. But left unconditioned, that is, apart from the FSM mix, it can lead just as 
76 Fantasy (Fantasie) and imagination (Embildungskraft) while ostensibly different 
words are used fairly consistently as synonymous in English translations of German texts. 
Yet there is evidence, although by no means clear, suggestive of a discrepancy between 
the two concepts. In Novalis for instance, the imagination presents as fantasy only when 
it deals with memory, but when it deals with the intellect, it presents as 'the power of 
thought' (Novalis 2007, p. 48). What is clear however is that the imagination is 'the 
ability to represent' and as far as Novalis is concerned, the 'power to represent is the 
ability to imagine' (Novalis 2003, p. 121), and as such, representation can either be of the 
real, in which case it is reproductive imagination or the ideal in which case it is 
productive imagination. Recalling Novalis' move to align fantasy with his magical 
idealism, we can now discern that is thus a manner in which the imagination is engaged. 
As far as Schlegel's formula is concerned, the F stands quite clearly for Fantasie, so for 
the sake of understanding Schlegel's equation it must be taken as the imagination 
engaging in a productive way with the ideal. 
This is the understanding that I use to guide me in the analysis of Schlegel's 
equation. 
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easily to the grotesque as it can to the beautiful and thus miss entirely the 
orientation towards the poetic ideal. For this reason Schlegel has placed fantasy in 
a reciprocal functional relation with sentimentality and with mimesis. We have 
seen in Chapter 1, how the imagination and, for that matter, reflection, are 
common to both philosophy and poetry and indeed provide the means by which 
these two modes are linked. We can see how Schlegel's formula captures this 
relation. Here too, the FSM is a continuum made up of the variation between two 
modes, but because they are linked, each serves to ground the other. 
Mimesis (absolut Mimik) means the same as imitation or representation, yet the 
way in which Schlegel envisages its operation within the poetic ideal where it is in 
its reciprocal relation with fantasy, is surprisingly different from what we would 
expect of a mimetic function in say, the representational arts, where the aesthetic 
value in particular of what is represented is at issue. While it is true that on one 
level it is the component in the mix that makes an artwork accessible by anchoring 
it to the history of a people, as well as nature, on a second level, mimesis in its 
intimate relation with fantasy opens up access to the divine. Indeed, now it 
represents the divine (Eichner 1956, p. 1025). Apart from this primary purpose, 
mimesis functions also to simultaneously curb and stimulate fantasy, disabling 
pure fantasy, yet enabling originality in the form of genius (discussed below). It is 
not in the mix to stifle fantasy but only to regulate it. As such, mimesis is for 
Schlegel the element in the mix that actually allows a work to become 
autonomously objective. The significance of this is expressed in the following 
passage from On the Study of Greek Poetry in which Schlegel argues that: 
201 I Page 
Even the term 'imitation' is insulting and is denounced by all 
those who imagine themselves to be born geniuses. Understood 
by this term is, in fact, the violence that a strong and great nature 
exerts on the powerless. But I know of no other word than 
imitation to describe the action of those - be they artist or expert 
- who appropriate themselves the legitimacy of that prototype, 
without allowing themselves to be restricted by the peculiarity 
that the outward form, the husk of the universal spirit, may still 
carry with it. It is self-evident that this imitation is utterly 
impossible to achieve without the greatest autonomy. I speak 
here of the disclosure of the beautiful by means the expert comes 
into contact with the artist, and by means the artist comes into 
contact with the divine. This is much like the magnet that does 
not just attract iron but, rather, imparts magnetic force through 
contact. (2001, pp. 47-48) 
In the first instance the implication is that mimesis is not in any way derogatory in 
terms of it being a blemish in the face of genius. It does not impede genius. Indeed 
if we take into account Novalis' theory that 'when we speak of the external world, 
when we depict real objects, then we are acting as genius does' (1997, p. 26), it is 
immediately obvious that it in fact helps to define genius. In which case, mimesis 
is especially linked to perspicuity, which means one is not only making an 
accurate observation of the appearance of something but also representing that 
which is not immediately obvious. This, as was suggested earlier, is the function 
also of irony. Genius is, quoting Novalis again, 'the acute use of acuity' which 
ultimately includes also 'treating imaginary objects like real ones' (1997, p. 26). 
In other words the genius has a penetrative gaze; its insights are not limited to the 
external world but penetrate 'the husk of the universal spirit' (1997, p. 26) in 
order to reveal the truly beautiful, which is that which persists in all incarnations -
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the divine spirit. Having said that however, mimesis apart from fantasy and 
sentimentality, cannot fulfil this ontological function. 
Turning now to the unifying principle - sentimentality. 
In his Dialogue on Poetry, Schlegel provides the reader with a clear definition of 
sentimentality. The definition reads as follows: 
What then is this sentimental? It is that which appeals to us, 
where feeling prevails, and to be sure not in a sensual but a 
spiritual feeling. The source and soul of all these emotions is 
love, and the spirit of love must hover everywhere invisibly 
visibly in romantic poetry. This is what is meant by this 
definition. As Diderot so comically explains in The Fatalist, the 
gallant passions which one cannot escape in the works of the 
modems from the epigram to tragedy are the least essential, or 
more, they are not even the external letter of that spirit; on 
occasion they are simply nothing or something very unlovely and 
loveless. No, it is the sacred breath which, in the tones of music, 
moves us. It cannot be grasped forcibly and comprehended 
mechanically, but it can be amiably lured by mortal beauty and 
veiled in it. The magic words of poetry can be infused with and 
inspired by its power. But in the poem in which it is not 
everywhere present nor could be everywhere, it certainly does 
not exist at all. It is an infinite being and by no means does it 
cling and attach its interest only to person, events situations, and 
individual inclinations; for the true poet all this - no matter how 
intensely it embraces his soul - is only a hint at something 
higher, the infinite, a hieroglyph of the one eternal love and the 
sacred fullness of life of a creative nature. (1968, p. 100) 
203 I Page 
Sentimentality is thus a unifying principle sourced by love and not anything that 
is_ linked with self-interest in terms of personal attachment and heightened 
emotions. Being sourced by love, it is the element in poetry that raises the work to 
a higher level. In terms of the equation it is the ingredient that enables a work to 
pass the test of eternal validity. It either exists in an artwork or it does not. It 
cannot exist by degree. Schlegel also argues that the function of sentimentality in 
romantic poetry provides it with a key difference to ancient poetry, and in this 
respect, modern poetry. Sentimentality does not discern between play and 
seriousness, for example or appearance and truth and enables a work of art to 
represent reality in conjunction with a fresh interpretation of reality, unlike in 
ancient times when even a tragedy is, for all its seriousness, still only a play that 
is grounded in mythology. Romantic poetry in contrast, is built on historical 
foundations, meaning that it is based on an existing or past event (Schlegel 1968, 
p. 100). Historical themes are then treated romantically with an infusion of love 
sourced sentimentality so that the audience is moved, but not through the 
invocation of pity for example. Rather through the recognition of the divine, the 
audience is lifted to a higher level of appreciation and understanding of wholeness 
and are able to identify themselves with the artist and artwork in a universal 
manner, for they are themselves drawn into it. If sentimentality is not sourced by 
love, the audience may respond emotionally, for example, with pity or with joy, 
but are not moved beyond this personal affectation. 
As unifier, love sourced sentimentality brings together the other elements in the 
equation, namely fantasy and mimesis. The intricacies of this event represent in 
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effect a microcosmic likeness to the universe, where the whole universe is, as 
Schlegel describes it, a 'poem of the godhead.'77 Poetry, whether we speak of it in 
terms of the poem of the godhead, or an artwork, is according to Schlegel's 
formula, an ordered structure. The ordering is initiated and held together by 
sentimentality sourced by love. As such it resembles quite closely Holderlin's 
'poetic spirit,' (Chapter 4) which we have seen, is also a unifying principle, as is 
the concept of remembrance, (Chapter 3). For Schlegel sentimentality as love 
imbues fantasy to ideally connect with mimesis and arrive at an elevated position 
- the newly and ideally created. In the 'poem of the godhead' this is an eternal 
and infinite occurrence; in poetry, it must also be eternal and infinite. 
Schlegel makes the following claim in Talk on Mythology: '[ ... ] the highest 
beauty, indeed the highest order is yet only that of chaos, namely of such a one 
that waits only for the touch of love to unfold as a harmonious world' (1968, p. 
82). Implicit in this claim is that sentimentality, if we accept that it is sourced by 
love, is then the component in the synthesis that brings it to order. Nonetheless, 
order and chaos belong to each other and one does not make sense without the 
other - therefore the interplay between fantasy, mimesis and sentimentality 
remains reciprocally regulatory. This is so because 'order' does not cancel out 
chaos in the sense that chaos no longer exists, rather it transforms it, but in the 
instant of transformation there is again, chaos. Chaos is infinite and therefore is 
infinitely ordered; love too, is infinite and therefore infinitely ordering. 
77 Schlegel, cited in Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy (1988) p. 93, '[ ... ]that one poem of 
the Godhead of which we too are part and flower - the earth.' 
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In the following section, the difficult concept of God is considered. In relation the 
thesis topic, it is in God that finally the philosophical ascesis rests. 
God 
Schlegel places 'God' on the conclusive, right hand side of the equation, and we 
will assume that this is a strategic move, since God, in the romantic context is the 
final destiny of humankind. Indeed, Schlegel suggests that it is through a world 
that God comes into being. 78 This suggests that God must be the result, in part, of 
the efforts of humankind, although this does not mean that humankind creates 
God. Only through absolute freedom does humankind become God and thereby 
also become immortaI79, however, striving to become God is eternally progressive 
implying that God as the destiny of humankind is unachievable. On the other 
hand, Schlegel presents us with the idea that God is both infinite and finite80 
leaving us with the impression that knowledge of God is possible in and through 
the temporal world. Schlegel argues however that God does not exist exclusively 
in either the 'I' or the 'not-I.' In this case Novalis' conception this time, that God 
presents as something like a 'sphere' that encompasses both the self as the 'act 
which posits the I' and the other, in so far as it is the antithesis, namely the 
78 Extrapolated from my own reading of the following fragment: 'Gott ist die 
Liebe, das ist weining gesagt; aber Gott ist eine Universum von Liebe und ein Roman von 
We/ten, das ist sehr bedteutend Gott wird durch die Welt geschaffen. '(KA XV/II 1963, 
,Zur Religion. 1798'. fr. 23, p. 327) 
79 Ibid, p. 330, ,Frey ist man, wenn man Gott macht und dardurch wird man 
unsterblich' but at the same time Schlegel claims that , Gott kann nur geschaffen werden' 
80 Ibid, p. 329 - 'Gott is nicht bloP undendlich, er ist auch unendlich' 
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'independent [according to Novalis] Not-I' (Novalis 2003, p. 7), gives us a 
comprehensible impression of God in the current context. 
But while God is posited as an all 'encompassing sphere', it nonetheless is in 
itself, unconditional and therefore independent of either of these two connected 
components that are supposedly encompassed by this sphere. Evidence for this 
claim is found in the following passage for instance, where Novalis boldly asserts 
that: 'Henceforth one must separate God and nature - God has nothing to do with 
nature - He is the goal of nature' (2007, p. 9). Already in this assertion we have 
an enormous step away from Spinoza's pantheism. God as the goal of nature, 
which includes the goal and destiny for human beings is, in other words, the 
ultimate reality for all. Both Schlegel and Novalis have a strong belief that it is the 
destiny of both nature and human beings to become God. Indeed Schlegel makes 
the observation that 'every good man progressively becomes God' (1968, p. 146). 
This is an innate tendency that must come from God itself. This means that God is 
an underlying principle, ultimate reality. On the other hand, as we will see in 
Chapter 6, in relation to Bi/dung and the moral education of humankind, in this 
context, God as such can do little to influence the will of the individual. While it 
may be the case that every human strives progressively to become God, ultimately 
this is dependent on human will, not God's will. 
God also translates according to Novalis as 'love.' In tum, 'love is the highest 
reality- the primal foundation' (2007, p .. 12). The paradox remains however, and 
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as previously mentioned while humans strive to become God, they can never 
become God. This paradox is also addressed in Chapter 6 as part of the discussion 
on Bi/dung and the moral education of humankind, but a preliminary remark to be 
made here is simply to say that according to Novalis 'God is neither free nor 
moral' (2003, p. 52). If we accept this proposition, then the ultimate goal 
envisaged for humanity by Schlegel and Novalis must fall short of either 
becoming God, since the highest achievement for human being is to become the 
ideal moral being - to be authentically free, or, that finally to become God is 
simultaneously an overcoming of being human in the world. A final but very 
revealing point to be made here is provided by Novalis when he contrasts the 
philosophical aspirations of Fichte and Spinoza respectively, while himself 
positing an alternative goal. That is, Novalis makes the claim that 'Spinoza 
ascended as far as nature - Fichte to the I, or the person' and 'I [Novalis], to the 
thesis God' (2003, p. 55). In other words what Novalis is pointing to is something 
that neither Spinoza's monistic view of nature nor Fichte's Absolute I, in 
themselves, represent. In so far as Fichte's principle of the Absolute is concerned 
it falls short of Novalis's God as does Spinoza's pantheism, albeit that, at least in 
Schlegel's equation, God equates with nature. Since these oppositions represent 
respectively a form of idealism and realism, it follows that for Novalis and 
Schlegel, it is God, the 'middle way' that must represent the fusion, or the 
transcendence of the particularity, of the two. Ultimately this amounts to what has 
already been mentioned in the introductory chapter that God is a 'complete 
concurrence of idealism and realism [ ... ] transformation of the one into the other' 
(Novalis 2007, p. 114); indeed, we could say that God is the 'Poetic Ideal'. 
208 I Page 
Conclusion 
The key objective in this chapter was to demonstrate how Schlegel's formula, 
which Eichner argues provides us with a summary of his entire poetics, serves as 
a prime example of how the structures of poetry, when appropriated, can support a 
philosophical ascesis in which the self and reality are an integrated totality. This 
totality is a continuum in which opposing forces are harmoniously interrelated, a 
continuum that displaces what would otherwise be an antagonism, or an 
irresolvable rift between two opposing positions; idealism and realism. Schlegel 
in his formula wants to prove that these positions are reconcilable, at least (quasi) 
mathematically, and aims at the in-between point - the poetic ideal, the 'point of 
indifference' - indeed, that which is equal to God. As such, the equilibrium 
established through the integration of ideal and real states in to a continuum 
exemplifies or represents God. 
In unravelling Schlegel 's formula the interrelatedness and interdependence also of 
the philosophical and the poetic processes discussed in Chapter 1, are revealed. 
Indeed, to this end, this formula represents an embodiment of the symbiotic 
relationship between poetry and philosophy, also described in Chapter 1. 
Therefore, not only is poetry and philosophy unified in the initial preparatory 
sense, that is to say, that philosophy provides for poetry a direction while poetry 
provides for philosophy an extension to its investigative and expressive power, 
but Schlegel has gone further by seeking to incorporate into the very form of 
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poetry, a philosophical structure. In this way the reciprocal relationship is kept 
alive within the poetic product. In other words, the philosophical aspect is built 
into the poetic formula to provide, for instance, a safeguard for fantasy, or at least 
to keep it in check. What Schlegel seeks also to achieve with this formula, in so 
far as the poetic work is concerned, is symmetry, consistency and coherence. The 
ingredient that enables this is sentimentality (as love), which much like 
Holderlin's 'third tendency' is the unifier, the element that seeks harmony. 
With respect to 'God' we can see that within the context of Schlegel's formula 
some issues arise since whatever happens on the other side of the equation cannot 
be equal to God, at least not in an 'identical' way, since God in the romantic 
context is and remains a goal, and an unattainable one at that. 
As to the effectiveness of Schlegel's formula we might say that, much in the same 
way as Holderlin's efforts can do no more than present a context in which an 
arrival at a metaphorical representation is possible, so too, Schlegel's formula can 
do no more than provide for poetry (and for philosophy for that matter), a 
prescription of how to arrive at the best structural reflection of God. The 
difference is, however, that Schlegel, in accord with his attempt at empirical 
calculation of the God, strives for an infinite approximation, whereas Holderlin 
strives for an accurate representation, which includes a conscious experience, of 
unity. In each case however, it is clear that Schlegel with his formula and indeed 
his and Novalis' theory ofromantic poetry as does Holderlin with his tonal theory, 
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expand the scope of the philosophical by lending philosophy an added dimension 
in which to experience the problematic nature of the Absolute. This is the ultimate 
aim that Schlegel ' s formulaic approach attempts to represent, while at the same 
time it demonstrating what Schlegel has already determined theoretically, that the 
very essence of the Absolute is that it is eternally becoming and therefore 
unfathomable. For this reason we see that Schlegel is not preoccupied, as is 
Holderlin, with incorporating into poetry structures that support a metaphorical 
representation of an ' intellectual intuition '. Schlegel ' s concern lies more directly 
with formulating 'eternal becoming ' which in order for poetry to qualify as 
accurately representing the Absolute, it must itself be, 'eternally becoming'. 
As far as poetry and philosophical ascesis is concerned, Schlegel ' s formula as was 
suggested from the outset represents a philosophical ascesis in an equation. 
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Chapter 6 
POETRY and the MORAL EDUCATION 
of HUMANKIND81 
The Romantic Adaptation of Bi/dung 
Morality must be the core of our existence if it is to be for us what it wants to be. 
Its end, its origin must be the ideal of being. 
(Novalis 2003, p. 165) 
The key argument in this chapter is as follows: The romantic adaptation and 
appropriation of Bi/dung encapsulates the aspiration for the cultivation of a 
uniquely 'free' and 'moral' society in which, individuals flourish, both 
independently and interdependently, but in harmonious unity. Ultimately, this 
state of being finds its expression and facilitation in and through (romantic) 
81 I have used the term 'humankind' as a term that encompasses all human beings, 
collectively and individually. While Schlegel, Novalis, and Holderlin seek the education 
of humankind or Menschheit ('Mankind', humanity), it does not preclude the moral 
education of individual beings e.g. Schlegel: 'every good being is progressively 
becoming God'. The final aspiration is for the 'ideal of being', which in this thesis is 
interpreted as the final goal of humankind as a collective. It would be false to assume that 
an individual alone can attain this goal, since, the romantic perception is that an 
individual is the microcosm of the entire universe, which means that if the attainment of 
ideal being is possible for the individual apart from the whole, this would contradict the 
nature of the universe as a reflective totality. However, this tension is not resolved in this 
chapter. 
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poetry. We have already seen in previous chapters how poetry functions to deal 
with philosophical issues such as the structure of consciousness and the 
philosophical expansion concerning the Absolute. The application of Schlegel's 
formula and Holderlin's tonal theory are two ways in which this philosophical 
expansion is envisaged to occur. Indeed the moral education of humankind is 
integral to the philosophical expansion that occurs in and through poetry. For this 
reason, Novalis argues that 'morality must be the core of our existence, if it is to 
be for us what it wants to be. Its end, its origin, must be the ideal of being' (2003, 
p. 165). In conjunction with this, Novalis further claims that 'all knowledge 
should produce morality' and 'the moral drive, the drive toward freedom 
occasions knowledge' (2003, p. 164)82, and indeed that '[t]he highest philosophy 
is ethics' (2003, p. 165). 
The ultimate vision is that poetry unified with philosophy transcends the literal 
realm and becomes, as it were, the 'living theory of life' 83, a state in which human 
being is finally free, thriving in wholeness in the epitome of its own ideal. 
Schlegel and Novalis optimistically refer to this as the 'Golden Age'84• It is the 
82 What does not fit quite into the discussion at this stage is that Novalis makes this 
comment as part of a discussion concerning the inherent capacity of 'all being, being in 
general' to be free which correlates with the activity of oscillation between extremes 'that 
necessarily are to be united and necessarily are to be separated'. The purpose of 
footnoting this is to keep in mind the connection between freedom, which is essentially 
about not resisting the inherent oscillation between extremes and morality (Novalis 2003, 
p. 164) 
83 Novalis (1997): '[ ... ]just as his life is real philosophy, so his philosophy is ideal 
life- the living theory oflife [ ... ]', p. 52 
84 Although there is evidence of an inconsistency in regard to pinpointing a precise 
interpretation of the Golden Age, which will be explained towards the end of this chapter. 
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age in which 'the revolutionary desire to realise God's Kingdom here on earth' 
finally comes to pass (Schlegel 1968, p. 144). It is the age in which Novalis 
argues, 'man will be a perfect and total instrument of self' (2007, p. 47). 
Schlegel's vision for a society in which a 'genuinely free and educated man 
should be able to tune himself, as one tunes a musical instrument absolutely 
arbitrarily at his convenience [ ... ]' (1968, p. 127) argues for the very same ideal. 
These claims and aspirations support the determination to unite poetry and 
philosophy in a symbiotic relationship for the sake of a profound philosophical 
ascesis, for indeed it is in and through such integration that ideal moral being, will 
emerge. Schlegel argues for example that Bi/dung, as poesy85 [poesie ], combines 
the art of morals and the science of philosophy. 86 Ultimately, however, the moral 
education of humankind follows a self determined path that is fully reliant on an 
internal persuasion the direction of which is decisively soteriological. Even so, 
85 It is worthwhile to quote here an extract from Novalis' Das Allgemeine 
Broui/lon, in which he gives a definition of poesy. As will become apparent, this 
definition serves well to support the meaning of poesy in the current context, particularly 
the last sentence: 
Poesy is directly related to language. Contrary to what those 
gentlemen would have us believe, "aesthetics" is not such a bad 
expression - however, "the theory of beauty" seems the best expression 
tome. 
[ ... ] 
In general, one can include all the stages of linguistic technology 
under the expression "poesy". Correctness, clarity, purity, completeness, 
and order are predicates or characteristics of the lower genera of poesy. 
Beauty is above all the ideal, the goal - the possibility - the purpose of 
poesy' (Novalis 2007, p. 127). 
86 Extrapolated from my own reading of the German text 'Die Moral soil am 
meisten als Kunst behandelt werden, Philosophy als wissenschafl, Poesie als Bi/dung als 
Beider' (Schlegel KAXVIII, p. 199). 
214 I Page 
Schlegel and Novalis make it their task to contribute to the facilitation of 
Bildung87• 
The strategy of this chapter is to firstly turn to Holderlin to view his standing 
within the scheme of this particular aspect of the romantic project. While the 
moral education of humankind is more explicit in early German Romanticism, 
Holderlin nonetheless, shares in a similar aspiration, which we cannot ignore in 
the context of this thesis. After this the early German Romantic concept of 
Bi/dung, its meaning and utility is discussed. Following this is an exploration of 
the concept morality in terms of its adaptation by Schlegel and Novalis to fit their 
romantic agenda. The overall discussion involves clarifying conceptual aspects of 
the romantic philosophy underpinning their particular aspiration for moral 
education, especially the relationship between the concepts of human freedom, 
and self-determination. This will include an analysis of the paradoxical pedagogy 
which confronts the self-determined moral society of free individuals. 
87 Indeed in the context of facilitating a new religion, Schlegel and Novalis pay 
particular attention to their personal role in the facilitation and initiation of this new 
religion. Referring again to the pedagogical component, it has been argued that Schlegel 
and Novalis even 'had at the time a powerful messianic thrust' (Riasanovsky 1992, p.59). 
This argument is derived from Schlegel's aspiration as he expressed it in a letter to 
Novalis that he wanted to 'found a new religion' or at least 'help to proclaim it' and that 
the aim of his literary project 'is to write a new Bible and to follow the footsteps of 
Mohammed and Luther' (Cited, 1992, p. 60). 
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Holderlin's standpoint on moral education 
Evidence suggests that, just like Schlegel and Novalis, Holderlin recognised the 
significance of moral education. In a letter to his friend Immanuel Niethammer, 
for example, Holderlin writes of his aspiration to produce an article entitled 'New 
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man' with the aim in particular to focus on 
the 'aesthetic sense' (Holderlin 1988, p. 132).88 Evidently, thus, Holderlin as do 
Schlegel and Novalis, considers the significance and function of education in its 
particular relation to poetry and the arts. Indeed some of Holderlin's theoretical 
texts are explicitly pedagogical, in that they offer instruction to the poet. Further 
Holderlin wanted to contribute to the overall education of humankind by putting 
together his own journal. In 1799, when the Jena circle are at the height of their 
productivity and their publication Das Athenaeum is successfully transmitting 
romantic ideals, Holderlin finds himself independently inspired to set up a journal 
of his own. In July of that year he wrote to Schelling requesting assistance from 
him by way of contributions, or at least by associating himself with Holderlin's 
proposed 'humanistic journal'. The aim of the journal was to 'educate', claims 
Holderlin, it would be 'practically poetic [ ... ] historically and philosophically 
instructive about poetry' and 'historically and philosophically instructive from the 
viewpoint of humanity' (Pfau 1988 p. 146). Holderlin had contemplated the 
88 Pfau (1988) mentions in a footnote tat Schiller's 'Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man had already appeared in Niethammer's journal, Die Horen, in 1795. 
We can suppose that Holderlin's intention to produce an article with a similar title is a 
response to this. 
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project through to the extent that he would be editor and the main contributor to 
the j oumal. 89 
More technically, Cyrus Hamlin (1999) argues that implicit in Holderlin's tonal 
theory is a theory of education designed for the benefit of the individual, and to 
serve simultaneously as a 'model of history for humankind as a whole' (cited in 
Fioretos 1999, p. 299). Hamlin has in mind the threefold of minor tones, discussed 
in Chapter 3, which are the naive, heroic and ideal, each symbolising an aspect of 
the undercurrent supporting acculturation. The naive, argues Hamlin, is a 
projecting back unto childhood, symbolising 'innocence and simplicity'. The ideal 
is a projection forward; it represents the 'goal of education and culture; the heroic 
denotes the actuality of the human condition - 'defining the inevitable condition of 
opposition and conflict' (1999, p. 299). There is no doubt that Holderlin's tonal 
work, as well as his actual poetry and his novel Hyperion, can be viewed as 
contributions to understanding morality. In Hyperion, especially, we see a critique 
of the German way of life within a moral context and with the implicit intention 
of giving moral guidance. 
89 Evidence suggests however, that Holderlin was strangely ignorant of what was 
really going on in Jena. Unfortunately, for Holderlin, it seems that this time Schelling 
opted to shun Holderlin, because despite the fact that the two were close friends 
particularly during the years that they and Georg Hegel spent at the Tilbingen institute 
Schelling was not forthcoming with a response to Holderlin's request. This neglect for 
Holderlin may be related to Schelling's own intimate involvement with the Jena circle 
where he was one of the most regular attendees at their meetings (Eichner, 1970, p. 91). 
Holderlin had also written to Goethe, requesting him for a contribution to this 
forthcoming journal but like Schelling, did not respond. Schiller, too, was approached and 
although he responded, was dismissive of the project. (Constantinel988, p. 106) 
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A further parallel between Holderlin's project and the romantic project is evident 
in the way in which nature, in Holderlin's view, becomes dependent on the poet 
for its completion. Holderlin is convinced that 'nature only becomes divine in 
conjunction with the diverse and harmonious art' (1988, p. 53). Novalis similarly 
argues that '[n]ature is to become moral. 'We are its teachers - its moral tangents 
- its moral stimuli' (1997, p. 123). The extent to which the moralisation of nature 
is dependent on art (and therefore poetry) Novalis makes clear in the following 
passage: 
'Nature will become moral - when out of a genuine love for 
art - it devotes itself to art - does what art wishes - and 
when art, through genuine love of Nature - lives for Nature, 
works in accordance with Nature' (2007, p. 12). 
Clearly, while a reciprocal relationship between art and nature is evident, there is 
a shared common conviction that moral education is highly dependent on art. 
Del Caro also observes that Holderlin's vocational calling is to cultivate 'man's 
place on earth' (1991, p. 27). He argues that by appealing to the gods Holderlin 
does not want to establish a place for humankind amongst them, but for the gods 
to make their presence felt amongst the people, on earth (1991, p. 27). This falls 
in line with Novalis' and Schlegel's aspiration for the kingdom of god to be 
realised on earth. However, while, this aspiration aligns itself with the moral 
development of humankind for Schlegel and Novalis, for Holderlin it is 
predominantly an ontological development. 
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Nonetheless, if we are to link Holderlin with the authorship of 'The Oldest System 
Programme of German Idealism'90, or even associate him with the development of 
this text, then it is clear that he does share in the romantic vision of a perfect 
moral society. This short and incomplete text gives, a thoughtful declaration of 
hopes and aspirations for a future in which human beings exist in '[a]bsolute 
freedom' as moral beings, unimpeded by 'state, constitution, government or 
legislation', where 'all spirits who carry the intellectual world within themselves' 
must 'search neither for God nor immortality outside of themselves' (Pfau 1988, 
pp. 154-155). These sentiments surely resound in Hyperion's cry- 'By heaven! 
He knows not what his sin is who makes the state a school of morals' (Holderlin 
1990, p. 23). 
Finally, Holderlin as do Schlegel and Novalis subscribes to the idea of a 'moral 
law'. Holderlin like Schlegel and Novalis links this law with the 'law of freedom' 
90 As is usually accepted, the exact authorship of this fragment is unknown. Pfau 
(1988) argues as follows: '[t]his fragment, preserved in Hegel's writing [ ... ] was 
considered a copy and originally attributed to Schelling'. However, Pfau continues, 
'Holderlin's first major editor Wilhem Bohm argued for Holderlin as the author, and for a 
long time the consensus on this issue was that Schelling had been the author and yet that 
the theory of beauty was mainly Holderlin's work' (Pfau 1988, p. 182). It makes sense to 
think however, that it was Schelling in fact who may have composed it since the 
fragment's proposal is towards a 'new mythology of reason' which is an idea that 
Schelling was working out in the context of a poem that was to launch this new 
mythology of reason (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988, p. 28). In the case of the 
authorship being attributed to Schelling it is fair to conclude that the early German 
romantics were in some way conscious of at least the ideas in this fragment, since 
Schelling did have a close connection with the romantics. In any case, Holderlin too, 
proposed the need for a new mythology as did Schlegel and Novalis. 
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(1988, p. 33) but allows for an added dimension by attaching it to punishment. 
Indeed, he argues that it is in punishing that the law of freedom is first revealed 
, (1988, p. 34). There is certainly an element of natural justice in Holderlin's essay 
'On the Concept of punishment' where he makes the claim that punishment is 
designed to reveal that a person has acted immorally and that one ought to accept 
'what happens, happens rightly so because it happens' (1988, p. 35). However, on 
Holderlin's account, the punishment, if it is imposed, must be just and fitting but 
cannot be arbitrarily imposed. It must in fact fall in line with the moral law, which 
reveals itself originally in moral consciousness, where, says HOlderlin, 'it 
announces itself negatively' through 'its resistance as a result of the fact that we 
willed something which is opposed to the law of morality' (1988, pp. 35-36). This 
conflict between the human will and the moral law manifests itself as suffering. 
Holderlin thus draws the conclusion that 'all suffering is punishment' (1988, p. 
36) and giving it a harsher touch, Holderlin's Hyperion adds that 'only gods and 
children are not smitten by Nemesis' (1990, p. 115). Further, Holderlin works 
with the idea that morality is what it is in virtue of non-morality. For example he 
states that 'the origin of all virtue occurs in evil' (1990, p.115) which is consistent 
with his theory of opposing antagonistic forces working together to form a cyclic 
totality. 
Evidently then, Holderlin has given the moral education of humankind some 
thought, however, for the purpose of this chapter, the focus, for the most part, is 
on Schlegel and Novalis, since their preoccupation with human moral 
development is substantially more pronounced, particularly in their theoretical 
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writings. As such, it stands out as a clearly defined objective on their romantic 
agenda, and poetry is expressly appropriated to enable the fullest facilitation of 
the moral development of humankind. It is clear for example that romantic poetry, 
as prescribed by Schlegel and Novalis, incorporates a distinct teleology (despite 
the fact that poetry is eternally becoming and forever allegorical) that holds in 
view perfect moral being. Holderlin on the other hand tends to use poetry as a 
platform to lament the moral condition of humankind and to emphasise the 
distinction between the poet and mere mortals. Of course, Holderlin will use 
lamentation and the emphasis on distinction, as a tool to put mortals in touch with 
the 'gods' and to sanctify nature, and there is no doubt that Holderlin has the 
moral education of humankind in mind, when he does this. Indeed to connect 
humans with the 'divine' is an act towards facilitating the moral law since the 
moral law and the divine are intimately connected. 
The concept of Bi/dung- its meaning and utility 
The everyday contemporary use of the word Bi/dung in the German language fails 
to do justice to its etymological and historical development, which over the past 
several centuries has seen its use and appropriation in philosophical, political and 
social discourse. Today the translation of Bi/dung into English is simply 
'education', or 'culture.' However, as Beiser suggests, the 'word signifies two 
processes - learning and personal growth' and are 'not understood apart from one 
another as if education were only a means to growth' (1998, p. 286)91 • The 
91 Beiser, F. (1998), 'A Romantic Education. The Concept of Bildung in Early 
German Romanticism' Philosophy of Education: Historical Perspectives, Routledge, 
New York pp. 284-299 
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modem use of Bi/dung, however, reveals little about its origin in medieval 
mysticism where in accord with the Christian doctrine of salvation, its function 
was largely soteriological. Bi/dung in this context means transformation. In 
accordance with Christian doctrine, it describes the transition from an individual's 
'fallen state of grace' to an elevated state of redemption. In this instance, Bildung 
is the work of 'God'. The individual remains passive and takes no responsibility 
for his/her redemption (Kontje 1993, p. 2). 
An alternative perspective is that a person is responsible for the transformation in 
him/herself. Gadamar argues for example that the concept Bi/dung, 'evokes the 
ancient mythical tradition according to which man carries in his soul the image of 
God, after whom he is fashioned, and which man must cultivate within himself 
(Gadamar, 2004, p. 10). In this case it is the task of the individual to cultivate this 
aspect in him or herself through effort and self-discipline. 
In German philosophy from about the middle of the eighteenth century the 
concept of Bi/dung is adapted by various thinkers for various political, social, 
religious and philosophical reasons, in relation to, and as a consequence of the 
Auflkldrung and later, the French Revolution. Two thinkers in particular stand out 
as influential precursors to the romantic adaptation of Bi/dung. One is Johann 
Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and the other Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). 
Herder's adaptation of Bi/dung emphasises the genetic, cultural and 
environmental factors as having a profound influence on an individual's 
transformative capacity (Kontje 1993, p. 2). In other words, the inherent potential 
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in each individual is only one of the conditions necessary for growth and 
development. The environment (which for Herder includes such factors as 
climate) also contributes to the formation of the individual, as does the pre-
existent culture with all its norms and expectations. Humboldt, on the other hand, 
preoccupied himself with developing a theory of the moral cultivation of the 
individual self which advocated strongly that moral development ought to, and 
can occur, independently of cultural, political and social determination. To this 
end, Humboldt sought actively to alter the political and educational institutions by 
proposing a reduction in state power, which he saw as a necessary step to allow 
individuals to flourish naturally and freely and become ideal moral beings in the 
form of good citizens (Sorkin 1983, pp. 5-73). Humboldt began theorising about 
Bi/dung from as early as 1788 when in his essay 'On Religion' he was already 
making a distinction between the inner and outer development of human kind. But 
it is his essay 'Limits of State Action' that may have made an impression on the 
romantics, for it is here that the idea of human freedom at the expense of an over-
authoritative State is discussed (1983, pp. 5-73). 
The Romantic Adaptation of Bi/dung 
The romantic adaptation of Bi/dung somewhat reflects a combination of the above 
theories. Schlegel and Novalis, incorporate in particular, into their view on 
Bi/dung, the traditional Christian soteriological perspective which argues that the 
prospect of the transformation of the individual through the individual's own 
effort. Schlegel's claim that 'every good human being is always progressively 
becoming God' and 'to become God, to be human, to cultivate oneself are all 
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expressions that mean the same thing' (, 1968, p. 146) demonstrates this. 
Especially the latter, 'to cultivate oneself is important to the romantic 
understanding of moral education. 
Gadamar, although not speaking specifically about the early Romantic adaptation 
of Bi/dung, nonetheless provides us with another useful account that appropriately 
relates to this particular aspect of Schlegel's and Novalis' vision of Bi/dung, 
namely, Bildung as self-cultivation Gadamar's account is as follows: 
[ ... ]Bildung is not achieved in the manner of a technical 
construction, but grows out of an inner process of formation and 
cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state continual 
Bildung. It is not accidental that in this respect the word Bildung 
resembles the Greek, physis. Like nature, Bildung has no goals 
outside itself. [ ... ] In having no goals outside itself the concept of 
Bildung transcends that of the mere cultivation of given talents. 
[ ... ] In Bildung [ ... ] that by which and through which one is 
formed becomes completely one's own (2004, p. 10) 
All the elements of Bi/dung discussed above are relevant to the early German 
Romantic understanding and utility of Bi/dung, particularly and more obviously, 
the notion of Bi/dung as a continual process of becoming. Nonetheless, it must be 
pointed out, that Schlegel and Novalis do have a teleological perspective invested 
in the process of Bi/dung - ideal moral being - God, which appears to contradict 
the idea that Bi/dung, according to Gadamar's account, 'has no goals outside 
itself.' Indeed, the vision that sees humankind progressively becoming God is not 
a vision that sees the goal of God as a final end. It is rather the case that this goal 
describes a way of being in the world, which is eternally progressive - 'every 
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good human being is progressively becoming God.' In this way, 'ideal being' is as 
much the means as it is the end, in much the same way as in Gadamar's account 
above, the inner process of transformation is in a continual state of Bi/dung. 
'Every Good human being is progressively becoming God' 
Novalis echoes Schlegel's argument, discussed previously regarding the 
relationship between cultivating one-self and the notion of 'progressively 
becoming God', with the following statement: 
The theory of the future of humanity contains all that was foretold 
by God. Every machine, which now lives by the great perpetuum 
mobile is itself to become the perpetuum mobile - every person who 
lives now by God will himself become God (1997, p. 127)'. 
These claims generally correlate with the late eighteenth century development of 
the notion of Bi/dung (Mendelssohn, Herder, Humboldt et al.), that human beings 
are innately good and that goodness will eventually assert itself through the 
persistent impact of the individual's efforts at self-determination. However, both 
Schlegel and Novalis, appear, at least with these claims, to distinguish the 
Romantic perspective. Schlegel when he says 'every good human being is always 
progressively becoming God' and Novalis when he says that 'every person who 
lives by God will himself become God.' Implicit in these statements is a challenge 
to the premise that all human beings are inherently 'good', with the implication 
that only those who are 'good' are unequivocally on their way to progressively 
becoming 'God' and only those who live by God, will become God. Fortunately, 
this point is less contentious, when one considers what 'good' and 'God' signify, 
225 I Page 
in the Schlegel and Novalis view. Schlegel argues for example, that [b ]eauty in 
the broadest sense[ ... ] is the pleasurable manifestation of the good (2001, p. 56). 
Here Schlegel makes an important connection between beauty and good. In 
Chapter 5, it was argues that the 'concept of beauty and the romantic concept of 
self-determination in which something emerges according to its own laws, are 
intimately connected'. In which case, if 'good' is a manifestation of beauty, then it 
is at the same time a manifestation of the kind of objectivity that facilitates self-
determination. 
Previously, in a footnote, an excerpt by Novalis from Das Allgemeine Brouillon 
was given, which provided a definition for poesy. In this excerpt Novalis argues 
that '[b]eauty is above all, the ideal, the goal - the possibility - the purpose of 
poesy' (2007, p. 127). The earlier reference to Schlegel's view that poesy as 
Bildung is a synthesis of the art of morals and the science of philosophy, finds a 
new relevance here in that we can now see how beauty is also the highest ideal of 
Bildung. It thus follows that for Bildung to emerge as moral education, it must be 
given over to the same conditions that give rise to the poetic ideal, namely beauty. 
What is more difficult to dismiss however is the discrepancy between Novalis' and 
Schlegel's view on what are the actual limits of moral education and also their 
variance, albeit subtle, on the question of where God stands in relation to 
morality, given moral being and God are not identical. Indeed while Schlegel and 
Novalis both claim that God is a goal for humankind and that nature, of which 
humans are part, must become moral, Novalis wants to maintain a clear 
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distinction between God and nature. Novalis argues for example that 'God has 
nothing to do with nature' (1997, p. 123). Indeed when Novalis argues that God is 
the 'goal of nature', he does not actually mean that nature should 'become God.' 
Novalis argues that God is that 'with which [nature] must one day be in harmony' 
(1997, p. 123). This is quite a different target in contrast with Schlegel's argument 
that 'every good being is progressively becoming god'. What Novalis admits to 
nonetheless, is a close link between moral education and God. To be in harmony 
with God is to be moral. Morality and to be in harmony with God are thus 
reciprocally refined - 'the more moral' argues Novalis, 'the more in harmony with 
God' (2007, p. 9) and while the moral education of human beings does not 
culminate in their being identical with God, there is certainly hope that humans, 
individually and collectively, will at least grow in equity with God: 'If our 
intelligence and our world harmonise', argues Novalis, then we are 'on par with 
God' (2007p. 12). 
That this is able to occur is dependent ultimately on God, and also on the will of 
human beings falling in line with 'the law and the will of God' (Novalis 2007, p. 
10). The nature of the relationship between humans and God is revealed in the 
following series of claims made by Novalis. He argues firstly that God is love' 
and that 'love is the highest reality - the primary cause', followed by the 
suggestion that '[w]e ourselves are a seed of love [ ... ]' (1997, p. 123). The 
implication is thus that human beings are the fruit of God, so to speak, and as such 
are potentially able to grow in to at least, the image of God. 
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To thus act in accord with '[t]he law and the will of God' requires 'free action'. 
Indeed '[f]ree action and moral action are one' argues Novalis, and so 'the 
morality of an action cannot be determined from principles at all' he argues further 
(2003, p. 45). In other words, true morality is only possible through the alignment 
with the will of God. The difficulty remains then, how to determine with 
sufficient certainty which actions are in line with the will of God. On the other 
hand, is it important that we are certain about this? Schlegel, for instance, says 
'Just let Bi/dung do its work [ ... ]' as the following excerpt from On the Study of 
Greek Poetry argues: 
Nothing as such can be determined about the future course of 
Bi/dung: much no doubt, can be conjectured about it. 
Conjectures to which one is compelled by the requirements of 
humanity, and which the laws of reason and history justify and 
establish. As if they had sat in counsel with the gods, they appear 
to know the secret intentions and drives according to which 
nature clandestinely operates. Science and history do not know 
as much as this. Yet they do know that the rarity of genius is not 
the fault of human nature but rather of an imperfect human art, 
political bundling. The freedom of humanity is fettered by its 
own perspicacity, which constrains the fellowship of Bi/dung. If, 
despite all this, the stifled fire comes back to life, then it will be 
beheld as a miracle. Just let Bi/dung do its work [ ... ] (2001, p. 
91) 
What Schlegel identifies in this passage is firstly something about the very nature 
of Bi/dung - that human beings themselves, as has already been identified, cannot 
determine its course. Any conjecture as to what the moral course of humanity 
should be is thus false and leads to a serious compromise of human freedom and 
its effect, true moral being. For this reason, Schlegel argues that the political and 
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social attitudes (which are essentially conjecture based) are thus stifling the 
process of Bi/dung and thereby stifling the moral development of humankind. 
Schlegel argues that human freedom is in fact constrained by the very power of 
reason that is expected to deliver us from moral uncertainty. 
Bi/dung, Genius and the securing of objectivity 
In the above excerpt, Schlegel makes a reference to the 'rarity of genius', which 
he argues, is not the fault of humankind, but is rather the consequence of their 
imperfect art, which he observes expresses itself in - 'political bundling'. The 
concept of genius plays a vital part in Bi/dung. Indeed, for Bi/dung to proceed, it 
needs ingenuity. The problem is that geniuses can be suppressed' or their 
emergence simply blocked, which is precisely what Schlegel understands is at 
stake by making the connection between the rarity of genius and 'political 
bundling'. Genius will flourish best in the absence of imposing laws and 
institutional regulations - political aspirations are thus not conducive to the 
cultivation of genius. Genius must be able to emerge freely and thus any 
expectation that human beings conform to rules and regulations will hamper the 
emergence of genius. The suppression of genius will in tum suppress the progress 
of Bi/dung. 
How genius functions to aid Bildung is that its creative capacity ensures forward 
thinking. Leaps are made because the act of contemplation together with that 
which is contemplated are brought together in unison. Novalis argues for 
example, that 'the talent of representing, of making an exact observation', even of 
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'describing the observation purposively [ ... ] is different from genius' (1997, p. 
26). The talent of bringing the act of contemplation together with the object of 
contemplation is to make use of both analytic and synthetic processes and 
functions in a way that bridges the gap between the real and the imagined and 
allows for true creativity to proceed. Recalling some of the argument in Chapter 
1, we can see how genius works, insofar as it is a composite of poetic and 
philosophic processes. 
Schlegel claims that the flourishing of genius and hence the moral education of 
humankind is contingent on the reciprocal interplay between four conditions. 
These are aesthetic vitality, law-governedness, freedom and communality, and 
must be developed simultaneously according to their 'thoroughly reciprocal 
relation with one another' (Schlegel 2001, p. 91). 'Only when the law-
governedness of aesthetic vitality is secured' argues Schlegel, 'by an objective 
basis and style, can Bi/dung - by means of freedom of art and the communality of 
taste - become thoroughly far-reaching and public' (2001, p. 91). 
That the relationship between the conditions is reciprocal indicates that each is 
indebted to the other for what it is and must be so, also, in the circumstances 
where they assist the facilitation of Bi/dung. Starting with aesthetic vitality for 
example, we can see that all of the other three conditions feed into it. In insisting 
that Bi/dung is contingent upon the securing of an aesthetic vitality by an 
objectivity that is in turn determined by freedom of art and a communality of 
taste, Schlegel gives a directive that has left no room for subjectivity. All factors 
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contribute to an assurance of an aesthetic vitality that is determined according to a 
law not arbitrated by a personal taste or affectation. To clarify how law-governed-
ness, freedom of art and communality of taste feed into aesthetic vitality, it is 
useful to link aesthetic vitality with the concept of beauty, a concept which in turn 
is directly linked to, as we have seen also in Chapter 5, morality and the poetic 
ideal. Indeed an aesthetic inclination is a moral inclination - it is an ability to 
recognise what is good and harmonious in all of nature. Holderlin too understands 
the significance of beauty in its direct relation to morality. To refer to earlier 
comments about genius, it is through the honouring of the 'genius' in humanity 
that beauty can be 'cultivated' (Holderlin Hyperion 1990, p. 130).92 
The securing of objective beauty is, according to Schlegel, a preparatory measure 
for Bi/dung to proceed. This preparation paves the way for 'modern poetry' to 
'attain the next imminent stage of its evolution' (2001, p. 91), however Schlegel 
argues also that 'genuine beauty must first have set secure roots in many different 
places before it can spread itself over the entire expanse [ ... ]' (2001, p. 91, see 
92 
'Oh Bellarmin, where a people loves Beauty, where it honors the Genius in its 
own artists, there a common spirit is astir like the breath of life, there the shy mind opens, 
self conceit melts away, and all hearts are reverent and great and enthusiasm brings forth 
heroes' (Holderlin 1990, Hyperion, p. 130). 
Through the voice of Hyperion, Holderlin makes a further connection between 
the 'one and all' and humankind's quest for higher knowledge as follows: 
Oh you who seek the highest and the best, whether in the 
depths of knowledge in the turmoil of actions, in the darkness of the 
past, in the labyrinth of the future, in graves or above the stars! Do you 
know its name? The name of which is one and all? Its name is beauty. 
(1990, p. 41) 
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also Novalis 2003, p.194 for a similar idea). Schlegel further claims that aesthetic 
development 'has a divided nature'. He also argues that on one level it ensures 
'the progressive evolution of a skill', in which the 'original disposition,' namely 
morality, is refined and strengthened. On another level it acts as an organising 
force where it 'promotes the agreement of all according to the needs of the 
whole', dictating 'strict correctness, elegant proportions and completeness' and 
forbidding 'the confusion of original aesthetic boundaries' while 'banish[ing] the 
mannered as well as every aesthetic heteronomy. In a word' says Schlegel, 'it 
achieves objectivity' (2001, p. 45). 
Objectivity stands here also as one of the conditions, namely as freedom. 
Freedom in tum stands in a reciprocally allied relationship with law-governed-
ness and aesthetic vitality. All four 'conditions' as Schlegel points out are 
cultivating factors that contribute to the moral development of humankind. In 
which case, both freedom and law-govemed-ness determine aesthetic vitality just 
as aesthetic vitality must be a determining factor in freedom. 
As is evident, the facilitation of Bi/dung is dependent on a variety of factors. In 
tum, these factors are also dependent on further facilitation. This is where human 
beings, or more accurately, the authentic poets, who are more advanced in their 
moral education, need to step in. 
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Exploring the concept of Morality further 
From the outset it was suggested that morality is intimately linked with 
knowledge and with freedom and that, indeed, knowledge, freedom and morality 
are virtually identical, or at least they coincide in such a way that they reflect each 
other. Morality is also identical, with what Novalis identifies as 'goodness' (2007, 
p. 127), which in tum is linked to the poetic ideal of beauty. Novalis makes the 
claim that 'beauty is objective goodness' and that '[t]ruth' is 'subjective 
goodness'. Truth is at the same time 'analogous to right', whereas goodness is 
analogous to beauty (2007, p. 127). However, beauty and goodness are not 
identical. Beauty relates to 'mediated sensible phenomena' while goodness relates 
to 'immediate rational phenomena' (2007 p. 127). Truth and right are, in a similar 
way, differentiated. Novalis argues that 'right' is to do with 'rational noumena' 
while 'truth' relates to the 'noumena of the senses' (2007 p. 127). Novalis also 
makes the point that the four attributes, goodness, beauty, truth and right, are not 
absolute but exist in degrees. In respect of goodness, for example, Novalis claims 
that it may exist as natural, polar, educated or philosophical (2007 p. 127) and so 
it must be the case that morality too can be similarly sub-categorised. This makes 
sense if we are to accept that morality is something that can be cultivated 
particularly keeping in mind the current context in which the moral development 
of humankind is the key objective. To this end, there is seemingly a causal 
connection between the moral education of humankind and poetry because 
'poetry', argues Novalis, is 'the voice accompanying our developing self and as 
such facilitates our 'entry into the land of beauty' (2003, p. 136). 
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Morality, objectivity, beauty, freedom and goodness like Schlegel's becoming 
God, being human and educating one self, (Schlegel 1968, p. 146), belong to the 
same constellation. In contrast, 'truth' and 'right', considered subjective, do not 
belong to this constellation. Novalis for example asserts that there is a distinction 
between truth and beauty, just as a distinction prevails between 'right' and 
'morality' (1968, p. 138). Indeed, Novalis identifies 'truth' and 'right' as private 
regulators of morality (1968, p. 138). This is because they are arbitrarily 
conceived notions, which are precisely the kind of elements that block moral 
development. Ultimate morality must emerge according to its own determination, 
from within. This is the conviction that underpins the moral development of 
human kind in the early German Romantic context. 
The Pedagogical Aspect of Bi/dung 
Foreshadowed in the introduction to this chapter, was the paradoxical nature of 
the pedagogical aspect of Bi/dung. The challenge for Schlegel and Novalis is to 
facilitate the moral education of humankind without recourse to external 
influences, laws and regulations. To limit the risk of these sorts of impositions, the 
facilitation of Bi/dung needs to occur through a mediative process. However, even 
if Schlegel and Novalis subscribe to a pedagogical mediation there is little 
evidence in their writings, as Beiser (2003) quite rightly identifies, about how this 
mediation is to occur. Indeed, in the light of the discussion so far, the whole 
concept of 'education' presents as a paradox in early German romanticism. Yet 
the moral education and development of humankind is dependent on it. The 
nature of this paradox is summarised by Beiser as 'the utter commitment and 
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devotion to the education of humanity' versus the 'recognition that it cannot and 
ought not to do anything to achieve it', which Beiser further identifies as a 
'striking gap between theory and practice' (2003, p. 105). To add to the paradox, 
Novalis and Schlegel want nothing more than to make theory and practice one and 
the same. However, even they recognise the difficulty here. Schlegel himself 
notes that 'the gap between theory and practice, between the law and a particular 
deed is infinitely great' (2001, p. 42). Yet he is convinced that 'the law must 
become inclination' (2001, p. 42). What this means is that ideally human being 
will act lawfully in accord with the will of God and not abide by a set of contrived 
laws and regulations. 
The inclination to be moral is cultivated from within. The external world cannot 
teach morality, however an active engagement with the world could precipitate 
the cultivation of moral being as is suggested in Schlegel's claim that 'man cannot 
be active without developing himself' (2001, p. 24). On the other hand, what this 
'being active' entails is not immediately obvious since on the face of it, a tension 
between activity and Schlegel's commitment to passivity is evident. In his 
discussion of Schlegel's Lucinde, Firchow argues that the 'principle of passivity' 
is symbolised in this novel through the characterisation of a plant. Firchow draws 
a parallel between passivity and unconsciousness, which quite clearly 
demonstrates the kind of passivity that is also required of humankind to enable 
Bi/dung. Firchow describes it like this: 
The plant represents passivity and unconsciousness par 
excellence, since it instinctually obeys the mandates of nature 
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and does not need to discover rules by which to develop itself ... 
. The plant grows, blossoms and withers in harmony with the 
seasons and the course of nature; it does not rebel against dying 
because it cannot be conscious of rebellion. It exists for nothing 
but itself; it is its own achievement and purpose. (Firchow 1971, 
pp. 25-26, cited in Riasanovsky 1992, p. 61) 
Firchow expands on this by comparing the plant with humankind. The difference 
between plant and 'man' he argues is that 'man attempts to live according to 
ideals and purposes outside himself and outside nature' and that 'he seeks to 
impose his own consciousness upon nature' (1971, pp. 25-26). Despite the fact 
that Novalis argues that, 'nature is to become moral' and that 'we are its teachers' 
it is not through imposing 'ideals and purposes' or 'man's' own consciousness, on 
nature that this is to occur. The ultimate goal is for a free and moral society and 
this can only happen through the passivity of giving into the laws of nature. 
When it comes to pedagogy, it is clear that what is required is the facilitation of 
passivity. However, to be passive and to allow nature to take its course is not 
something to which humankind is accustomed. The teaching of passivity, as 
method, must then be a pedagogical goal of which a primary objective is to 
persuade humankind that this is what is required. 
In terms of pedagogy, the key to understanding romantic Bi/dung is to deviate 
from imagining it in terms of an education that employs a 'teaching' method as 
such. Romantic Bildung, although teleological in nature, meaning that there are 
expected outcomes, does not conform to an imposed curriculum, or at least not a 
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curriculum set by humans. If it were to contrive a conditioned and prescribed 
learning, it would prevent the ideal moral being from emerging and thus defeat its 
purpose. To impose a curriculum presupposes that what is 'taught' already exists 
in the form of knowledge. Certainly, this kind of teaching works when imparting 
scientific and historical data but cannot work in the cultivation of an ideal moral 
being. Learning concepts and storing information by itself is not enough to effect 
authentic moral being.93 
Clarification of how poetry assists Bi/dung. 
In the footsteps of Schiller, the romantics are convinced that the best facilitation 
of Bi/dung occurs through art. Art is dependent on aesthetic sensibility - feeling, 
expression, imagination, a sense for beauty, love and spirituality - these are all 
aspects of aesthetic sensibility. The challenge Schlegel and Novalis face is to 
justify to a world that largely agreed with Plato's perspective that 'art and poetry 
appeal to, and represent, the lower less rational parts of our nature' (Plato 2003, p. 
93 It is appropriate to argue that if the romantics had developed an educational 
model based on their romantic perception of Bi/dung it may have resembled something 
like Rudolf Steiner's Waldorf education. Although this is not the place to elaborate on 
such a comparison, one cannot help but see in Steiner's work a similar impetus. Steiner 
too felt the need to bring together the various strands of human development, namely 
science, religion, art and morality that still in his day were cultivated independently rather 
than in their reciprocal relation to each other. Steiner built his model too on a concept of 
freedom that would nurture the emergence of the human spirit. He focused particularly on 
nurturing the creative aspect of human being, allowing it to emerge unimpeded (See 
Steiner A Modern art of Education, 2004 passim). Similarly, Romantic Bi/dung 
encompasses the cultivation of the individual human being, which occurs through the 
cultivation of his/her aesthetic sensibility. In a 'formal' education, even today, it is often 
the case that this aspect of human being is neglected for the sake of excellence in other 
areas. 
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345), that aesthetic sensibility is not trivial, but crucial in the overall education 
and cultivation of moral being. 
Aesthetic sensibility is the ability to perceive the beautiful which, as has been 
discussed, is at the same time linked decisively to morality. In turn, morality has a 
direct link to the will of God and so whenever, a poet achieves the objective of the 
beautiful, he has at the same time achieved a sense of God. It is thus important to 
link these together - aesthetic sensibility is the aspect of being human that 
facilitates an experience of God and thereby facilitates also, morality. 
When aesthetic sensibility is abandoned, the consequences are dire. Schlegel and 
Novalis hold the French Revolution up as a prime example of where an education 
lacking in the cultivation of aesthetic sensibility has ultimately come to lead to a 
human catastrophe. The importance of aesthetic sensibility is explicitly clear in 
the following quote form Novalis: 
Let the genuine observer contemplate the new revolutionary times 
calmly and without prejudice. Does not the revolutionary seem to 
him like Sisyphus? Now he has reached the zenith of his 
equilibrium and already the mighty burden is rolling down again 
on the other side. It will never stay up unless a force directing it to 
heaven keeps it balanced at the highest point. All your props are 
too weak if your state still tends toward the earth, but bind it by a 
higher longing to the heavenly heights and give it a connection to 
the universe,[ ... ] (1997, p. 146) 
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Where humankind labours for the betterment of its own human condition while 
ignorant of itself as part of a universal whole, and in particular, while ignorant that 
individual beings are microcosmic instances of this whole, then all human striving 
will be in vain. In relation to the eighteenth century, in the view of the early 
German Romantics, apparent advances in political and philosophical reasoning 
were being made while the emotional (which includes the spiritual) aspect of 
human nature was being neglected (Beiser 2003, pp. 88-91). The result of such a 
bias saw the revolution become, as Schlegel put it 
'the grotesque of the age in the most awesome dimensions, 
where the most profound prejudices and the strongest 
presentiments of the age are mingled in a horrible chaos, and are 
interwoven to a tremendous tragicomedy of mankind to the most 
bizarre degree' (1968, p. 148).94 
In keeping with the romantic notion of epoch and the evolutionary aspect of the 
Absolute itself, the progress of which is reflected in poetry, Schlegel makes the 
following announcement: 'the time is ripe for an important revolution in aesthetic 
development' (2001, p. 89). Schlegel's study of poetry leads him to conclude that 
modem poetry (and this includes the poetry dating from the time of Dante through 
94 This statement requires immediate clarification however, in relation to the use of 
the word 'chaos'. 'Chaos' itself is not an issue for Schlegel. In his Talk on Mythology 
Schlegel aspires to the following: [ ... ] to cancel the progression and laws of rationally 
thinking reason' and to 'transplant us once again into the beautiful confusion of 
imagination, into the original chaos of human nature[ ... ]' (1968, p. 86) So while on one 
hand there is negative talk of a 'horrible chaos' in relation to a particular state of affairs, 
namely the French Revolution, there is on the other hand a wish for the 'original chaos' 
which in a positive way will facilitate the liberal education of humankind. In this respect 
Schlegel's study of the arts and in particular, poetry fashioned in him optimism for the 
future. 
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to the poetry of Schlegel's contemporary, Goethe) is itself still in the process of 
development. This development, says Schlegel 'presents nothing less than the 
constant struggle between the subjective disposition and the objective tendency of 
the aesthetic faculty' (2001, p. 88). As such, Schlegel perceives modem poetry to 
be in its third and final stage of development in which the 'objective tendency' 
will come to predominate. Not that this final stage signifies the conclusion of 
poetry, for that would go against the grain of the romantic idea that poetry is 
progressive and 'eternally becoming'. Rather, this final stage represents the period 
in which poetry reaches its evolutionary peak; where its capacity to facilitate the 
eternal approximation of truth reaches its most advantageous position. 
The order of development of modem poetry according to Schlegel is as follows: 
In the first stage (pre-classicism) a propensity for a 'one-sided national character' 
predominates. In the second stage (classicism), nationalistic tendencies persist but 
are augmented by a turning to antiquity. In the third stage (romanticism), Schlegel 
anticipates that poetry breaks away from these predominantly subjective 
tendencies, into a realm where objectivity predominates. The transition from the 
second to the third stage, however, Schlegel observes to be problematic. Except 
for glimpses of it in sporadic but disconnected pockets of what Schlegel calls 
'genius', Bi/dung has, at this point, reached an uncomfortable plateau. 
Yet Schlegel is convinced that romantic poetry is 'capable of the highest and most 
universal education' (1968, p. 141), however at this stage of the proceedings, 
poetry is in need of a preceptive adjunct. As Schlegel claims, 'nothing great occurs 
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of its own accord without strength and resolve' (200 l, p. 45). And so the cluster of 
individuals gathered in Jena in the last decade of the eighteenth century, whose 
concern was precisely the direction of poetry in relation to the transition from the 
second to the third stage of development, turned their attention to developing the 
ultimate theory, namely romantic poetry, in which all other genres (and other 
disciplines, including the sciences as we have seen, but also the social and the 
political spheres of human activity) come together to function as a whole. This is 
precisely the concern reflected in Novalis' Das Allgemeine Brouillon and it is 
through this concerted effort that Bi/dung can gain momentum to proceed. 
Finally, the free and moral society, God's Kingdom on Earth 
A key argument in this chapter is that the romantic adaptation of Bi/dung 
incorporates the idea of the cultivation of a uniquely 'free' and 'moral' society in 
which individuals flourish both independently and interdependently, but always in 
harmonious unity. This goal represents the ultimate scope of Bi/dung and is 
reminiscent of the proposal in the 'Oldest System-Program of German Idealism', 
which presents as a clear testament to the romantic vision for the future of 
humankind. The connection with the idea conveyed in this fragment with respect 
to the cultivation of an 'absolute free being', is a being that exists in a stateless 
condition, one without 'constitution, government' or 'legislation' (Pfau 1988, 
p.154 ). This ideal being will be the only truly authentic moral being, existing 
simultaneously in an ideal (authentic) moral world (community). In this ,truly 
authentic moral world the individual is no longer in need of discipline, not 
socially, not politically and certainly not religiously (or at least not in a 
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conventional way); ultimately the individual exists in a free society constituted by 
free individuals. This idea transpires to a degree from Humboldt's initial theory of 
Bi/dung, where the vision was for a reduction in the power of the State to allow 
the individual ample freedom for an effective and expedited self-cultivation 
toward becoming a good and moral citizen. 
The 'golden age,' which characterises the realisation of 'God's Kingdom on 
Earth', further describes the society of free and moral individuals. The ideal 
society that this characterisation reflects is in fact the 'reality' that holds the 
perfect balance between the ideal and real states; in which, finally, the self no 
longer experiences itself as removed from totality but as perfectly integrated with 
it. Consciousness and nature, the finite and infinite, are here reconciled. 
Curiously however, Novalis presents us with a contradiction: 
For the living being the world becomes more and more 
unending - therefore there can never come an end to the 
connecting of the manifold, a state of inactivity of the thinking 
I - Golden ages might appear - but they do not bring the end of 
things - the goal of the human being is not the golden age - the 
human being should exist eternally and be a beautifully ordered 
individual and endure - this is the tendency of human nature 
(2003, p. 167). 
Clearly, in this passage Novalis is particularly careful to convey a distinction 
between a Golden Age and the enduring goal of human beings; to be a 
'beautifully ordered individual'. However, in other texts, Novalis discusses the 
golden age as a state that is realised through just the kind of discipline required to 
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sustain order, symmetry or balance. Novalis mentions the Golden Age in the 
following passage: 'All representation rests on making present - what is absent 
and so forth [ ... ] Like the assumption, perpetual peace already exists - God is 
among us [ ... ] the Golden Age has arrived - [ ... ]' (2003, p. 144). Indeed in 
another excerpt, Novalis refers to the Golden Age as that to which all ages will be 
elevated (2003, p. 160). Again in the following excerpt Novalis' optimism 
invokes a Golden Age: 'That will be a Golden Age, when all words become -
figurative words - myths [ ... ] when we learn to speak and write with figures -
and learn to perfectly sculpt and make music with words' (2003, p. 206). Perhaps 
we can take the final word on this from Novalis' novel, Henry von Ofterdingen in 
which a young lute player comes onto a scene to sing a song about the: 
' [ ... ] origin of the world, the stars, plants, animals, and men, the 
all-powerful sympathy of nature; the remote age of gold, and its 
rulers love and Poesy; the appearance of hatred and barbarism, 
and their battles with these beneficent goddesses; and finally, the 
future triumph of the latter, the end of affliction, the renovation 
of nature, and the return of an eternal golden age (Novalis 1842, 
p.65 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that the romantic adaptation of Bi/dung represents an 
integration of a soteriology with the romantic notion of a god's kingdom on earth, 
where human beings flourish as a society of free moral beings. Various aspects of 
Bi/dung as moral education of humankind have been discussed revealing once 
more in the respective projects of Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin, a tum to 
poetry for the sake of a philosophical ascesis. Indeed the significance of this 
chapter in relation to the overall thesis is that it has shown how the moral 
education of humankind is an immanent concern for Schlegel, Novalis and 
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Holderlin, in the very midst of the extensive technical work they undertake in 
detailing the philosophical significance of the relationship between poetry and 
philosophy; a relationship regarded as profoundly symbiotic; a relationship 
regarded as giving issue to an equally profound ascesis, an ascesis from which, in 
human terms, the moral maturing of humankind could be wrought. 
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Chapter 7 
NOV ALIS' 'MAGICAL IDEALISM' 
'In the world of the future everything is just as it is in the former world -
and yet everything is utterly different' (Nova/is 2007, p. 34) 
Novalis' Magical Idealism is a concept that appears, at first glance, to contradict 
the effort made thus far to present early German Romanticism as the harmonious 
integration of idealism and realism. That Novalis uses the term 'idealism', could 
be construed as problematic since the very use of the word suggests a favouring of 
idealism over realism. Some navigation of the concept of Magical Idealism is 
required if it is to be understood as in accord with the early German Romantic 
commitment to an eternal and infinite totality in which realism and idealism are 
perceived as unified. Indeed the first task of this chapter is to address the 
conceptual relationship between Magical Idealism and its 'sister' concept, 
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Magical Realism, a concept that Novalis does not develop to anywhere near the 
same extent as Magical Idealism, but nonetheless makes reference to in his 
writings. It is important to draw attention to the fact that Novalis' Magical 
Idealism is not an independent concept but that it is conceived of in relation to its 
particular counterpart, Magical Realism. However, the relationship conforms to 
the 'romantic' principle established previously in this thesis, that binary 
oppositions are aspects of a continuum, or a totality, rather than discrete entities. 
As with poetry and philosophy, Magical Idealism and Magical Realism, are in 
effect, two aspects of the same process, a point that will be clarified further as the 
chapter unfolds. 
The significance of this chapter to the thesis as a whole, is that, following on from 
the kind of moral education investigated in Chapter 6, it looks to Novalis' Magical 
Idealism as an idea that belongs wholly to the age in which humanity is to flourish 
in the epitome of its own ideal moral being. At the core of Novalis' Magical 
Idealism, is the notion of perfect freedom, or what Novalis also refers to as the 
'perfect present', which founds the kind of morality that, in the Schlegel, Novalis 
and Holderlin view, is attained and sustained through an ascetical self-
determination, conceivable only in and through perfect freedom. The notion of the 
'perfect present' is particularly important to Magical Idealism since in its wake, a 
'perfectly free future - and a perfectly free past' exist as reciprocally determined 
(Novalis 2007, p. 198). The significance of the 'perfect present' for Magical 
Idealism is that it provides an interstice or an interruption to what is perceived as 
normal causal sequencing. At this interstice arises an opportunity to invoke, 
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create, or make manifest, an out of conventional causal sequence, event. Novalis 
conceives of the 'perfect present' as a moment in which both past and future 'are 
simultaneously affected - and where both simultaneously effect' (2007, p. 198). 
If, in theory, the nature of the relationship between past and present is reciprocal, 
and likewise the future and the present, then it follows that neither the past nor the 
future exclusively determines the present. If we conceive of a 'perfect present', 
quarantined from the impact of past causes or expected future effects, it is 
conceivable that an out of sequence event, that is, an event not determined by or 
causally connected to either the past or the future, could occur. However, the 
emphasis is on 'could', since such an out of sequence event requires the 
intervention of a powerful intention, which, we will see, is a latent, function of the 
'will'. 
Further to its foundation in a 'perfect present', Magical Idealism is the 
overarching exemplification of the connection between poetry and philosophical 
ascesis. That is, what is essential to Magical Idealism, founded in a 'perfect 
present' is also a harmonious integration of the 'self and reality' or of 'spirit and 
nature. '95 This harmonious integration of self and reality finds its fullest 
expression in and through poetry because the poet, whom Novalis also names the 
'magician' (1997, p. 79), has cultivated a highly refined responsiveness that 
challenges the customary causal connection between events and the function of 
the senses. The refined responsiveness constitutes a renewed sense of possibility 
95 Supporting quotes from Novalis: 'Higher philosophy is concerned with the 
marriage of Nature and Spirit' (2007, p. 8) and 'The whole of Nature must be interwoven 
in a wondrous manner with the entire spirit world' (2007, p. 34). 
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at every instant, a fresh seeing, as it were, through a disciplined and disciplining, 
focused will. 
The strategic contribution of this chapter, then, is to explore how Novalis 
conceives of Magical Idealism, theoretically as that which subscribes to the 
possibility of interrupting the normally expected causal sequence of events. The 
discussion explores what is essential to Magical Idealism, namely freedom, by 
which normal causal sequencing may be superseded and a mastery of the senses, 
by way of the will, may be attained. The discussion will also include an 
exploration of the function of the senses, and a consideration of the significance 
(to Novalis) of the concept 'pure', which represents the 'extra-mechanical' or un-
relational component in freedom, that makes magic (theoretically) possible. 
Finally, the discussion focuses on tbe relationship between Magical Idealism, 
poetry, philosophy and morality, highlighting in particular, the significance of the 
poet as the magician; as the master poet-philosopher. 
Magical Idealism and Magical Realism 
Any adequate examination ofNovalis idea of Magical Idealism, of course, invites 
a contrast with the idea of Magical Realism (which Novalis, albeit in a very 
limited way, also uses). Novalis begins to develop the idea of Magical Realism 
alongside the idea of Magical idealism in Das Allgemeine Brouillon, but does not 
elaborate on the difference except to say that the 'Magical Idealist [ ... ] seeks a 
wondrous movement - a wondrous subject' while 'Magical Realists' seek a 
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'wondrous object - a wondrous figure' (2007, p. 116). Novalis explores this a 
little further and decides that '[b]oth are logical afflictions - types of delusions -
within which nonetheless, the ideal manifests or reflects itself in a twofold manner 
- holy - isolated beings - who wonderfully refract the higher light - Genuine 
prophets' (2007, p. 116).96 
While the above excerpt highlights an obvious distinction between the Magical 
Idealist and the Magical Realist, Novalis' also implies that Magical Idealism, 
nonetheless, already contains the idea of Magical Realism. The basis for this 
argument is the following passage: 
If you are unable to make thoughts indirectly (and fortuitously) 
perceptible, then try the converse, and make external things 
directly perceptible (and at will) - which amounts to saying, if 
you are unable to transform thoughts into external things, then 
transform external things into thoughts. If you are unable to 
make a thought into something independent, something separate 
from yourself - and therefore also something extraneous - that 
is, into an externally occurring soul, then proceed in the opposite 
manner with external things - and transform them into thoughts. 
Both operations are idealistic. Whosoever has both completely in 
his power is a Magical Idealist. 
In the above passage, Novalis describes the domain of the Magical Idealist. It 
includes both the external world (object) and the internal world (subject). The 
96 For an engaging investigatory report concerning the possibility of a connection 
between Novalis' Magical Idealism and the post-modern literary/art movement of 
'magical Realism' (1920s), that also takes into account this particular excerpt, see 
Christopher Warne's article, 'Magical Realism and the Legacy of German Idealism' in 
the Modern Language Review, 101 (2006), pp. 488-498. 
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reason for referring to this passage is, as already stated, to justify the argument 
that the concept of Magical Realism is already contained within the concept of 
Magical Idealism. Indeed, the argument here is that Magical Idealism exemplifies 
the integration of idealism and realism. Indeed, Novalis' Magical Idealism can be 
viewed, in a similar way to Schlegel's formula discussed in Chapter 5, as a 
concept that describes a balanced integration between ideal and real states. 
Moreover, the intention behind the integration is to acknowledge the validity of 
both, but as reciprocally conditioned. There can be no idealism without realism 
and vice versa. 
On this basis, it is reasonable to argue that Magical Idealism seeks, or rather 
embodies, the integration of the 'wondrous subject' and the 'wondrous object', 
which previously had been suggested, are distinct goals of Magical Idealism and 
Magical Realism, respectively. That Novalis alludes to a distinction between 
Magical Idealism and Magical Realism thus does not contradict any previous 
attempt to present the philosophy ofNovalis as seeking the integration of idealism 
and realism because, like the relationship between idealism and realism, or poetry 
and philosophy, Magical Idealism and Magical Realism are ultimately a totality. 
For this reason, Novalis argues that the 'idealist, in order to work directly for 
idealism, must try to prove realism - and conversely' (1997, p. 131). Or, in other 
words the 'proof of realism is idealism - and conversely' (1997, p. 131 ). These 
claims work to amplify not only the reciprocal nature of the particular relationship 
between idealism and realism, but all binary relationships. Also, because Novalis 
does not develop the idea of Magical Realism as a separate doctrine, from here 
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forth, the inquiry is focused only on Magical Idealism. However, the conviction 
that the idea of Magical Realism is implicit within the idea of Magical Idealism 
persists. 
Effecting causality and achieving mastery of the senses, by way of the will 
Stoljar (1997) in her introduction to Novalis' Philosophical Writings identifies 
Magical Idealism as 'the philosophy of the future that is also art, magical in that it 
transcends causation and the senses, ideal since it belongs in the realm of pure 
spirit to which we aspire' (1997, p. 20). In agreement, David W. Wood (2007) in 
his introduction to Novalis' Das Allgemeine Brouillon writes that Magical 
Idealism is Novalis' 'own personal philosophy,' that it is a 'combination of the 
idea of romanticising and an extension of transcendental idealism' (2007, p. xxiii). 
There are two points made in the above claims that need qualification before we 
can proceed with the investigation. Firstly, Magical Idealism is identified above, 
as a philosophy or more precisely as Novalis' 'personal philosophy' - although 
this is a common interpretation97 (and not as such incorrect), it is nonetheless 
misleading. In Das Allgemeine Brouillon, for example, Novalis states 
unequivocally that 'magic is utterly different from philosophy[ ... ] and constitutes 
a world- a science - and art in itself' (2007, p. 23). Moreover, in consideration of 
97 Beiser similarly identifies Novalis' Magical Idealism as a 'personal philosophy' 
(2002, p. 422). 
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the thesis topic and the effort to consistently point to the early German Romantic 
project as one in which totality is sought in and through a harmonious union of 
philosophy and poetry, it is more apt to think of Magical Idealism, as a 'living 
theory of life' that fully embraces this union. 
Secondly, a key feature of Novalis' Magical Idealism identified in the above 
claims by Stoljar and Wood, is the idea of the 'transcendental' which, as has been 
pointed out throughout the thesis, functions not only to define romantic poetry, 
but inspires also Holderlin's attempt at a metaphorical representation of 
'intellectual intuition'. The 'transcendental' however, as this thesis also argues, 
lies in the balance of binary oppositions, not in the 'beyond,' as such, as at least 
the Stoljar representation of Magical Idealism implies (See Introduction, p. 7). For 
this reason it would again be misleading to interpret Magical Idealism as 
specifically about transcending causation and the senses, particularly if the 
meaning of 'transcending' is construed specifically as, to 'go beyond'. While it is 
true that the 'transcendental' in the early German Romantic context, is certainly 
about overcoming limits, including the limits of causality as well as the limits of 
the senses, it is more appropriate, at least in this context, to think of Magical 
Idealism in terms of effecting causality and the senses. In this way, an 
understanding, more consistent with Novalis' extended thinking arises, namely, 
that the conventional laws of causality are breached, or interrupted, rather than 
transcended. This interpretation of what is at issue is significant because it takes 
into consideration a key and necessary component of Magical Idealism, namely 
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the function of the will, which arguably presents as a causal, or 'effecting' 
principle, of a certain kind. 
'Effecting' too is a more apt characterisation of Magical Idealism when we align 
the meaning and function of 'romanticising' with Magical Idealism. We can learn 
quite quickly from Novalis' texts, what he has in mind when we consider the 
analogy, for example, which Novalis uses in the following excerpt: 
The world must be made Romantic. In this way one can find the 
original meaning again. To make Romantic is nothing but a 
qualitative raising to a higher power. In this operation the lower 
self will become one with a better self[ ... ]. By endowing the 
commonplace with a higher meaning, the ordinary with 
mysterious respect, the known with the dignity of the unknown, 
the finite with the appearance of the infinite, I am making it 
Romantic. The operation for the higher, unknown, mystical 
infinite is the converse - this undergoes a logarithmic change 
through this connection - it takes on an ordinary form of 
expression. Romantic philosophy [ ... ]. Raising and lowering by 
turns. (1997, p. 60) 
In this excerpt, Novalis juxtaposes the process that is to romanticise with the 
business of 'romantic philosophy' very much in a manner that exemplifies the 
symbiotic relationship between poetry and philosophy outlined in Chapter l. It is 
conceivable that Magical Idealism similarly embodies the key elements that 
characterise early German Romanticism. As Donehower writes in the introduction 
to The Birth of Novalis: 'Magical Idealism is [ ... ] Hardenberg's attempt to 
articulate an organising concept for early-romantic theory' (2007, p. 9). 
253 I Page 
Donehower further describes the concern of the Magical Idealist to be a 'creative, 
playful sublimation of the ordinary-everyday into the poetic-mythic' (2007, p. 9). 
This interpretation conceives of Magical Idealism as a project that is oriented 
towards elevating the ordinarily perceived status of world, to one that is extra-
ordinary, an elevation that appears to be possible through the process of 
sublimation - a 'raising to a higher power'. Beiser's interpretation is similar when 
he argues that the 'romantics wanted to break outside the confines of our ordinary 
and mundane perception of the world' with the intention to 'develop our power of 
contemplation so that we can see things anew, as they are in themselves and for 
their own sakes, apart from utility and common meaning' (2003, p. 101). Both 
interpretations of romanticising are suggestive of a technique that promotes an 
elevated perspective of world, without actually altering the physicality of that 
world; however, there is another dimension to Magical Idealism that seeks to 
challenge the actual physicality of the world. 
Wood, for example, observes that what Novalis understands by 'magical' 
concerns the 'art of using the sense world at will' (2007, p. xxiv, p. 61). The 
mastery of the senses by way of the will is thus a significant feature of Novalis' 
Magical Idealism. Novalis' argues that the senses, whether we are aware of it or 
not, are the cause of our body. In terms of mastery of the senses, and consequently 
also the mastery of the body, the following excerpt reveals the premise upon 
which Novalis bases the theory that mastery of the senses is possible: 
Is not our body in itself nothing but a common central effect of 
our senses - if we have mastery of our senses - if we are able to 
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transform them into activity at will - to centre them at a common 
point, then it only depends on us - to give ourselves the body we 
want. Indeed, if our senses are nothing other than modifications 
of the mental organ - of the absolute element - then with mastery 
over this element we shall also be able to modify and direct our 
senses as we please (1997, p. 76). 
The logic that Novalis uses can be summarised as follows. Senses give rise to 
body (matter); senses are modifications of the mental organ, therefore the mind 
(mental organ) gives rise to matter. From this logic the following conclusions may 
be drawn: If the mind can be controlled, then the effect of the mind, which in the 
above quote is 'body', can also be controlled. Further, there is no reason why the 
effect of the modification of the senses cannot be extended to the physical world, 
as such. As will be further revealed when discussing the function of the will 
referred to in the above excerpt, Magical Idealism and its functioning is clearly 
based on this hypothesis. But before discussing the significance and function of 
the will it is important to be clear about what the senses, in the Novalis view, 
actually are. 
Novalis advances a theory regarding the senses in the following important and 
revealing excerpt: 
We have two sense systems which, however different they appear 
are yet entwined extremely closely with one another. One system 
is called the body, one the soul. The former is dependent on 
external stimuli, whose essence we call nature or the external 
world. The latter originally is dependent on the essence of inner 
stimuli which we call spirit, or the world of spirits. Usually this 
last system stands in a nexus of association with the other system 
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- and is affected by it. Nevertheless frequent traces of a converse 
relation are to be found, and one soon notices that both systems 
ought actually to stand in a perfect reciprocal relation to one 
another, in which, while each of them is affected by its world, 
they should create harmony, not a monotone. In short, both 
worlds, like both systems, are to create free harmony not or 
monotony. The transition from monotony to harmony certainly 
will pass through disharmony - and only in the end will harmony 
ensue. In the age of magic the body serves the soul, or the world 
of spirits (1997, p. 61 ). 
Novalis' view of the senses thus includes, but is not limited to, the sense organs; 
sight, taste, hearing, speech and touch. In association with the body serving the 
soul, we know for example, that Novalis views the poet as 'truly bereft of his 
senses' and that 'instead everything takes place within him' (1997, p. 162). We 
saw in Chapter 4, how this was a necessary condition for the poet if a truly 
objective poem, and therewith an accurate, that is to say, a balanced or 
harmonious representation of reality, is to emerge. The implication in the above 
suggestion seems to be that the senses are not conducive to achieving objectivity 
and that mastery over them involves, in this case at least, a neutralising, or 
sublimation, of their subjective or personal effect. The poet still sees, hears and 
feels, but is directed now by the 'inner senses', or, taking into consideration the 
excerpt above, the poet is directed by the 'soul' system, to which the sensory 
system of the body, becomes dependent. Effects of the external senses, such as 
sight, smell, touch and sound, are thus sublimated and subjective conclusions 
about the world are avoided. Novalis notes that the 'poet orders, combines, 
chooses, invents' but 'even to himself it is incomprehensible why it is just so and 
not otherwise' (1997, p. 163). In other words, the poet, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
puts his (or her) personal sensory apparatus aside, and gives himself (or herself) 
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over to the poetic process, guided by his (or her) inner senses, which we now 
know are constitutive of, in Novalis' view, the soul, analogous also to 'the world 
of spirits'. 
Throughout Das Allgemeine Brouillon, Novalis identifies a number of senses, 
apart from the basic five, that are identifiable as belonging to or effects of the 
'soul' or 'world of spirits'. Some of these have been cited previously in reference 
to the imagination (Chapter 1), and include the memory, noted as a direct and 
positive sense, the intellect as an indirect and therefore negative sense and the 
imagination itself, described as 'simultaneously an (outward) direct sense, and an 
(inward) indirect sense' (2007, p. 48). We can add to this list the 'sense for poetry' 
(1997, p. 162), the 'sense for mysticism' (1997, p. 162) and the 'moral sense', 
which Novalis views also as the, 
[ ... ] sense for existence [ ... ] the sense for unity - the sense for 
the highest - the sense for the freely chosen, and innovative, and 
yet communal life - and Being - the sense for the thing in itself -
the sense of divination. Divining, to perceive something without 
cause or contact (2007, p. 10). 
With the above expanded understanding of what the senses are in the Novalis 
view, it becomes clearer why Novalis would contemplate their mastery, 
particularly when considering also the ambition for the moral education of 
humankind, which is dependent on the moral sense, just outlined. Novalis thus 
argues that the 'increase and training of the senses[ ... ] belongs among the central 
problems for the improvement of the human race, for raising mankind to a higher 
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level' (2007, p. 64). A significant aspect of the improvement involves making the 
senses, like the imagination, simultaneously direct and indirect. Mastery of the 
senses ultimately means making our senses more than tendencies in the manner 
just described, but resolutions or realisations of what the respective tendencies 
represent. In other words, the mastery of the senses, both inner and outer, body 
and soul, culminate in an ascesis within which, for example, the 'moral sense' will 
be replaced by morality, or moral being, itself, or where the sense for harmony or 
the sense for unity, is realised as actual harmony and unity. Harmony, unity and 
morality thus become 'performance indicators', as it were, and if they are 
inconsistently present within the expression of 'being', we can be sure that mastery 
of the senses has not yet been attained. Physiologically, mastery of the sense 
organs, we may assume, is achieved simultaneously. One would expect, for 
example, that a highly refined moral sense is reflected in the external senses and 
vice versa. 
The 'will' as pivotal to Magical Idealism 
Wood introduces the concept of the will and the significance it bears for Magical 
Idealism when he makes a correlation between 'magical' and the 'art of using the 
sense world at will'. To support Wood's claim, several passages in Novalis' texts, 
including the one just discussed, may be cited. For example, Novalis will argue 
'[i]f one only wills, then one can' (2003, p. 134). Further, in an effort to set a goal 
for Magical Idealism, Novalis argues that, '[m]an must control his nature and 
secure right mastery for the individual in himself - mastery of the will is proper to 
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him - and the submission of the senses' (2003, p. 158).98 The following passage 
even more explicitly, illustrates Novalis' understanding of what the will is 
capable, once mastered: 
[ ... ] everyone will be his own doctor - and will be able to feel 
his body in a complete, sure and exact way. Then for the first 
time the human being will be truly independent of nature, 
perhaps even in a position to restore lost limbs, to kill himself 
merely by will, and thereby achieve for the first time true insight 
into the body - mind - world, life - death and the world of 
spirits. Perhaps then it will only rest with him to quicken inert 
matter. He will compel his senses to produce for him the shape 
he demands - and he will be able to live in his world in the truest 
sense. Then he will be capable of separating himself from his 
body - if he finds it good to do so. He will see, hear - and feel, 
how and in whichever combination he will' (1997, p. 75). 
In this case, mastery of the senses by way of the will involves intending the mind 
to exert power over matter and particularly, the sense organs. Herewith one is able 
to create, or 'produce' a 'world' at will.99 However, even though the above 
98 Novalis makes this point in a move that at the same time seeks to distinguish 
male from female and present them each as binary oppositions by characterising each 
according to their particular strengths. In this context then, the use of the word 'man' 
refers to the masculine and does not necessarily represent humankind. Novalis' view is 
that 'woman must obey nature' and that her 'sensation must determine her will' (2003, p. 
158). For man it is of course the other way around, in that he must make will the master 
of the sensation. This idea appears to contradict the idea that the mastery of the will is a 
possibility for all of humankind. However, Novalis also declares that man and woman 
have a 'singular root' (2003, p.158), and so in light of the thesis so far, man and woman 
belong to the same thing - humankind. It is therefore quite reasonable to argue that the 
mastery of the will ultimately belongs to humankind, period. 
99 Novalis prefers the use of the expression 'world' over the expression 'matter' 
Novalis argues that '[i]nstead of matter as such I would use the expression 'world' (2007, 
p. 218). 
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excerpt alludes to the materialisation of objects (such as limbs), if we scrutinise 
more carefully Novalis' view of what is at stake, we will see that the command of 
the senses and the creation of the world at will, is not limited to the manifestation 
of material objects. Indeed the world is an all encompassing sphere, to which the 
mind itself belongs, and, to which it contributes. While Novalis will argue that 
'[t]he world is to be as I will it' (1997, p. 63) and that 'the will is nothing but the 
magical, powerful capacity for thought' (1997, p. 136), the world cannot be an 
object of the mind. Just as the poet is integral to the poem, so too is the mind 
integral to the world. Indeed, there is no meaningful separation between mind and 
world in terms of discrete objects, when we consider them fully as an integrated 
unity. This point is substantiated by Novalis when he argues that '[w]e shall 
understand the world when we understand ourselves because we and it are integral 
halves' (1997, p. 61). 
Novalis observes further that we 'seek the design of the world' but that 'we are 
this design ourselves. What are we? Personified all-powerful points' (1997, p. 58). 
There is no doubt then that Novalis understands that we have a capacity for 
manipulating the world and that this is the domain of Magical Idealism. However, 
that this is done at will requires an understanding that the self and world are 
integrated. Indeed the awareness of our capacity for magic can only come from 
understanding ourselves as truly integrated, which includes an understanding of 
how 'we are related to all parts of the universe,' says Novalis (1997, p. 40). 
260 I Page 
Importantly, Novalis argues, 'the universe is a complete analogue of the human 
being in body, mind and spirit' and that through 'the modification of my body, I 
modify my world for my self' (1997, p. 118). Effectively this means that what 
ever we do, including thinking, impacts on the totality, by virtue of the fact that 
we are integral to it. In other words, anything we do, say or think contributes to 
the shaping of this totality. Indeed, in this quote, the suggestion is that we need 
not attempt to modify the world as such, for the world is modified in accord with 
the modification of our personal body. Novalis argues that 'I neither ought nor 
want to act on the world - for that I have the body' (1997, p. 118). However, for 
the most part, we are not aware of how our activities, let alone our thoughts, affect 
the totality, for it is not always immediately obvious. Yet if we follow Novalis' 
thinking then we are in some manner not only causally connected to the world of 
which we are part, but causally co-responsible for it, whether we are consciously 
aware of it, or not. 
Novalis develops this view into an argument that supports the possibility of 
affecting the world with a conscious intentionality. To this end, Novalis insists 
that 'the foundation of creation lies in the will' and that 'the power of faith is the 
will' and out of the application of faith a world 'gradually arises' (2007, p. 92). 
This is because the will, Novalis argues further is 'without doubt the polarising 
power' (2007, p. 31). 
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This last claim suggests that the will might function in a similar way to Fichte's 
Absolute, whereby the Absolute posits itself in opposition to itself - an act that 
precipitates the emergence of a world. However, for the will to be able to operate 
in this way, it must operate from an independent space, that is to say, a space of 
pure freedom. The will itself, is not necessarily free, for it is prone to being 
conditioned by external influences or internal inclinations (Novalis 2007, p. 5). 
What Novalis seeks, is for the will to be independent, for only as independent, can 
it emerge and function fully as the kind of will that is capable of creating and 
being in control of the senses, in the manner Novalis envisages. 
In the bigger scheme of things, however, one must question how Novalis deals 
with the idea of competing and conflicting wills. For example, if there are strong 
intentions from various individual 'mind' localities, but the intentions are 
incongruous, which intentions predominate? Is it possible that one person's will 
impedes the will of another, even though equal intentional strength is applied? If it 
can, then Novalis' theory appears flawed. 
However if we persist with Novalis' argument a little further, we can see that he 
has attempted to deal with just this type of objection. For example, Novalis makes 
the claim that '[e]very individual will is a function of every other will' (2007, p. 
I 09). If we follow this line of thinking then the idea of competing or conflicting 
wills is not an issue, since each individual will functionally relates to every other 
will. While we cannot at this stage draw definite conclusions about what Novalis 
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means precisely, we can at least say this, that Novalis' thinking reveals the 
significance of an interconnectedness of minds, akin to Schlegel's mirror model of 
reflection which was in Chapter 2 likened to 'Indra's Net'. We can therefore 
understand at least the aspect of the claim that suggests that there is no exercise of 
will which is exclusive to an individual. 
Following Novalis' argument further, much depends on whether we are at 'one 
with our self' which Novalis argues is the 'highest end - or to Be, or to be free' 
(2003, p. 164). Further, Novalis argues that '[w]here a person places his reality, 
what he fixes upon, that is his god, his world, his everything' (2003 p. 132) and 
that '[h]uman beings can become anything that they reflect upon, or that they 
resolve[ ... ]' (2003, p. 132). 
Novalis' Magical Idealism thus taps into an aspect of the will of which for the 
most part, human beings are ignorant, or at least, inattentive. Moreover, while 
Novalis speculates that such ignorance might be a 'prerequisite for our morality', 
he suggests that '[w]e are only ignorant, because we want to be so' (2003, p. 54). 
Thus in the Novalis view if we want to change ignorance to knowledge, we have 
the capacity to do so. Whatever the state of the world, it is how it is because we 
have (at least in a collective sense) willed it, whether we are aware of it or not. 
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Purity and freedom - essential to Magical Idealism 
The concept 'pure' is similar to the early German Romantic concept of 'freedom' 
insofar as it too describes an unconditioned state, a state that is unindebted to 
either the past or the future, or any other effects or influences including the effects 
of the senses. However, Novalis in his 'Fichte Studies', argues that the 'concept 
pure is [ ... ] an empty concept, to which no intuition corresponds - a concept that 
is neither possible nor actual, nor necessary [ ... ] (2003, p. 77). This is because 
'pure', Novalis argues further, is 'neither related nor relatable' (2003, p. 77). Yet, 
as we will see, the concept pure belongs in a significant way, to the sphere of 
Magical Idealism, for only in and through this 'state', if we can call it that, can we 
possibly conceive of Magical Idealism as disrupting or affecting causality. Indeed, 
the talent to 'raise to a higher level', which is analogous to seeing 'the thing in 
itself' (Novalis, 1997, p. 10) relies on the talent to recognise it purely, which in 
tum requires that the 'thing' is seen as profoundly particular - but 'neither related 
nor relatable'. Of course, this sits uncomfortably with the romantic notion of 
integration and interconnectedness, where all is related and relatable within the 
context of a totality; the whole thing, life, is, as has been consistently argued, a 
continuum. On the other hand, we know also that the early German Romantics 
work with the idea that all aspects of a totality are in themselves, in a microcosmic 
way, a totality, and indeed the macrocosmic whole is reflected in the microcosmic 
particular, just as the particular is reflected in the whole. In any case, Novalis' 
Magical Idealism, points to the 'in between', the 'transcendental or the 'interstice' 
as this thesis has identified it previously, of the integrated harmony of a unified 
whole. However, to be able to conceive of an 'in-between' or a transcendental 
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space, depends on the concept of a unified and integrated whole. Indeed, there can 
be no separation where there is no unification, just as there cannot be unification 
where there is no separation. 
Novalis thus argues that '[a] pure thought - a pure image, - a pure sensation, are 
thoughts, images and sensations that have not been aroused by a corresponding 
object etc. but have originated outside so-called mechanical laws - outside the 
sphere of mechanics' (2007, p. 152). We can suppose that the 'sphere of 
mechanics' is the sphere of causality, the sphere within which a world unfolds. To 
challenge the limits of this causal sphere is to contradict the power of mechanical 
laws through pure thinking, pure acting and pure sensing that are free of this 
causal sphere, or at least preclude this causal sphere from being the exclusive 
determinant of what is, or may be, actualised in the universe. 
Concerning the 'extramechanical,' Novalis nominates 'fantasy' to be 'an 
extramechanical force of this kind' (2007, p. 152). As was illustrated in Chapter 5, 
fantasy is a key element in Schlegel's formula, but what we saw was that it 
functioned optimally in its reciprocal relation with mimesis and sentimentality. 
Novalis adds that the imagination works as an effecting principle and that in 
working with memory, the imagination gives rise to fantasy, a key element in 
poetry that works to 'represent that which cannot be represented' (1997, p. 162). 
Novalis further argues that the 'imagination is the marvellous sense that can 
replace all senses for us' and that if 'the senses seem to be entirely governed by 
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mechanical laws - then the imagination is obviously not bound to the present and 
to contact with external stimuli' (1997, p. 118). This being the case, it is the 
imagination which, as Novalis suggests is controlled by the will (1997, p. 118), 
that works within the extra-mechanical sphere, itself unaffected by causality, past 
or future, or the senses, but can, nonetheless, create or instigate a deviation from 
the normal and mechanical sequencing of events. The capacity to create in this 
way is however dependent on freedom. Indeed Novalis argues that the 'capacity 
to be free' is in fact 'the productive imagination' (2003, p. 164). 
We can see then why the idea of 'purity' or 'freedom' is essential to Magical 
Idealism, for without it, we are bound by an endless series of causal connections. 
The possibility to interrupt such a series depends on being free to do so. 
Exploring the significance of the connection between Magical Idealism, 
poetry, philosophy and morality. 
Novalis tells us that 'in order to become truly moral, we must endeavour to 
become magicians' (2007, p. 9). We know from the previous chapter that in the 
Schlegel and Novalis view, ideal being is the ultimate goal for humankind. 
Indeed, as Novalis argues, 'morality must be the core of our existence' and that its 
'end, its origin, must be the ideal of being' (2003, p. 165). It follows then that 
Magical Idealism must also hold morality at its core. 
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Novalis proceeds also to argue that: 
All knowledge should produce morality - the moral drive, the 
drive toward freedom occasion knowledge. To be free is the 
tendency of the I - the capacity to be free is the productive 
imagination. - Harmony is the condition of its activity - of 
oscillating between opposites. Being one with yourself is thus 
the fundamental condition of the highest end - to Be, or to be 
free (2003, p. 164). 
The conditions listed here relate, in some form or another, to Magical Idealism. In 
particular, the capacity to be free, which Novalis argues is the productive 
imagination, is, as discussed above, essential to Magical Idealism. The Magical 
Idealism Novalis espouses, embraces freedom, as in the 'pure' freedom discussed 
in the previous section, in order to allow immediacy between the apprehended and 
the mind that apprehends; in other words, freedom allows immediacy between 
subject and object. Thus, to be one with oneself, is to be cradled in the 
harmonious balance between oneself as subject and oneself as object. What this 
condition of harmony exemplifies is ideal being, that is to say, true moral being. 
How does this condition relate to poetry? 
In the introduction to this thesis it was mentioned that the early German Romantic 
view regarding the moral education of humankind relies on the premise that the 
poet is already a 'truly moral person' (Novalis 1997, p. 57). It was further 
suggested that the poet is 'the transcendental physician' and poetry is 'the great 
art of the construction of transcendental health' and 'mixes everything together 
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for the sake of its great purpose of all purposes - the elevation of the human being 
above himself (Novalis 1997, p. 56). For this reason, the poet, in the Novalis 
view is in essence, a magician, and as we have seen in Chapter 4, this requires a 
willingness to overcome the barrier of personal subjectivity for the sake of 
objectivity. Objectivity operates like freedom in that it allows 'the thing in itself', 
if we can put it that way, to emerge. 
Novalis envisages that Magical Idealism belongs to the sphere of ideal moral 
being; the significance of the poet and hence poetry, is thus to facilitate the 
development of ideal moral being in and through the processes integral to Magical 
Idealism. Already poetry, in its literal form, provides a space in which Magical 
Idealism may be realised in and through the 'magic' of poetic language. As has 
been argued throughout the thesis, the problem of the separation of subject and 
object can be worked out, in the Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin view, within the 
structures of poetry. It is in this way that poetry can be the teacher of humanity, 
insofar as learning how to exist in harmony as ideal moral beings, is concerned. 
Poetry can give us an experience of unity, in which the self and reality are 
integrated, and from within the profound philosophical ascesis, toward ideal moral 
being, the life of Magical Idealism, as in Novalis' 'living theory of life' (1997, p. 
52), is enabled to arise. To this end, Novalis suggests that there exists 'no genuine 
distinction between theory and practice' (2007, p. 135). Indeed, Novalis' idea of 
the 'living theory of life' is an idea that represents the embodiment of theory in 
the living form. Indeed, the evolved philosopher-poet for Novalis is one who 'sees 
suddenly that the problem is already solved by his existence - and that 
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consciousness of the laws of his existence is knowledge kat exochen [ ... ]' (1997, 
p. 52). Kat exochen is ancient Greek for 'pre-eminence' suggesting that finally, 
knowledge is superior, in that romantic elevated sense, exemplified in the actual 
being of human life itself. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to look at Novalis' attempt to imagine what underpins the 
mature nature of the individual who is the product of the kind of moral education 
investigated in Chapter 6. Such an individual is the 'magician'; the one from 
within whom 'ideal being' has emerged and the one from whom the view of the 
'Magical Idealist' can be seen. For Novalis the poet is the 'magician' and 
exemplifies 'magical idealism' and thereby the mature relationship between poetry 
and philosophy which yields a profound philosophical ascesis. Novalis' Magical 
Idealism embodies the possibility of making things happen, so to speak, by 
interrupting the normally perceived causational mechanism that supports a world. 
Novalis' Magical Idealism is imbued with the idea that a will, which works with 
pure freedom is able to make manifest determinations of its own choosing, 
without conventional causal connections. But, while intervening with the 
conventional causal mechanism, Magical Idealism is nonetheless itself a principle 
of causation and it has therefore been necessary to rethink, to a degree, what other 
Scholars (Stoljar for example) have argued, that Magical Idealism is about 
transcending causation. This chapter, on the contrary, argues that Magical 
Idealism is better viewed as a theory that supports the possibility of producing a 
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causal event o~her than by that event being an effect of a conventionally 
established previous causal event. 
This chapter has sought, then, to present the theory of Magical Idealism in a 
manner consistent with the fragments of thought through which Novalis sought to 
directly express its meaning and also through a correlation of those direct thoughts 
with the many complimenting thoughts which recur throughout his (and other of 
the early German Romantics) broader romantic project. Magical Idealism is 
especially significant to a deeper understanding of the relationship between poetry 
and philosophical ascesis, especially when one considers how the arising of 'pure' 
freedom is essential to being ideally moral, and also that the 'magician' of Magical 
Idealism, is the culmination of the poet-philosopher, through whose mode of 
engagement with the world, liberation from the limits of conventional thinking 
and acting is able to arise. 
270 I Page 
ONCLUSION 
The main contention of this thesis has been that in the theoretical work of 
Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin, there is a common and broadly developed 
spectrum of perspectives that argues the significance of poetry and philosophy to 
each other, and also the philosophical significance of their union. Schlegel, 
Novalis and Holderlin hold that this significance is profound and broad ranging 
and is founded on the recognition of what (this thesis argues) is a symbiotic 
relationship between the modes of thinking usually regarded as philosophic and 
those usually regarded as poetic. Furthermore, the philosophic work of Schlegel, 
Novalis and Holderlin which extensively scrutinises this relationship between the 
poetic and the philosophic, implicitly reveals that this symbiosis between poetry 
and philosophy culminates in a cognitive unfolding which this thesis argues is a 
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special kind of philosophical ascesis. The essence of the ascesis in question is 
such that it reaches its zenith when subject and object merge into an integrated 
cognitive totality. Although there are subtle differences between the kinds of 
methods and responses each thinker articulates, this thesis has argued that the 
common objective of all three thinkers is to deal with the problem of subjectivity, 
that is to say, the unity of subject and object, which is, at the same time, an 
analogue for the unity of all binary oppositions, within the structures of poetry. In 
virtue of this, it is quite fitting, then, to view the common project of Schlegel, 
Novalis and Holderlin, particularly during the early German romantic period, in 
terms of 'poetry and philosophical ascesis '. 
The significance of this thesis is that it brings into focus an aspect of the 
philosophical and poetic intent of Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin that has not 
previously been argued in such specific terms in contemporary philosophical 
discourse. Moreover, this thesis also argues that this specific focus shared by all 
three thinkers, constitutes an important pioneering attempt at an integration of 
cognitive processes that have been traditionally viewed as incompatible, in terms 
of collaboration towards a common objective. The integration of these processes 
in the Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin view, exemplifies a synthesis deemed 
necessary to ensure that the differentiating function in consciousness (i.e. the 
subject/object relation), from which awareness of a world arises, could be 
resolved into a meaningful cognitive unity. Importantly, Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin view the synthesis as a way forward also from a philosophical impasse 
between two dominant perspectives - idealism and realism. 
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The synthesis of poetic and philosophical processes offers a means by which to 
elevate epistemic, ontological and by extension, ethical awareness. It is the 
profound expediency of this means as we have seen, that reveals the relationship 
between poetry and philosophy to be symbiotic. Moreover, Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin argue that this synthesis is most importantly for the moral education of 
humankind which is envisioned by them, to culminate in the ideal of being. 
The evaluation of the respective theories and methods of Schlegel, Novalis and 
Holderlin, has identified a consistent and common commitment to embrace a 
symbiosis of poetry and philosophy. Particularly as represented in Chapter 1, this 
symbiosis is advanced as a genuine heuristic response to the limits inherent in 
both philosophy and poetry, when pursued separately. The thesis has further 
identified that a high level of discipline and rigour is required in order to achieve 
the kinds of elucidations of and solutions to, philosophical problems that Schlegel, 
Novalis and Holderlin seek to attain. In particular, the problem of self-
consciousness (subjectivity) and the unknowability of that which sustains it, plus 
the moral education of humankind towards 'ideal being,' are paramount concerns 
common to all three thinkers; the most penetrative engagement with which can 
only be progressed in and through a concentrated effort of the combined 'powers'. 
The methodology, which is precisely the harmonious and balanced combining of 
powers, thus belongs in an essential way to the philosophical ascesis that this 
thesis argues is at issue. Indeed as we have seen, the ascesis ultimately consists in 
the integration of both means and end because the means to arrive at an integrated 
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totality is given momentum only through an actual achievement of integrating 
totality. 
In Chapter 6, Schlegel is quoted as saying 'just let Bi/dung do its work'. This, one 
could argue, exemplifies the ultimate poetic gesture, from the depth of Being 
itself. Of course, this gesture, would then have to be grounded by philosophy, but 
in such a way that the gesture and the grounding are aspects of the same totality, 
in much the same way as the relationship between 'grounding' and 'inventing' 
was structured in Chapter 1. Philosophical articulation and poetic creation -
understanding and intuition - these together make a whole. 
The theme of this thesis 'poetry and philosophical ascesis' is of course one that 
deserves further exploration, not only in philosophical discourse but in other 
disciplines such as literature and art, as well. It is however already the case, that 
any engagement with Schlegel, Novalis and Holderlin, whether it be from the 
perspective of aesthetics, literature or philosophy, cannot avoid but engage also 
with the philosophical aspirations of these three thinkers. Similarly, to do justice 
to the philosophical aspirations underpinning the project, philosophical discourse 
needs to extend its investigation of the means by which philosophically significant 
cognition can be developed beyond the product achievable through conventional 
analytic methodologies. 
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Finally, the limits of this thesis exemplify the limits of conventional philosophic 
investigation in general, in that it deals only with the theoretical elements of the 
project and is limited to an analytic exploration of how this theory is actually at 
work within poetry itself. However, even before such a venture is achievable, 
further work needs to be done in articulating even more comprehensively what the 
philosophical issues are, and in particular, in developing an understanding of their 
significance for contemporary philosophical discourses. 
Further philosophical exploration of some of the core issues discussed in this 
thesis, including the theme 'poetry and philosophical ascesis' itself, would be 
valuable, since by no means is the investigation complete. What comes to mind in 
particular is Novalis' Magical Idealism, an idea that he did not himself have the 
opportunity to fully develop, but one that portrays already an advanced 
perspicuity into challenging cognitive limits when maintaining tension between 
notions of the 'ideal' and the 'real'. Indeed each topic including Holderlin's tonal 
theory and Schlegel's formula, because they are inherently complex theories, 
would benefit from additional investigation and presentation. 
It is hoped that the work of this thesis contributes to the recent work countering 
the earlier philosophical treatment of the early German Romantics which clearly 
undervalued their philosophical significance. It is also to be hoped that the thesis 
goes some way to acknowledging, in philosophically credible terms, the 
innovative and ambitious nature of the project undertaken by Schlegel, Novalis 
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and Holderlin during early German Romantic period of German philosophy. The 
thesis at least makes a contribution to contemporary scholarship in this area and it 
could quietly claim to have modestly illumined some of the key methods and 
modes of thinking that made the revolutionary tum to poetry in the late eighteenth 
century, a significant tum, not just in the history of German philosophy between 
Kant and Hegel, but for its own sake and for what it may offer philosophic and 
poetic scholarship of the future. 
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